Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part IV

Mr. Motley to Mr. Seward.

No. 45.]

Legation of the United States, Vienna, January 23, 1864.

Sir: It is of course impossible for me to communicate any news to you in regard to the current history of Europe. The telegraph and the post inform you of the events as they rapidly succeed each other, and it only remains for me from time to time to furnish such commentaries as may help to elucidate the present and the immediate future so far as my opportunities allow. I see nothing to alter the opinion which I have for some time expressed in this correspondence, that a war of some kind in Europe is imminent and almost inevitable.

As you have doubtless observed, the Diet at Frankfort, by a decisive majority, rejected the Austrian-Prussian motion for taking possession of the duchy of Schleswig in pledge for the enforcement of the stipulations entered into by Denmark, as alleged by the two great German powers in 1851, upon which the London treaty of 1852, as is asserted, was subsequently founded.

The majority of the Diet which voted against Austria and Prussia were in favor of much more stringent measures against Denmark, and were disposed to proceed at once to occupy Schleswig, with the hardly concealed intention of severing that duchy as well as Holstein from all connexion with the Danish kingdom. Had Austria and Prussia submitted to the will of the majority of the Bund, the result would have been the formal proclamation of the Duke of Augustenburg as legitimate sovereign of both duchies, and his instalment by the whole power of the Bund.

But Austria and Prussia, holding to the London treaty, refused to submit to the majority, on the ground that the Bund by its proposed course of action was about to exceed the powers conferred upon it by its constitution, and they announced the resolution to take the matter into their own hands.

The demand upon the royal government at Copenhagen to revoke the November constitution within forty-eight hours was then made by Austria and Prussia.

The answer was couched in courteous and conciliatory terms, and represented that it was impossible for the Danish government within the term assigned to comply with the demand.

Certainly, unless constitutional government in Europe be a sorry farce, it would be difficult to see how a king and his cabinet could revoke a constitution in the manner proposed.

A convocation of the legislative bodies, and an understanding to propose certain constitutional changes within a reasonable time, were, it seems, not considered admissible. Nothing but the trampling of the new constitution under foot by the monarch who had just signed it, would satisfy the peremptory claim of the two great German powers.

The King refused to make the suggested coup d’etat, and 50,000 Austrians and Prussians are now on the march to the Eider. The Danish minister at this court received his recall yesterday. The Austrian and Prussian ministers at Copenhagen have already been recalled.

It is calculated that by the 6th of February the Austrian-Prussian army will be in position to commence operations. A formal ultimatum will then be sent in, and on its refusal, which I take to be certain, the Dannewerk will be attacked. Whether England or any other power will come to the rescue or not, must soon be decided.

Strenuous efforts will be made by European diplomacy to arrange the quarrel during the brief interval which must elapse before the commencement of hostilities; but unless that diplomacy is infinitely more successful than it has been on any occasion during the past year, in any field, these efforts will be fruitless. Meantime the thaw which has commenced, after a frost of unexampled severity and duration in this part of Europe, has extended to the Danish regions. The Dannewerk, if the present milder weather lasts, cannot be turned, but must be assaulted in front, and unless I have been misinformed, the Danes will make a most desperate resistance.

War once commenced, it is supposed that Austria and Prussia may consider themselves no longer bound by a treaty, which the sword has already cut asunder. It is hoped by these powers to localize the war, and keep it within moderate dimensions; but I can hardly believe that Denmark will be left to fight single-handed.

At the same time, while the rest of Europe looks on with dissatisfaction, to say the least, at the aggressive attitude of Austria and Prussia, the other states of Germany are discontented that so little is to be done against Denmark.

You will have observed that the Prussian Chamber of Deputies has refused, by a vote of 275 to 51, the loan required by the government to carry on its military operations.

It is not my province nor my purpose at this moment to go into any details in regard to the long-standing conflict between the Prussian ministry and the legislative body, but it is certain that the majority of the Chamber would be desirous of a common action of the whole Bund against Denmark, for the sake of definitely dismembering that state, and placing both duchies under the Duke of Augustenburg. What the vote in the Austrian Reichsrath may be upon the proposed ten-million florin loan for the expenses of the Schleswig-Holstein expedition is doubtful.

To judge by the language of the report of the committee on the loan, an adverse vote seems very possible. I append to this despatch, and recommend to your attention, a few extracts from this document, which appeared in some of the yesterday morning’s papers of Vienna. They paint the situation very clearly, and will show the opinion of a large portion of the German people on the subject.

As explanation of the intense and widespread excitement throughout the German people upon the German-Holstein matter, it should always be kept in mind that it is really the German democracy which, more or less disguised, is making itself felt throughout these proceedings. The national Verein, the assembly of German deputies, the national central committee, the popular mass meetings, the popular ballads—these are the machinery through which the spirit of German democracy is working and pushing on the governments of the middle and smaller states in the movements in favor of Schleswig and Holstein.

