May 1999

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, May 24–25, 1999


Open Session, May 24

Chairman Michael Hogan called the meeting to order at 1:40 p.m. He announced that adoption of the minutes would be postponed until a final version had been prepared and asked the Executive Secretary to give his report.

Report by the Executive Secretary

William Slany told the Committee that he had tried to summarize the status of the Foreign Relations series in the briefing material and emphasized that the Office of the Historian was not publishing enough to reach the 30-year line. He reported that nearly all of the historians were now working on the Nixon administration but there were not enough volumes underway to meet the 30-year line. As previously reported, declassification remained a major problem. Approximately 80–100 disputed documents were holding up publication of 12 volumes, only one of which, on Iran, would be published soon. The High-Level Panel was succeeding but not fast enough to break the bottleneck.

Slany noted that the Committee would hold a discussion tomorrow on redesigning the Foreign Relations series so as to better meet our publication goals. He said that there were important issues to discuss since publication had slowed, fewer historians were working on the series, and fewer still would be working after September.

Slany characterized it as a serious time for the Office with the number of staff vacancies. An announcement would be posted on H-DIPLO indicating the possible availability of entry, contractual, and term positions. He would like to seek quick authorization to hire, but the issue had to be viewed in the wider State Department context of financial limitations and limitations on the number of positions available to the Bureau in light of the merger with USIA, AID, and ACDA. The office needs five positions but could get more or fewer.

Slany hoped that the Committee would take stock of the situation and recommend to the Department of State the necessity of maintaining staffing levels equal to those of the last 5–10 years. Hopefully, the Committee would help the Department understand the urgency of the problem and the special needs of the Office.

Concerning the redesign and modernization of the series, this was an important matter for which he and the entire Office needed the Committee’s advice and recommendations, especially since the Bureau leadership needed assurances that the changes were necessary and that the Committee would recommend the redesigned series to academics and the general public. Slany explained that the Office was working on a plan but that there must be an action plan-encompassing resources and personnel-as well. He emphasized that the Department and the Bureau would listen closely to the Committee’s advice. He said that Bureau leadership took the redesign seriously but that they saw no problems with series as it is and would have to be persuaded about the need for changes.

Warren Kimball asked about the types of candidates Slany wanted to apply and whether that included senior people. Slany said yes, possibly on contract. Kimball then asked about retirees, including recent retirees who might be “double-dipping.” Slany responded that the Office would be flexible but that the Department would probably not approve contracts for work that could be done by full-time staff. He emphasized that he was not trying to redesign the staff by making it part-time, but he felt that the 1969–89 era would also need people with specialized skills.

Kimball then inquired about the status of various volumes listed as “publication delayed” in Exhibit E of the Committee’s briefing package. He used Indonesia as an example and asked whether “publication delayed until the Indonesian situation stabilized” meant that publication was tied to the Indonesian elections. He felt that it was worthwhile to consider approaching the Indonesian desk to get a commitment to release once the election had taken place. Ted Keefer commented that there was not much point to doing so since the elections were scheduled in June.

Kimball then asked what action was taken when other departments or agencies such as Defense and Energy exceeded their time limits for declassification. Slany remarked that the Department of Defense was a “particularly egregious” case. He said that it was hard to get Assistant Secretary Rubin to deal with his DOD counterpart, Kenneth Bacon. Kimball stressed that they were in violation of the law, it was clearly a pattern of behavior, and that the Office needed to give them a wake-up call.

Philip Zelikow asked about the status of the Committee’s invitation to Alfred Goldberg to attend a session and discuss the problem. Slany said that the level of cooperation and interaction with the Department of Defense was “a lot less” than with CIA and expressed pessimism about Goldberg’s willingness to cooperate. As an operational suggestion, Zelikow said that the Office of the Historian should send a letter to Goldberg and to the JCS historian inviting them to come. This would force a reaction. Kimball asked if Goldberg was the right person to approach. Slany said he was; Zelikow agreed that it was a good place to start.

