Mr. Motley to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of despatches Nos. 51, 52, 53, 54, the latter containing certificate for Baron Bothmer.
In my last I expressed the opinion that a war of some kind was imminent. Since then hostilities on a considerable scale have commenced in the Danish Peninsula, it would be idle for me to make any allusion to the military events as they succeed each other, which the public prints bring to you almost as soon as they are made known in Vienna; but I may renew the assertion often made in this correspondence, that never did a belligerent make war so unwillingly as does the government of Austria at this moment.
Thus far the campaign is a kind of political and military paradox. War is waged in order to prevent war. The enemy’s territory is invaded for the sake of preserving it from dismemberment. Fire and sword are carried into the very heart of Denmark, to save Denmark from national extinction. The treaty of 1852, establishing the succession, is recognized as sacred by the war-making powers, while at the same time the question of the succession to Holstein is reserved. The Bund troops enter Holstein to compel Christian IX, as member of the Bund to execute its laws, while at the same time his claim to be a member of the Bund, is disputed, and his representative excluded from the Diet at Frankfort. Moreover, we learn to-day that the expedition undertaken by Austria and Prussia against the vote of the majority of the Bund, with the definite purpose of seizing Schleswig as a pledge of the revocation of the November constitution, and the fulfilment of the stipulations of 1851, has proceeded to invade Jutland, which has no more to do with the Schleswig-Holstein dispute than Iceland has.
There are explanations of all these apparent inconsistencies, no doubt, which are more or less satisfactory, according to the point from which they are judged; and I suppose, too, that there can be no doubt that Denmark has signally violated its own engagements, in regard to both Schleswig and Holstein, that its rule in those duchies has been for years characterized by systematic injustice and oppression towards the German population, and that, sustained by the idea of the necessity of its national existence to the most important powers of Europe, it has reckoned on an impunity, which is now at an end.
As to the immediate future, so far as this government is concerned, it is certain that the object is still to localize the war, and to confine it to the Danish peninsula. The great powers of Germany wish a little war; Denmark, on the other hand, naturally wishes a great war. This policy is so obvious as to need no comment. Of course, Denmark, without the assistance of Prance or England, or both, must be destroyed in the war to the knife on which she is resolved. But she thinks herself more likely to obtain that assistance by the boldest demeanor, and by the most desperate resistance, while, on the other hand, by a vacillating policy and a further submission to the demands of the enemy, she considers her destruction as certain. The personal union between the kingdom and the duchies, which might have been obtained yesterday from Prussia and Austria, she considers as equivalent to dismemberment. Indeed, such a union as existed between England and Hanover before the accession of the present Queen of England, would hardly seem to imply much additional strength to either of the realms united under the sceptre of one and the same sovereign.
The question, whether the invasion of Jutland, on the one hand, and the vigorous defence of the Düppel forts and Alsen, with the establishment of a [Page 145] blockade by Denmark of the German ports, on the other, will suffice to bring England and France into the field, must now soon be settled.
It seems certain that the object of England is to avert war—still more certainly is this the desire of Austria. No power in the world has so much to gain by peace and to lose by a general European conflict as this empire. The words Gallicia, Venice, Hungary, are sufficient guarantees in themselves for its pacific intentions. On the east, west, north and south, open or secret enemies are ever lying in wait to take advantage of any hostilities on a great scale in which Austria may be involved.
I was present during the whole of the important and interesting debate which occupied the Reichsrath, four days long, at the close of last month, and was much struck by the eloquent and masterly manner in which the discussion was conducted, both by the ministers and their adherents, and the opposition. No one who witnessed those forensic encounters could doubt the capacity of the Austrian nation for a full, constitutional, and parliamentary life. But although the ministers obtained the majority, it must be admitted, I think, that no party is thoroughly satisfied with the character of the war. The liberals suspect the Prussian alliance, repudiate the London treaty, and plant openly the standard of the Augustenburger. The extreme conservatives, on the other hand, look with dissatisfaction upon the waste of blood and of treasure for the protection of oppressed nationalities by a power which is itself composed of so many distinct nationalities, and all of them very apt to raise the cry of oppression, and feel the inconsistency at this moment of employing, as Austria is now doing, Polish, Italian, and Hungarian regiments in Denmark, to rescue the oppressed Germans of Schleswig-Holstein.
There is an uneasy feeling prevailing all classes of society that the empire is drifting into a general and very dangerous war without a clearly defined object. The attempt to avert a great war by making a little one is thought by many to be a hazardous experiment.
Austria, therefore, is, in good faith, I think, desirous of peace, but may not be taking the best means of arriving at such a consummation. The policy of Prussia is mysterious, and excites, whether with reason or not, much uneasiness and suspicion.
The probable attitude of England and France, now that Jutland has been invaded, and the blockade formally declared by Denmark, excites a general alarm. It is not my province to speculate as to the ultimate position of those powers. England certainly wishes peace; but it wishes Denmark to exist, and it is useless to deny that that existence is more imperilled every day. England would be excessively endangered in its commercial and general interests by a European war, and it can hardly desire to reap the harvest which so many Englishmen have been so lavishly sowing during its period of neutrality. Its conscience may suggest that there may be noble-minded merchants as ready to build swift-going Alabamas on one side of the Atlantic as the other, in defiance of international law, and of every precept of morality, and that the flag of Wurtemberg or Baden may be as convenient a standard for neutrals to burn and plunder unarmed trading vessels under as that of the slaveholders’ confederacy. It may be feared, too, that the United States may be as slow as the English government has been to prevent such crimes on the part of its citizens.
In brief, there is a prevailing impression that Denmark is sincerely desirous of localizing the war; and while England is desirous of avoiding all participation in it, the ambition of Prussia, the determination of Denmark to defend what it considers its rights, and the irresistible force of events, may bring about a general conflict before the summer is over. I confess I do not exactly see the road by which diplomacy will be able to bring the nations back again to peace, while all seem just now to be travelling on the path that leads to war.
[Page 146]I transmit herewith a translation of the Emperor’s speech at the closing of the Austrian Reichsrath.
I have the honor to remain, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.