Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part II
Mr. Pruyn to Mr. Seward
Sir: In my despatch (No. 15) of the 10th ultimo I informed you of a demand made by the British government for reparation for the murders of June and September last, and enclosed you a copy of the letter which her Britannic Majesty’s chargé d’affaires sent me a few days after he had read me the note he was preparing to address to the Japanese government.
Since that time a correspondence has taken place between the British chargé d’affaires and myself. I hasten to enclose copies, as follows:
No. 1. Colonel Neale to Mr. Pruyn.
No. 2. Memorandum of meeting held at the British legation in Yokohama.
No. 3. Mr. Pruyn to Colonel Neale.
No. 4. Colonel Neale to Mr. Pruyn.
No. 5. Colonel Neale to Mr. Pruyn.
No. 6. Memorandum, to provide for the safety of foreign residents at Yokohama.
No. 7. Mr. Pruyn to Colonel Neale. No. 8. Mr. Pruyn to Colonel Neale.
I submit these letters without remark, hoping that nothing will be found in those written by myself which the President will disapprove.
I have felt from the outset that the course of the British government has been a most extraordinary one. No one can deny that the occurrence of September, however unfortunate, was purely accidental. It is conceded that under the same circumstances a Japanese would have been killed. It is likewise conceded that the nationality of none of the parties attacked was known. Indeed, the governor of Kanagawa despatched a messenger that evening to our consul, under the impression that one of the wounded men was an American.
And yet I have strongly urged a compliance with the demand, though I view it with feelings I shall not permit myself to express.
I have also pointed out the danger of the demand being withdrawn, and largely increased if not promptly complied with, sums being demanded to meet the expenses of the fleet and for damages to business sustained by merchants.
Failing success in this, I shall recommend the Japanese government to propose submitting the whole case for settlement to the President of the United States or the Emperor of Russia, or both, or even to the British government.
If the demand must be complied with without modification or even discussion, as the British minister declares, results of the most deplorable character may follow. No country is so susceptible of defence as this. There are no roads for [Page 1080] artillery. The whole country is intersected by ditches and canals, and covered by rice fields. The people, or rather the two-sworded men, are as reckless of life as any people that ever existed, and no hostile force can hold any considerable portion of this empire without the sacrifice of thousands of lives and millions of money.
A ship leaves for San Francisco on the 5th instant. I shall inform you if anything decisive meanwhile occurs.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.
[Enclosure No. 1.]
Sir: I do myself the honor to transmit for your information the copy of a memorandum which I have addressed to her Britannic Majesty’s consul at this port with a view to its circulation among British residents. I have likewise instructed her Majesty’s consul to communicate the same to his colleagues, the consuls of all other foreign states.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
General Pruyn, Resident Minister of the United States in Japan.
[Enclosure No. 2.]
Memorandum.
A meeting was held at the British legation this day, the 16th April, 1863, of the following authorities, viz:
Rear-Admiral Kuper; Colonel Neale, her Britannic Majesty’s chargé d’affaires; Captain Massot, commanding his Imperial Majesty’s ship-of-war Dupleix, (representing also his excellency Monsieur Duchesne de Bellecourt, minister plenipotentiary of France, absent from ill health;) Captain Cosembroot, commanding his Netherlands Majesty’s naval forces in Japan; Captain Brine, royal engineers.
The object of the meeting was stated, and understood to be to elicit the opinion of the naval authorities respecting the degree of protection which could be afforded by the ships-of-war available to the foreign residents at Yokohama, in the event of the settlement being seriously threatened.
After due deliberation and discussion, it was decided that there was not a sufficient force at present in Japan to guarantee perfect security to the foreign community at Yokohama in the event of an attack in force by the Japanese.
British residents at Yokohama are therefore individually advised to adopt such measures for their security as may be in their power before the 26th instant, so as to be prepared for the contingency of hostilities being entered upon.
Arrangements will be made by the officers commanding ships-of-war in this port, in conjunction with the guards on shore, to render all possible assistance in case of alarm, and the details of which will be communicated in due course.
[Page 1081]A copy of this memorandum will be transmitted through her Majesty’s consul to the consuls of friendly states for the information of the subjects of their respective nations residing within this settlement.
[Enclosure No. 3.]
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 7th, and also letter of the 17th instant, enclosing memorandum of a meeting held at her Britannic Majesty’s legation the day before.
Although confined to my bed by sickness, and subject to intense spasms of pain, such as I never experienced before, I hasten to make a few remarks for your consideration.