Anne Van Camp noted that David Herschler, who used to be responsible for declassification coordination, did a good job of “riding herd” on recalcitrants within the bureaucracy, including the Department of Defense. Slany said that it was not enough to identify problems in the declassification process; it was necessary to offer solutions. He also noted that declassification was an important aspect in planning for the future of the Foreign Relations series. Patterson added that delay in DOD clearance of volumes was only one problem. The broader question, as he understands it, is the decentralized way in which DOD conducts its review. Documents for Foreign Relations volumes receive no priority and were relegated to the end of the general declassification queue. Patterson suggested that someone from DOD should explain this process to the Committee.

Schulzinger asked what HO does when other agencies—in particular, DOD—fail to meet declassification deadlines. Slany replied that the agencies were formally warned in advance of the deadline; once the deadline passed, HO contacts the offending agency by phone and then by letter. Herschler explained that the answers received were not good, mostly low-level and informal. Susan Weetman added that whether the communication was in writing or by phone the answer was always the same: the referral is in the queue.

Slany said that HO could escalate the complaint to the Assistant Secretary level (Rubin); in that event, HO would appreciate the Committee’s support. Kimball stated that part of the problem involved a rider to legislation pending in the House Armed Services Committee that would slash DOD funding for declassification. Kimball thought that Rubin, if he became involved, should not get into specific declassification problems. Hogan asked where the Committee should start. Kimball answered that the Committee should start with Secretary of Defense Cohen and work down, eliciting support from Secretary of State Albright if necessary.

Zelikow observed that the DOD declassification unit had little authority of its own, serving instead as a clearinghouse, which farmed out referrals to other units within the Pentagon. He said the Committee could bump the issue up the chain of command. Slany replied that this had been tried before, when former Assistant Secretary McCurry had contacted his opposite number in DOD. The approach worked for a while, but subsequently broke down. Zelikow thought the Pentagon would meet its obligations if it knew the deadline was serious. Patterson remembered that this had been tried with Treasury with little effect because the coordinating office on declassification had no power to coerce the reviewing offices. Vince Davis suggested approaching Capitol Hill, although he admitted this would be “playing with fire.”

Hogan asked whether the Committee or Rubin should send a letter to DOD. Slany thought a letter from Rubin would carry the most weight. Hogan sought the Committee’s approval and, hearing no objections, formally supported Slany’s recommendation. Davis inquired about the attitude of Senator Jesse Helms on the general issue of openness. Kimball replied that the relevant legislation did not appear to be high on the Senator’s agenda anymore. Slany was loathe to engage in the “agency warfare” that might result by seeking Congressional involvement. He thought that a better response would be more likely by keeping the issue in normal bureaucratic channels.

Patterson reminded the Committee of the personnel problem: HO is losing three historians this summer. Slany said he was working on an announcement, but did not have a job description ready yet. He would consider several options: recruitment from the civil service; term appointments, which would not take as long to fill; and the formal posting process for full-time positions, which would take much longer. Rita Baker noted that she had posted a notice on H-DIPLO this morning. Patterson added that he and Ted Keefer planned to hold informal discussions with interested candidates at the annual SHAFR meeting next month.

Report of the Subcommittee on Public Release of Advisory Committee Minutes

Hogan turned to Michael Schaller for a report from the Subcommittee on Public Release of the Advisory Committee Minutes. Schaller reported that the subcommittee had met with Robert Leggett and James Oliver of the CIA, who had expressed concerns about the substance and tone of the minutes recording CIA involvement in Committee meetings. The concerns were two-fold: sometimes the minutes do not accurately reflect the Agency’s position; publishing the minutes also could reduce the level of candor during discussions. Schaller said Leggett and Oliver were uncertain how to solve the problem. Perhaps CIA comments should be kept off the record; perhaps CIA should be more involved in the clearance process. Hogan noted that the issue had arisen because Steve Aftergood had posted the available Committee minutes on his Web site.

