Mr. Burnley to Mr. Seward

Sir: I have received the instructions of her Majesty’s government to communicate to the United States government copies, herewith enclosed, of Sir Rutherford Alcock’s despatches on the late events in Japan.

Her Majesty’s government having considered these despatches, has signified to Sir R. Alcock, in the despatch of which I beg also to enclose a copy, her Majesty’s gracious approval of his conduct.

As regards the future policy to be observed in dealing with the Japanese government, her Majesty’s government think it advisable to await the result of the negotiations which, at the date of Sir R. Alcock’s despatches, were still in progress between the representatives of the treaty powers and the ministers of the Tycoon, and perhaps the arrival of Sir R. Alcock in England, which may be expected in a few weeks, before taking any definitive decision on the subject; but in the meanwhile her Majesty’s representative in Japan will be apprised with reference to Sir R. Alcock’s despatch No. 63, of the 28th of September, that her Majesty’s government are willing to renounce any money payment on account of the forbearance shown by the allied troops in dealing with the town of Simonsoaki, and on account of the expenses of the expedition against the Prince of Nagato, if greater or equal advantages can be secured by stipulations to be obtained from the Tycoon or the Mikado.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

J. HUME BURNLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

[Page 24]

Earl Russell to Sir R. Alcock

Sir: Your despatch of the 28th of December is a successful vindication of the policy you have pursued.

My despatches of the.26th of July were written with a view to discourage the interruption of a progressive trade by acts of hostility, and to forbid recourse to force while the treaty was generally observed. These despatches you will understand remain in full force. But the documents you have sent me, which arrived by the last mail, show that the silk trade was almost wholly interrupted by the Tycoon, who seemed to be preparing to abet or to abandon the project of driving out foreigners according to the boldness or the timidity of our demeanor. In this position there could be no better course than to punish and disarm the Daimio Prince of Nagata. That course had these three separate advantages:

1. It gave the best promise of concurrence of the four powers, as France, Holland and the United States had all been sufferers from the Prince of Choshin’s violation of treaty, while we were most exposed to risk and loss by any Japanese attack on Yokohama.

2. It involved proceeding only against a rebellious vassal, and not against the Mikado or the Tycoon.

3. If the operation should prove successful, the four powers were under no obligation to undertake fun her hostilities, unless fresh provocation should be received.

Her Majesty’s government have received with great satisfaction the account of the naval operations of the four squadrons, and their result, contained in your despatch No. 60. Those operations were conducted in the most gallant manner, the loss was not considerable, the four powers acted in harmony together, no defenceless city suffered during the hostilities, and the terms granted to the offending Daimio were moderate towards him and sufficient for us.

I have only to add, that I am commanded to express to you her Majesty’s full approbation of your conduct.

I am, sir,

RUSSELL.

Sir R. Alcock, K. C. B., &c., &c., &c.