I regret to see that at this late day Rear-Admiral Kuper and the naval officers of France and the Netherlands now in command at Yokohama have come to the conclusion that the means at their command are insufficient for the protection and defence of that settlement, as from your communication of the 7th instant, in which you say “that Admiral Kuper will concert with the diplomatic agents and naval commanders,” &c., an impression was certainly conveyed of an entirely different character.
I sincerely regret that no notice or invitation to assist at that meeting was given to me, as the diplomatic representative of the United States, as I would then have had an opportunity of explaining my views more fully. Such an opportunity not having been afforded me, I have to say, if it be now intended that it is impossible to afford protection in the event of an unprovoked attack on the settlement, that I have no observation to offer, as in such a contingency the attack must be met and resisted with the means at hand; but I do not believe it at all likely that such attack will be made.
But if, as I suppose, you refer to hostilities which may ensue at the expiration of the time noted by you, in consequence of the refusal of the Japanese government to accede to the demands you have been instructed to make, and of measures being resorted to to enforce these demands, then I feel it my duty to say that it is probable that this people, like all Oriental nations, have an exaggerated idea of their own strength; any temporary advantage which they might gain would probably arouse the whole country, and deprive us of advantages which we have now secured, and which we could never regain except by the expenditure of life and treasure of infinitely more value than those advantages.
It appears to me, therefore, the dictate of wisdom, that no coercive measures be resorted to by any power, unless ample means be at hand for the defence and protection of life and property at the settlement.
The memorandum communicated to all the foreign consuls for the information of foreign residents must necessarily be known to the Japanese, and may be regarded by them as a declaration of weakness, as well as an invitation to attack.
It appears to me, further, that such of the treaty powers as have a valuable commerce with this country, and citizens and subjects residing here, who have made large investments, should desire to avoid establishing a precedent which may lead at some future time to great loss of life and property.
[Page 1082]What is now done by Great Britain while there is a powerful fleet in these seas may hereafter be attempted by some one of the treaty powers with a force wholly inadequate for the protection of residents.
I shall be pleased to learn that these views, thus hastily submitted, are substantially in accordance with your own already arrived at.
I have been induced to submit them for your consideration in consequence of our peculiar relations with this government, which will always be inclined to regard the treaty powers as one, and not be able to discriminate between them in the event of hostilities, and because the United States and Great Britain, having the largest commerce here, and the largest interests at stake, are most concerned in the preservation of peaceful relations.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
[Enclosure No. 4.]
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 18th instant, which reached me at a late hour the same evening.
I hasten in the first place to express the hope that you are recovering from the indisposition from which I was sorry to find you were suffering when you wrote.
Allow me to assure you that I have read with much attention the observations you have addressed to me respecting the serious situation of affairs at present existing between the government of her Britannic Majesty and the government of this country.
Before entering upon the particular points of your despatch, I must beg leave to remind you that in the matters at present at issue, I am acting under explicit instructions which have been furnished to me by my government after due consideration of all the contingent circumstances which might attend a peremptory demand for reparation arising out of unrequited outrages committed upon British subjects.
The execution of those instructions is, therefore, on my part a paramount and imperative duty.
I would next take leave to say that the general tenor of your views regarding the present situation of affairs, though doubtless applicable and just when regarded in the sole light in which you have presented them, namely, that of commercial interests—those views, in my humble opinion, are wholly inapplicable when weighed in the balance against the offended dignity of a great nation.
No nation more frankly, loyally, and assiduously watches over, and administers to, the interests of its subjects abroad and at home than Great Britain; but there is a point when the absolute necessity for punishing the defiant and offensive course often pursued by semi-barbarous states must and should override and suspend all such considerations.
Entertaining these sentiments, which I had hoped were equally participated by yourself, I had come to the conclusion that, had you deemed it to be your duty to take a friendly or intervening part at all in the preliminary stages of the existing differences, you would have joined your remonstrances with my own addressed to the offending government of Japan, with a view of discouraging its unwarantable course of action.
But so far from there existing any perceptible results out of the identity of interests, as you justly observe should exist, between the subjects of her Britannic Majesty and citizens of the United States in Japan, tending to [Page 1083] demonstrate to the Japanese especially, in the present critical situation of affairs, a mutual sympathy between the subjects and citizens of two nations having the largest commercial interests in this country, it is, on the contrary, a most regretable and notable fact that in this serious crisis, verging towards a rupture of relations and hostilities, the Japanese government actually derive their supply of arms through the active agency of merchants and traders of the United States established in this country.