Hogan summarized CIA’s concerns with the minutes and stated that we will continue to do pretty much what we’ve been doing but will do it better. Baker will send the draft minutes to CIA as a classified document so that CIA can review them for tone and accuracy. Kimball objected to treating the minutes as classified. Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists stated that he hoped the release of the minutes would not be delayed, since their value diminished as time passed. Schaller indicated that the subcommittee shared Aftergood’s concern. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker noted that the Committee needed the minutes by the next meeting.

Hogan raised the issue of the six sets of minutes that were withdrawn from the Reading Room but are on the Web. David Mabon of IPS explained that they had not gone through the normal classification review process, but they were available on the Web. An extensive discussion followed about the withdrawn minutes, especially as to whether they should go through the declassification process. Van Camp expressed the view that they should be formally declassified since they were official records of the Committee.

Looking to the future, Kimball asked whether it was understood that if the declassification process for a set of minutes was not completed before the convening of the next Committee meeting, the minutes would go on the Web. Hogan replied that he did not think that the latter point was understood but, Hogan continued, the subcommittee was assured at its meeting that morning with IPS that, in the future, IPS would conduct its review of the minutes in a timely fashion. The Committee discussed further the handling of the minutes and whether their formal declassification was required and then broke for coffee.

Following the break, Hogan returned to the issue of the Committee’s minutes, asking whether it was the sense of the Committee that all future minutes should be posted on the Historian’s Office Web site once they have received approval, but that a procedure for the minutes of previous meetings will be worked out. The Committee agreed.

Report of the Subcommittee on Electronic Records

Van Camp reported on the Subcommittee on Electronic Records, which met with representatives of IRM and NARA at Archives II that morning. She characterized the meeting as good and interesting. She said NARA representatives first reported on the status of systems planning for electronic records at the State Department and other agencies. Two contracts would soon be made with vendors for the internal AERIC system which will allow, among other things, organization and verification of State electronic records, perhaps within 6 months, and the ADAM system at NARA which will manage all electronic records for all federal agencies.

The contractor will ultimately work up a prototype, but NARA has not budgeted enough money yet for this final phase. NARA’s representatives at the meeting, however, expected this additional funding shortly. Van Camp made known the Committee’s concerns over this lack of full funding to the NARA representatives. In addition, the subcommittee impressed upon both NARA and IRM that they should not just focus on potential problems with the older records but to sample more recent files and see what potential problems lie there. She believed that the prototyping and testing should be done not just for a piece of the record but should use a complete sample from 1973 to the present, and she hoped they would be done this way.

She continued with a discussion of the State Department’s current schedule and priorities for State electronic records. This includes merging the information on the older ADS system into the newer SAS system and authenticating all the old data. State had encountered some problems but was confident the transfer would be completed by 2000 when the ADS system dies. An interim report should be ready in about 6 weeks.

Van Camp said that all those involved in the transfer of these electronic records were first coming to grips with the fact that the work will have to be completed by 2000, and she advised the Committee to continue monitoring the situation. She was more confident than at previous meetings, but the timing was very tight with respect to Y2K deadlines. At the last meeting, Steve Lauderdale of IPS had spoken about working out some way to cull non-permanent records from the database before being moved to the Archives, but everyone now realized that there was not enough time to develop such a plan by the end of the year. As a result, the database will be transferred in blocks. Van Camp also believed that NARA people had not yet adequately thought through how they will separate the withdrawn material from the open and it was agreed that NARA and State will address the feasibility of having parallel classified and unclassified systems and how to reintegrate material back into the open database once it has been declassified. The subcommittee believed that the database will not be publicly available for at least another 2 years and will be at first available only at NARA. However, there will be links to ARC (the still not fully developed NARA central electronic finding aid) through the World Wide Web.

Van Camp asked for comments but received none. Davis added that the subcommittee meeting was excellent and productive, and praised Van Camp’s excellent report.

