Mr. Perry to Mr. Seward
Sir: Tour instruction No. 107, of the 22d August, relative to the controversy between Spain and Chili, reached me at San Sebastian, where the Spanish court Was temporarily residing, on the evening of the 7 th instant.
I immediately sought an interview with Mr. Bermudez de Castro, and the next morning made this the subject of an informal conference at his residence at that city. I showed to Mr. Bermudez de Castro the motives for regret which the United States would experience if this affair should not be amicably settled, and made known your opinion as to all existing controversies between European and American states. Without repeating my own phrases, I will say that Mr. Bermudez concurred fully with the United States as to the nature of the relations proper to be maintained between the states of Europe and those of America.
Mr. Bermudez said, however, that Chili had wantonly insulted the Spanish flag, and Spain, with a powerful fleet in those seag, could not ignore those acts and withdraw, leaving things in that condition.
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I asked him if Spain denied the war with Chili, or whether she only wished to obtain certain demands from Chili, and if so whether she would be satisfied to obtain what she asked by any other means than war.
Mr. Bermudez said that Spain did not desire war with Chili, nor with any of the states on the Pacific; had no ill will, no spite, no sentiment of any kind to gratify by war, and no ambitious projects; but she wished merely to secure for her flag that respect which he was confident the flags of other nations did receive from Chili, and without which the amicable relations between Spain and Chili could not be maintained.
He then went over the causes of complaint, saying, among other things, that the flag of the Spanish legation had been publicly and grossly insulted by a crowd of people at Santiago de Chili, in the presence of a battalion of militia in uniform, drawn up under their officers in the street opposite the legation, who witnessed the outrage and remained quietly marking time to music, without offering any opposition whatever.
I am without authentic information as to the facts of this case, except such as Mr. Bermudez has given me. He mentioned also the fitting out and departure of a body of volunteers from Chili to make war against Spain in Peru; also, the refusal of coals and provisions to the veseels-of-war of Spain in Chilian ports, under the pretence of neutrality, when in fact there was no war in which to be neutral. I then said I supposed there was no doubt that the sympathies of the people, and perhaps of the government of Chili, had been entirely on the side of Peru during the recent controversy between Spain and Peru, but I did not suppose Spain would think of calling any American people to account for [Page 559] their sympathies against herself in the Peruvian affair no more than she expected to be called to account for the sympathies of Spaniards against the government of the United States and in favor of our southern rebels in the recent civil war. He must indeed be aware, from the experience of this government itself, how different it was when such sympathies are strong in favor of one or the other contending parties to prevent their offensive manifestation, and how easy it is to make up a list of grievances if the party not favored should be disposed to take offence.
Our own relations with her Majesty’s government were eminently friendly, but I could call to mind, if so disposed, (which I was not,) scenes and occurrences in Spain herself which would afford as good cause of complaint by the United States against Spain as any he thought it so necessary for Spain to resent in Chili, except, perhaps, the public insult to the Spanish flag at Santiago, if that had in fact occurred as stated. But the United States gave credit to the government of Spain for a desire to maintain friendly relations, and for honest efforts to prevent injustice being done to the government and people of the United States by all parties within the Spanish jurisdiction, and though the execution of this purpose had not always been perfect, and sometimes quite imperfect, yet the United States had not shown themselves disposed to take the government of Spain to task for things which were undoubtedly more or less beyond their control.
I could not suppose that the honor of Spain really required her to take any other attitude towards Chili, but, on the contrary, I did think that a policy of forbearance, even if there had been just cause of complaint, would be both more honorable and more profitable for Spain.
I hoped that Mr. Bermudez would not fall into the error of estimating the capacity of the American republics to withstand aggression by the number of their vessels, or their battalions, or the state of their finances.
Spain had herself just had the experience of San Domingo; France had found occupation for 50,000 men and a considerable fleet in Mexico, though the battalions of this republic were certainly not numerous, and those of San Domingo hardly merited the name.