Current reports proclaim a still more active agency on the part of United States citizens in behalf of Japanese—preparations for resistance, which, if they were subjected to proof, would ill accord with the spirit of the conjoint action and policy suggested by Mr. Seward to the British representative at Washington in December, 1861, and communicated to her Britannic Majesty’s government, on which occasion he specially proposed that the powers which had treaties with Japan should make a joint demonstration in support of their rights.
The right which her Majesty’s government at present most justly insist upon is that of obtaining reparation and redress for barbarous outrages committed upon British subjects, and all appeals for which have hitherto been treated with indifference and disregard.
In conclusion, permit me, with reference to that part of your despatch in which you refer to the circumstances of my having omitted to request your presence at a meeting which took place at my residence on the 16th instant, to offer to you the following explanations:
In the present condition of affairs, the expediency of inviting the authorities to elicit their views upon some technical points, suddenly arose, and was speedily carried out. The fact of your residence at Yedo would forbid my entertaining the hope that you could respond to such an invitation under two or three days.
Secondly, As I had not had the honor of receiving any acknowledgment or communication from you, consequent upon my first circular communication of the 7th instant, I had no reason to suppose you desired to take a direct part in an incidental discussion of minor importance. And,
Thirdly, That the sole object of the meeting at my house on the 16th instant, and in which I took no part beyond recording the decision arrived at, was to elicit the professional opinion of naval officers as to the means existing for the protection of this settlement. Had, therefore, a ship-of-war of the United States been in port, her commander would unquestionably have been invited to attend.
I trust these reasons for my apparent omission may be deemed by you to be sufficient. And it only remains for me to add that, should it happen in the progress of passing events that a meeting of my colleagues, the diplomatic agents of the treaty powers, appears desirable, I shall not fail to communicate the same to you, although, for the reason first assigned, such may be only a formality.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient, humble servant,
General R. H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan.
[Enclosure No. 5.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose for your information, and that of the American citizens through the United States consulate, a copy of a general order which Rear-Admiral Keeper has issued to her Britannic Majesty’s [Page 1084] squadron at this anchorage, detailing the arrangements made with the view of providing for the safety of the foreign community in the event of any attack or disturbances.
Copies of this general memorandum will be sent to the officers commanding vessels-of-war now in port.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
General R. H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of America, Japan.
[Enclosure No. 6.—General memorandum.]
The following arrangements, having been determined upon with the view of providing for the safety of the foreign community of Yokohama in the event of any attack or disturbance, are made known for general information and guidance:
The signals of alarm which will be used are:
By day.—The English red ensign hoisted at the flag-staff of Mr. Clarke, Portuguese consul, at any of the other consulates, or other conspicuous points.
By night.—A rocket from the British consular prison, or from the French legation, to be repeated if the danger is imminent, or a blue-light or port-fire from the British legation, the house of Mr. Maine, adjoining the eastern quay, or from that of Mr. Gower, the last house in the foreign settlement, near the custom-house.
Should either of these signals be made, (by day or night,) two guns in rapid succession, fired from one or other of the gunboats anchored in shore, will give the requisite notice of danger to the settlement, and the boats of all the vessels-of-war in port will immediately assemble at the eastern quay, (the general rendezvous,) adjoining Mr. Maine’s house; one-half of the boats to be manned and armed; the remaining, with half-crews, in readiness to embark the foreign residents, should this extreme measure be necessary.
The men are on no account to be permitted to land without orders from Captain Dew, of the Encounter, the officer in command, who, with such officers as he may select, is charged with the duty of superintending on shore.
The whole of the boats will be under the orders of Captain Josling, of the Euryalus, or, in the event of his absence, of such other officer as the senior officer present may direct.
Guard-boats will be stationed by night near the bend, to convey to the nearest gunboat any notice of danger, in order that the signal may be made for the assembly of the boats at the rendezvous.
The English boats to be stationed on the eastern part of the settlement, the French in the centre, the Dutch on the western.
The officer in command of the legation guards is hereby requested to make arrangements, in conjunction with the officers in command of the French legation guard and the Yokohama volunteer corps, for establishing picquets and patrols as follows:
Picquets by night—at the British legation, royal marines; Mr. Maine’s residence, volunteers; Mr. Grower’s residence, adjoining custom-house, 67th regiment; and at the British consular prison, 67th regiment.
Also by night, patrols (mounted or infantry, as most convenient) to communicate with the posts above mentioned.