Report by Peter Sheils, IPS. Peter Sheils then introduced Wanda Porter, a Ph.D. candidate at Howard University, who is the first Ralph Bunche Library Fellow. He added that Jacqueline Lilly, a branch chief in Steve Lauderdale’s division, was retiring, and her loss would be felt. He distributed copies of his report (with statistics) on the declassification review and transfer of State Department records to the National Archives. He said that there had been some changes from the last report, and he added that Marvin Russell could provide more information on material at NARA, such as the exempt material to 50 years. He referred to telegrams on page 2 of his paper. He said that State had to refer other agency equities to those agencies, and this was facilitated by the presence of other agency reviewers at Archives II. In response to Kimball’s question, Sheils affirmed that other agencies had been brought into the declassification process, and he cited the CIA as an example.

Sheils then mentioned the microfilm of the John Foster Dulles Papers at Princeton University. The review was now complete and the film would be available at Princeton. The opening will be announced at the SHAFR meeting there in late June, and Margaret Grafeld or another Department representative may represent the Department. Kimball thanked all those involved for their effort in getting the material opened and remarked that he had been told that some of the documents in the Dulles microfilm were not available in State Department records. Slany confirmed Kimball’s comment and commented on the importance of the Dulles collection. He reminded the Committee that Professor Crowl had filmed the S/S records in Secretary Dulles’ garage in 1958–1959, and the surviving paper S/S records at NARA are not as complete as the film. He noted that the microfilm was a very large collection and valuable to students. Van Camp asked if State had a copy of the microfilm, and Sheils indicated that the only copy will be at Princeton.

Robert Schulzinger wondered how the Harriman Papers compared with the Dulles microfilm and whether the Eisenhower Library had reviewed and opened all its pages of Dulles material. Sheils said he assumed that the Harriman Papers were already declassified, and he thought not all the papers at the Presidential Library had been reviewed. Schulzinger was sure that the State Department had done its work. Sheils continued that the State Department has not finished, and the chart indicates the number of pages of State documents within each Presidential library. The documents will be reviewed by Presidential library archivists who have been trained by State officers. Kimball said that the total is in the chart, but it was difficult to discern how much still had to be done. Hogan pointed out that the Committee should ask the Libraries how much still had to be done.

Schulzinger asked Sheils if the figures in column 3 of the handout which showed that no material was left to review at the Presidential Libraries, meant that these documents were now open to the public. Sheils said that this was not the case; it meant only that the facility had received IPS training and that procedures for review were in place. Kimball and Zelikow agreed that they had been misinterpreting the IPS charts and complimented Schulzinger in catching this in the chart. When Hogan asked if he had any more insightful questions, Schulzinger responded that he did not but that he thought a fourth column was needed to reflect progress at the Presidential libraries. Slany said that Sharon Fawcett of NARA’s Office of Presidential libraries could be asked to report at the next Committee meeting on the status of declassification review at the Presidential Libraries.

Report by Harry Cooper, CIA. Cooper reported on the Agency’s declassification efforts on State accessioned material at NARA. He said that 15,000 pages had been released, and 67,000 are currently mid-stream in on-site review at NARA. He further reported that 560,000 pages have been scanned, 450,000 of which contain State equities from Record Groups 59 and 84. He noted that the Agency had assigned an additional government certifier to oversee the on-site review and two additional reviewers. The Agency also continues to fund NARA employees working overtime to support reviews. The goal is a minimum of 10,000 pages per week on-site at NARA; with an overall target of 1 million pages by October 1 of NARA material. In response to questions from Van Camp and Tucker, Cooper said that some of the 1 million page target were part of the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project.