Mr. Bermudez de Castro interrupted me to say yes, but that I was answering myself. In San Domingo Spain had attempted to take permanent possession of the country, and in Mexico the French had set up an emperor; but there was no such project in this case, and Spain would not be tempted into any such policy in the Pacific ocean. She would not be lured into another San Domingo affair any where, nor would she meddle with the form of any government nor with any insurrection. Spain did not wish to exercise any special influence even, in any of those countries. But the Queen’s government did intend that the Spanish flag should be respected and the Spanish nation and subjects treated with the same courtesy which was due to the flag and subjects of all foreign nations, and which he believed was actually accorded in Chili to France, and England, and the United States, but which had been and still was denied to Spain. If Chili would not do that, Spain intended to punish her. Admiral Pareja was ordered not to make a long matter of it, but to first exhaust every effort to settle the controversy peaceably, and then, if that should be found impossible, to strike Chili hard, and chastise her till she should be willing to treat Spain as she treated other foreign nations.
I said that the United States did not call in question the perfect right of Spain to make war for such an object, but I did believe the object stated by Mr. Bermudez could be obtained without the war, and if it could, it certainly ought to be so obtained. 1 gave Chili the credit of being a reasonable government, and, though popular feeling had been much excited there in consequence of the proceedings of Spain in seizing the Chincha islands, which excitement was very natural and commendable under the circumstances, still, since that main controversy [Page 560] had happily been settled with Peru without war, I hoped the smaller questions which grew out of it would be peaceably settled also. I could not suppose Chili desired anything else, and had no doubt the Chilian government would listen willingly to any representations which the United States might think proper to make at Santiago with a view to peace. I was convinced that Spain also ought to treat this question in a spirit of conciliation.
I did not mean to offer the mediation of the United States; certainly not then; but I did invite Mr. Bermudez de Castro informally to consider whether the United States might not be of some service to arrange this business.
Mr. Bermudez said he should be very glad if this affair could be settled without war, and he was confident the United States could do much to bring about such a result, but he was afraid we were altogether too laie to take any efficient action. Before the result of anything we could do here would be known in Chili, Admiral Pareja would either have settled the business peaceably or commenced hostilities under his instructions (reported to you in No. 214 of July 23.) Mr. Bermudez supposed that he would get those instructions on the 12th or 13th instant, and that the admiral would lose no time in fulfilling them.
I remarked, however, that those instructions, as I understood, only authorized him to undertake at first a blockade of the Chilian ports, to be followed later by other acts of war, in case the blockade should not be found sufficient to procure a settlement.
Mr. Bermudez said that was so, and I then added that this might give time for the influence of the United States to be exerted at Santiago, if we should come promptly to an understanding here. Mr. Bermudez said that the Spanish opposition newspapers and political parties would immediately accuse the Queen’s government of having yielded to the influence of the United States in a question of national honor, and they would also say that whatever was conceded by Chili had been yielded to the United States, but not to Spain.
I then told him I did not see the necessity of putting the friendly offices of the United States for the sake of peace into any diplomatic formula having a special name, nor of giving them any prominence which would afford ground for commentaries in the public press. I neither offered the mediation of the United States, nor would he either accept or decline such mediation. I would not formalize any offer of the good offices of the United States, but if Mr. Bermudez would tell me what Spain was willing to concede for the sake of a peaceful settlement, and what she meant to insist upon at any cost, I should be able to form my own opinion as to the probability of a peaceful settlement, and whether the government at Washington would probably endeavor to persuade Chili to accede to such terms on the part of Spain.
Mr. Bermudez had no difficulty in telling me frankly what Spain would do, and proposed that I should put into writing the substance of what I wanted, and he would consider the matter and reply; if we should arrive at nothing definite, the notes on both sides should be withdrawn and destroyed.
I said that I thought we could better treat this subject entirely in verbal conference, and that if he wished to consult his colleagues in the government I would call on him again the next day. Meantime I had no objection to furnish him personally and confidentially with a memorandum of my instructions on this subject, which he might use as he saw fit under the proper reserve. I then took leave.
On the next day (9th instant) the court and ministers were occupied with the visit of the Emperor of France. I saw Mr. Bermudez a moment, and put into his hands a copy of your instructions (No. 107, of August 22) without address, date, or signature, and agreed that we should meet again the succeeding day at ten o’clock in the morning. On calling as arranged, I found Mr. Bermudez had been obliged to go to Biarritz, where the French court was residing, so that it was not until the morning of the 11th instant that our conference was resumed. [Page 561] It will not be necessary to repeat the conversation at this interview. The result was, that the Spanish demands being reduced to the terms of settlement reported to you in my despatch, No. 218, of the same day, (September 11,) I, on my side, did not hesitate to say that I considered those terms reasonable, and I had little doubt they would be so considered by Mr. Seward and the President. Though I could not presume to anticipate the action of my government, nor had I any authority to promise anything, still I imagined that on the receipt of the despatch which I should immediately address to Mr. Seward, the President would not hesitate to instruct the American minister in Chili to use his influence to persuade that government to accept those terms of settlement on their side, and thus to close this controversy without bloodshed by the peaceful exchange of national salutes, as before reported. I begged Mr. Bermudez de Castro, therefore, to write immediately to Admiral Pareja to suspend hostilities for a time sufficient for my despatch to be received at Washington, and for the instructions which I hoped would be sent to Santiago to arrive and exert their influence.