[Page 1085]The guards at each of these posts will (in case of an attack in force) retire gradually on the general rendezvous, the officers in command having previously satisfied themselves that the foreign community resident within their respective lines of retreat have been apprized of the danger.
The masters of the British merchant vessels at this anchorage, having at a recent meeting unanimously resolved to place the boats of their respective ships at the service of the community, under my directions, those gentlemen are requested (in the event of any of the alarm-signals being made) to send their boats immediately to the general rendezvous, in accordance with their resolutions, but not to allow any of their men to land.
The above arrangements are to come into force on Saturday, the 25th instant.
AUGUSTUS L. KUPER, Rear-Admiral, and Commander-in-Chief.
To the respective captains, commanders, and officers commanding her Majesty’s ships and vessels at this anchorage.
True copy.
[Enclosure No. 7.]
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, covering copy of a general order issued by Rear-Admiral Kuper, with the view of providing for the safety of the foreign community in the event of any attack or disturbances at Yokohama.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
Colonel E. St. John Neale, Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires in Japan.
[Enclosure No. 8.]
Sir: As you are already aware, your despatch of the 20th instant was sent to Yedo while I was on the way to see you, at the request of the Japanese government, in reference to the extension of the time fixed for their reply to the demands made by your government.
The time thus occupied, the interviews with the Japanese government consequent thereon, and a visit to Yokohama to make the necessary inquiries to enable me to notice that part of your letter relating to the sale of arms by citizens of the United States, have prevented an earlier reply.
I have already thanked you for your kindness in reading to me the note you were about to address to the Japanese government, conveying the decision which the government of Great Britain had taken; and as on that occasion you had informed me that you were acting under explicit instructions, it was far from my thought, while writing my letter of the 18th, to attribute to you the disposition to act with undue haste. On the contrary, I can bear willing witness to the kindness and considerate forbearance which, as far as I have observed, has marked your intercourse with this government. Nor was it my purpose to express an unfavorable opinion with reference to the action of the British cabinet.
[Page 1086]I had in view only the safety of American citizens. My solicitude was increased by the fact that among those citizens there was a larger number of women and children than of all other nationalities combined. In the absence of a national vessel of the United States, and of any offer of protection to those women and childrend from any source whatever, I could not but deplore a notice which appeared to contemplate the possible abandonment of the place, and was a deliberate declaration—a few days before the expiration of the period, when you had assured me measures might be taken which might eventuate in hostilities —of the insufficiency of the force at Yokohama for the defence of the place.
I felt it my duty to refer briefly to the serious consequences which might follow such abandonment, or from a partial success of the Japanese; and not being aware of the precise character of your instructions, I hoped they might be such as to enable you to postpone a resort to such measures until better prepared for defence. I have carefully reviewed my letter, and see nothing in its language or its spirit which I regret or would desire to modify, particularly as I had not failed in my conversation with you, before referred to, to express my opinion with great freedom, and to assure you of my desire for the prompt and satisfactory adjustment of the demands. I take this occasion to assure you that I had no idea that my delay in acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 7th could be attributed to a want of sympathy. You had already given me more information than that letter contained, for which I had thanked you; when your letter followed I regarded it as formal, and for the purpose of record, and as I had held several conversations with the Japanese government, I indulged the hope that I would be able to communicate to you information which might at least give promise of an amicable settlement when acknowledging its receipt. I need not remind you that on the day succeeding the murder of Mr. Richardson, Mr. de Wit, his Netherlands Majesty’s consul general, and myself obtained with much difficulty, because without the customary formalities, an interview with the ministers for foreign affairs, and made every effort to awaken them to the necessity of prompt and vigorous action and ample reparation. Nor have I since failed to bring this subject repeatedly to their notice, and to urge the danger of delay, and the advisability of proffering satisfaction in advance of a demand. And I have it in my power to say, and after this I trust my position cannot be misunderstood, that I have more than once advised a compliance with the demands of your government, on one occasion reading to them immediately on its receipt a letter in which the hope of the President was expressed that ample reparation would be made.
I also assure you that I have not been unmindful of the wise and humane proposition made by Mr. Seward to the British representative at Washington, in 1861, to which you refer, which was also made to the other treaty powers. On the tenth day of April, two days after the receipt of your letter, I referred to it in a letter addressed to my own government. I thought it proper, however, in writing you, to avoid expressing any regret that the government of Great Britain had not thought it desirable on the present occasion to act in concert with the other powers, thinking it more respectful to leave such expression to my government if it thought proper to make it.
