Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward
Sir: I have but a few minutes left before the closing of the mail to give you the result of a conversation which I held this afternoon with Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys upon topics which have formed a feature in several of your recent despatches.
After disposing of some business which is referred to in another communication to forward by this mail, I said to his excellency, in substance, that it was now generally conceded by witnesses more impartial than any American could be expected to be, that the war which has been raging in my country was drawing to its close, and that peace and order were destined to be restored, sooner or later, to the whole and undivided United States; that between the present moment and the realization of that auspicious state of things, the friendly powers who had conceded to the domestic enemies of the United States belligerent rights would be obliged to withdraw them, it not being consistent with relations of amity between two nations that either should encourage rebellion in the territory of the other, by perpetuating a concession of belligerent rights, after the motives for making it had practically ceased. I went on to say that it was the part of good statesmanship, as of good surgery, to heal a wound so as to leave no scar; that from one cause and another the traditional friendship of my country people for France had become somewhat chilled, and though it was not for me to say when the government of France ought to withdraw the declaration conceding belligerent rights to the American insurgents, I did feel prepared to say that if the imperial government could furnish any evidence of its friendship to the United States as intelligible to my country people as that which had begun to weaken their doubts of it, it would be highly politic to do so as soon as possible.
I then referred his excellency to a suggestion which I had the honor to make at a previous interview, from which I thought he might extract the opportunity required. If the Emperor would refuse belligerent rights or asylum to vessels built and equipped in violation of the municipal laws of the country from which they take their departure, I felt persuaded it would be regarded, not only as the establishment of a sound and prudent principle of international law, but go very fat towards removing impressions in regard to the feelings of Franco towards my country, of which the press wa3 only a too faithful exponent. I suggested that this proposal did not involve any modification of the Emperor’s declaration of September, 1861, and added such other considerations as I thought deserved to commend it to his excellency’s attention.
[Page 246]His excellency replied, that so long as the war lasted, that is, so long as our government encountered serious resistance by land or water, France could not be expected to treat our adversaries merely as disorderly persons, but the moment the contest degenerated into what he called “small war,” (petite guerré) it would be no longer war proper, and there would be no farther question of belligerent rights of neutrality.
He then went on to say that he had observed in the United States and in responsible quarters evidence of an echanfeiment against France, which he thought was without provocation, and which, if indulged or encouraged, might lead to unhappy (facheuses) results; that France had taken no side in our controversy, whatever absurd stories had been propagated to the contrary; and his excellency here referred with some warmth to newspaper allegations about the late duke of Sonora. “Throughout the war,” he said, “we have endeavored to treat the United States as a whole, and to avoid any act which looked towards a recognition of any part rather than the whole of the country. We have tried to be prepared for whatever fate was in store for the country, as the result of this war, disposed to accept what Heaven should send as, on the whole, best for the country, but without any disposition to anticipate nor control that result in any way whatever. That has been and will continue to be the position of France towards the United States.” “If,” said he, “you come to-morrow and inform me that peace has been concluded, I shall be happy to felicitate you. It would seem from your papers that your arms are prospered, but until you have crushed your adversaries we cannot deny to them the rights of belligerents.”
His excellency then went on to say, in reference to my suggestion about denying belligerent privileges and asylum to vessels equipped in violation of municipal law, that that was a subject upon which he could not give an answer at once. It involved intricate questions of law and required reflection and study. It occurred to him, he said, that there might be some difficulty in ascertaining whether a vessel-of-war had violated the municipal law of a foreign country. I replied that I did not propose that the government should be at the trouble of procuring the proof, but that it should designate the kind of papers an armed vessel should be required to furnish in proof of her lawful and innocent character. I said that I urged the matter less for a protection against any damages the rebels may be able to do us than as evidence of the friendly disposition of his government. I added that the occasion for invoking such a rule would probably cease very soon, while the good effects of the demonstration at the present moment would endure for ages.
His excellency seemed disposed to take the subject into serious consideration, repeated that it required study and reflection, and promised to bestow both upon it.
In the progress of his excellency’s remarks I found occasion to state that circumstances have certainly occurred to excuse a portion of the irritation betrayed by my country people towards France, and I referred particularly to the two years of anxigus suspense in which we were kept in regard to the ultimate destination of the vessels contracted for by Arman for the confederates. “If,” said I, “after the distinct pledge of your excellency to Mr. Dayton, one of these vessels is permitted to leave France, and passes straight into the hands of our enemies, as the Stonewall did, your excellency knows how difficult it is to satisfy the people of the United States that France has not been, to say the least, more indifferent than a friendly power should be about the damages which may result from her depredations.” “For this reason,” I said, “I had labored according to my means, both before and since I had been brought into official relations with his excellency, to have France remove every appearance of responsibility for the machinations of the rebels in France, and hence my earnest desire that the imperial government might take some step similar to [Page 247] what I bad already suggested to prove to the universal intelligence of my country people its friendly disposition towards them.”
When our conversation, of which, I think, I have given the spirit, had reached this point, I mentioned that I had just received a despatch from you, which treated upon some of the points referred to in our conversation, and, though not instructed to do so, I was at liberty to read it, and felt disposed to do so if his excellency was interested to hear it. He said, of course, that he would be very glad to hear anything from you, and I proceeded to read your despatch of the 27th February.
I may here mention, parenthetically, that in the progress of our conversation, and in reply to his reproaches against the irritating tone and imputations of our press and public men, I said that with us everybody’s most idle thought and casual impression might find expression in one way or another through the press; but I ventured to affirm that his excellency had no complaints to make of the government proper. “No” he replied, “our relations with your government have been very well. Mr. Seward has always been very amiable and considerate.” But he went on to deprecate the possible consequences of a public sentiment so prompt as that shadowed forth by the press of the United States to seize upon and misconstrue the motives of the Emperor’s government.
When I had finished reading your despatch he thanked me again for reading it, repeated substantially what he had said before, and nearly in the same language, about the attitude France had taken, and deemed it her duty to maintain towards the United States, insisting very emphatically that his government has never had relations with any fraction of our country, and that he sincerely desired such a termination of our trouble as might best conduce to our general prosperity.
In respect to the instructions to be given to M. Chateaurenard, he seemed disposed to treat that suggestion as gratuitous. He thought it did not become France to turn harshly upon the confederates now in their hour of disaster, and that, he said, France would not do; but when the war ended he hoped and expected to find the attitude of his government towards the United States the same as before the war.
This, though a very condensed and imperfect report of our conversation, which lasted nearly an hour, gives, I believe, the spirit of it faithfully. Much as it is condensed, I fear you will find it too long; but as it was conducted in a very friendly spirit, and covered a variety of topics which have not been before discussed between us, I have felt it my duty to reproduce it as fully as I could.
I am, sir, with great respect, your very obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.