He said that he could not countermand the instructions under which Admiral Pareja would probably be already acting. I said, no; but those hostilities which we supposed might have already begun before a new instruction to Admiral Pareja could reach him, would be limited at first to a blockade.
What I requested was that this preliminary state of blockade, if it existed, should be prolonged without any more active or vigorous act of war on the part of Spain until the result of the influence I hoped the minister of the United States at Santiago would exert could be known.
I did not promise anything, but I considered there was good ground to expect such action, and good reason to suppose that such counsel as the President of the United States might see fit to address to Chili would engage the serious attention of that government. At any rate, Spain would lose nothing in the estimation of the world by deferring the shedding of blood whilst there was a reasonable hope of a peaceful settlement.
The blockade was already a measure of vigor on the part of Spain, and its prolongation at my request was, under the circumstances, the least he could do as a mark of consideration to the United States, while it in no way prejudiced the question in debate with Chili, and might prove to be fruitful of excellent results.
Mr. Bermudez de Castro yielded to these considerations, and promised to write, as requested, to Admiral Pareja without loss of time. I then took leave, and immediately wrote the despatch No. 218, of 11th instant, communicating to you this result.
The Queen and ministers of war and of state left San Sebastian the same afternoon to visit the French court at Birraitz, and on the following day the court started on its progress back through the towns of old Castile, arriving at the royal residence of San Yldefonso on the 17th instant.
Thus I did not again see Mr. Bermudez de Castro for business till the 16th instant, at his ministerial department in Madrid. This interview and its results, again prolonging the time for commencing active hostilities in the Pacific, was reported to you in despatch No. 219 of the same day, and I expressed at that time my conviction that nothing more could be done here than what had been done, and left all future steps in this business to the decision of your better judgment. But I may be permitted to state my own impressions.
Without going into the merits of this controversy, nor attempting to decide whether the acts of discourtesy in the streets of Santiago, complained of by Spain, constituted a national insult or not, I do think that since Spain believes that her flag was there wantonly insulted, that fact is itself sufficient reason why the government of Chili ought to be willing to show now, by an act [Page 562] of courtesy customary in such cases, that no national insult was then intended or would be sustained now by that government; especially since what Spain proposes is an interchange of salutes, she herself saluting the flag of Chili as soon as the proof that her own is respected by Chili is received; and this impression, I confess, is strengthened by other considerations.
It is beyond question that the government and people of Chili did feel (as they had a perfect right to feel) great irritationagainst Spain and great sympathy with Peru during the recent controversy between these two powers. But the series of public acts complained of by Spain, (among which the refusal of the Chilian authorities to permit the customary hospitality to Spanish national vessels in their ports,) though called by Chili neutral acts, since Peru did not at any time recognize a state of war between herself and Spain, and finally settled her controversy without war, became and were simply unfriendly acts on the part of Chili towards Spain.
That is the true definition; and in making it I do not mean to criticise those acts of Chili, nor much less the very natural feelings which prompted them; but it is proper thus to recognize the precise state of the facts as between Chili and Spain at the moment when the controversy between Peru and Spain was at last happily settled without war.
Thus it was soon evident that a settlement must be made also between Chili and Spain.
But now that Spain, for the sake of peace, has retired from all points of her complaints and demands against Chili, save one; agreed to forego her claim for indemnity of her damages by the sudden refusal of coals and provisions to her ships, and to overlook other unfriendly acts by Chili, asking only an act of courtesy to the Spanish flag, to be replied to by a similar courtesy on her own part to the flag of Chili, I am of opinion that it would not be reasonable on the part of Chili to refuse such terms of settlement.
That government, however, is its own arbiter; and if it elects war under such circumstances, I trust at least that you will hold this legation free of all responsibility.
With sentiments of the highest respect, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.