If I rightly understand Mr. Seward’s proposition, he desired to establish the principle that the treaty powers, recognizing their identity of interest and their exposure to a common danger, should abstain from separate action and make common cause in maintaining common rights, and securing the common safety of their citizens and subjects. It was a wise suggestion, because it insured unity of action and moderation and equity of demand; it was humane likewise, because necessarily attended with peaceful results.
The proposition was made shortly after intelligence had reached him of the murder of Mr. Heusken, a subject of his Netherlands Majesty, temporarily in [Page 1087] the employ of the government of the United States. It was made neither because the United States felt unable of itself to enforce, if needful, just reparation, or was unwilling to incur the sole expense.
For the sake of a salutary precedent, a specific demand for redress was waived. A moderate provision for Mr. Heusken’s widowed mother, who was dependent on him for support, was accepted nearly a year after his death by my predecessor on his own responsibility, but not in satisfaction of his murder, the Japanese government at that time being distinctly informed that the arrest and punishment of the murderers was demanded.
With reference to the supply of arms “through the active agency of merchants of the United States established in this country,” which you state as “a regretable and notable fact,” I have to say that I have made strict inquiry, and am satisfied that with one exception no sales whatever have been made by citizens of the United States to any Japanese since the sixth instant. And I have reason to believe that in the case referred to the sale was made without reference to the present relations with Japan, and consisted of a small parcel brought over in the British steamer Leemin. I examined particularly into the sale of pistols you referred to, when I asked for specifications. The number of pistols sold was less than forty, and, with one exception, to foreign residents. These are only sales by citizens of the United States, with the exception of five hundred muskets sold to the daimio charged with the defence of Yokohama, which was on a contract made before you presented the demand of your government, and, if I mistake not, the arms were also actually delivered before that time.
A part of the exaggeration may have arisen from attempts, made by British merchants to effect sales through merchants of the United States, of which I have been informed on reliable authority. I have also been informed that one sale, whether shortly after or before your note was sent in I am not sure, was actually made by a British merchant, but I am also informed that he can plead in mitigation of his offence that the contract was not consummated, as the arms were so poor as likely to be most destructive to those who used them.
I was startled by that part of your letter wherein you say, “Current reports proclaim a still more active agency on the part of the United States in behalf of Japanese preparation for resistance, which, if they were subjected to proof, would ill accord with the spirit of the conjoint action and policy suggested by Mr. Seward,” &c.
I had the honor to receive your explanation of this remark, which was, that on one occasion, at night, a small boat was going up the creek adjoining Yokohama and was hailed. Some one responded it was Mr. Conner who was on board, which was untrue, as those who hailed were in his employ and knew to the contrary, and on the hail being repeated the answer was that it was Mr. Banks, the assistant United States marshal. It did not seem to occur to you that the second reply was probably as false as the first. The significance of this alleged transaction consisted in the fact of his official position, which I had the power to inform you at that time had terminated on the first of January last. Neither does it appear that the contents of the boat were known. I cannot see why it should have been assumed that arms were on board. Our consul informs me that extensive smuggling operations have recently been carried on of ale, wines, and other articles of bulk, to which his attention has been called, and I think it more likely that in the case referred to a fraud was being perpetrated on the custom-house.
I am informed that the sales of arms, at least those made by citizens of the United States, have been made openly, and I cannot imagine, therefore, why the cover of night should be sought for their delivery. It is proper also that I should say that Mr. Banks solemnly denies all knowledge of the transaction referred to, or of any sale or carriage of arms whatsoever, and it is not pretended that he was identified.
[Page 1088]As I am informed that nearly if not quite all the arms which have been brought to Yokohama came in British vessels, you have more opportunity of ascertaining what quantity has arrived than I have, particularly as you are in the place, and I am twenty miles distant.
You well know how little reliance can be placed on the reports of which Yokohama is the prolific parent, and I hope you have already had reason to distrust some of those to which you have referred.
In noticing this part of your letter I have waived the reply which might have been made, that all the transactions referred to, limited as they are in number and quantity, have been openly made in a time of peace, which I still hope will happily continue.
Should you regard it of sufficient importance, I shall be happy to join with you in any investigation you may judge needful, and I am convinced that the citizens of the United States will be found as little liable to censure as those of any other nation. I shall feel it my duty in this important crisis to attend any meeting of my colleagues which may be found necessary. A notice given in the evening would bring me to Yokohama the succeeding day.
Thanking you for your kind wishes for the restoration of my health, which is happily effected, I am sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
Colonel E. St. John Neale, Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires in Japan.