It is this democratic movement which Austria and Prussia are opposing. “You lay down the principle,” said Minister Van Bismark the other day to the opposition majority, in the Prussian House of Deputies, “that Prussia is to sink or to become a domain of the national Verein.” “The lesser German states,” said War Minister Van Roon, in the same debate, “have tried to escape from the legitimate influences of the two German great powers, through fear of some phantoms orother. These phantoms were not called up by the minister resident, but by the party which you (of the left) represent.” Of course, the question of questions is, how long England can help coming to the assistance of Denmark? This question must soon be solved, for Denmark unaided must cease to exist. But, so far as I can learn, Denmark has no intention of yielding without a bloody struggle.

The Austrian government is aware that at this moment its proceedings are unpopular both in Austria itself and in the rest of Germany, while they are looked upon with resentment and distrust by the other powers of Europe. At the same time Austria sighs for peace, and neither government nor people have a doubt that in peace alone is their only hope of prosperity. But the government believes that by its present course it is likely to insure the ultimate gratitude of Germany, and to solve the Danish-German problem with the least possible amount of bloodshed.

How this result is to be obtained, I confess I do not clearly understand. Even if the two powers succeed in occupying Schleswig, after overpowering the resistance of the Danes, I do hot see that the settlement is very near, or likely to be very satisfactory.

I have the honor to remain, sir, your obedient servant,

J. LOTHROP MOTLEY.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.

[Translation, to accompany despatch No. 45.]

Extracts from the report of the 1st section of the Finance Committee of the Austrian House of Deputies concerning the supplemental credit of ten million florins for defraying the cost of the Bund execution in Holstein-Lauenburg, published in the Botschafter, of January 23, 1864.

“In regard to the community of operations with Prussia, there were on both sides binding stipulations entered into, the communication of which has been refused on the part of the government.

* * * * * *

“The committee cannot find any happily-chosen measure in the whole course of the imperial government in regard to the operations against Schleswig; for there exists, according to the documents before us, no harmony in an affair of the highest importance for the German Bund, with the resolution of the German Bund assembly, and in consequence of this a lamentable difference between Austria as first German Bund power and the Bund threatens to arise, the extent and bearing of which are not to be overlooked. Yet it is, according to the documents before us, difficult to deny that Austria, in its present proceedings, is not wishing not to make valid a justifiable position of its own as a European great power, but that, according to its motions and declarations in the Bund assembly of its intention to interfere only for protection of the rights and dignity of Germany, she is acting as a German power in deed, but without the will of the legitimate organ of Germany, and that she is thus, in common with Prussia, effectually exercising an unjustifiable guardianship over the rest of Germany.

“The occupation of Schleswig is, moreover, under existing circumstances, equal to the beginning of a war against Denmark, and must impose at once severe burdens on the empire, for which neither material recompense nor preponderating remuneration in moral or political effects can be looked for, and it may increase immeasurably our financial calamities. The imperial government intends, indeed, by its proceedings to localize the danger of war to the conflict with Denmark, and through the sacrifices necessary to this end to avoid the still more severe misfortune of a general war which, in consequence of the position taken up by a portion of the German Bund states, might take place. Nevertheless there are neither fixed points of reliance (anhalts pückte) that the resolutions of the Bund assembly are leading to a general conflagration, nor sufficient guarantees that the proceedings of Austria and Prussia, in their remoter consequences, are not actually leading to an actual intervention of foreign nations; and at all events, if that be true which the imperial government has hitherto given as grounds of so high a military budget, that the protection of the boundaries of Austria partly requires warlike preparations even in peace, then the action of Austria in the north is affording only a welcome assistance to manifold hostile attempts against her boundaries.

“Austria has need of peace to its material palingenesis (wiedergehust) and to the strengthening and development of her constitution, and all her races are uniting in the wish, not without pressing necessity, to allow the calamities of war to be poured over them. Repeatedly has the House of Deputies declared that Austria should keep on the defensive, and only follow the policy of its interests, and the imperial government has repeatedly declared that only this standpoint shall henceforth be its guiding one. Now, however, an aggressive war is begun by Austria, and really not in the interests of Austria.

“To all this is to be added, that in the whole attitude of the imperial government in this question, that uncertainty of aim is again found which, as a peculiarity so fraught with consequences, has manifested itself in all European questions of the most recent times.

“Shall the integrity of Denmark give the limitation, or shall the legitimate rights of sovereignty in the Elbe duchies be the appointed factor? Shall the fulfilment of Bund duties, in accordance with treaties, direct Austria, or the mere political connivance with interests of another nature? Neither of these two purposes has thus far been decisively indicated or firmly maintained, and only one thing seems clear, that the imperial government is giving to another government for the attainment of its’ aims in the region of internal policy a virtual, even if an involuntary assistance.”