Kimball mentioned a rumor that the drop-dead date in the Executive order was being delayed until April 2001, and asked about the prospects for continued funding. Cooper said he could give only a general answer: the CIA had increased funding for 25-year declassification for FY2000 and FY2001; its funding appeared to be unabated. Sheils said that there was an 18-month extension and funding was geared to catch up. He did not foresee a reduction in State funding. He believed that for some records there was a 3-year extension. Cooper confirmed this and also said that there was proposed an additional 18 months for material with multiple equities and intelligence-related material. Kimball commented that the bottom line was public access to reviewed and declassified documents. Numbers and more information were needed. How much was available in relation to the total pie? In this regard, he thought Sheils’ report was helpful. Cooper said that CIA had 65 million pages, 25 million of which would be referred to CIA from other agencies for review. CIA was planning on reviewing 5 million pages this year and releasing 3 million, or about 60 percent. The goal for next year was to review 8 million pages.

Van Camp asked whether the reviewers were trained by the Department of Energy (DOE) to identify Restricted Data (RD) in documents. Sheils said that State reviewers had attended 5-day sessions by DOE on the problem. He added that RD was not a big issue for State and was not holding up the review of records so far. Such documents were set aside for senior reviewers. Cooper said that the CIA had the same training and procedures.

Microfilmed Documents at the Presidential Libraries

Zelikow passed out copies of documents demonstrating the historical significance of certain high-level documents microfilmed for the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries. The first document showed that in December 1963 Johnson had asked each Cabinet officer and agency head to collect copies of historical materials for the John F. Kennedy Library. In this November 15, 1966, letter, the President praised the great success of this program, which had been carried out by NARA, and said that it should be established as a permanent activity of that agency. In the next letter, dated May 22, 1968, Johnson commented on the progress of the program established to copy government papers for his Presidential Library, making it clear that he wanted this completed before he left office. Zelikow noted that he had also attached copies of three of the nine pages listing the Department of Defense files microfilmed for the Kennedy Library, for which he had the complete report. He also pointed out how very important the Department of Justice microfilm was in light of the absence of the Robert Kennedy papers.

Zelikow then emphasized that collecting this material had been the President’s wish, but the President’s wish had gotten lost. Johnson had wanted copies of this Cabinet-level material at the Presidential Libraries, but the Department of Defense documents were still at Suitland. He added that in the case of Defense Department materials, the Presidential intent is being frustrated in that the microfilmed holdings of the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries have not been declassified. In Zelikow’s view, these copies of Defense Department files present an important opportunity to hasten the declassification of materials not currently being processed expeditiously for declassification by the Defense Department itself. The libraries should be encouraged to take up the issue as an action item with the Defense Department and get guidelines to process the microfilmed files for declassification. Zelikow noted that the relevance of these files for the Foreign Relations series is limited because compilation has moved beyond the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. But the value of the files for scholars is obvious.

Kimball raised the question of whether there might be documentation in these files bearing upon intelligence or covert operations. If so, anything of consequence that had been bypassed by Foreign Relations could be included in a retrospective volume. Zelikow had pointed to the value of the collection of material dealing with the Special Group Augmented recently made available at the Kennedy Library. This is not a microfilmed Defense Department collection, but it raised the issue of intelligence-related documentation.

Zelikow then said that he wanted to raise a much larger problem. He had followed leads indicating that Directors of Central Intelligence had routinely recorded conversations in their offices, especially John McCone (who definitely did), and maybe William Raborn and even Richard Helms. Zelikow said that he had brought this to the attention of the CIA History Staff, in case it was not aware of the practice, so that the audiotapes would not disappear or be destroyed. This should be brought up in the session tomorrow morning with the CIA representatives.

Hogan said that the subcommittee, which met earlier in the day, had discussed the possibility that such tapes might exist. Zelikow said that he had talked at a previous meeting with Lloyd Salvetti, who had confirmed that this was true for McCone. David Geyer pointed out that compilers had used transcripts for CIA documents that indicated they were “made from a tape,” although Zelikow said that he not seen such indications in the annotation. Both Humphrey and Keefer commented that the transcripts the HO historians had seen were not very interesting, and Patterson noted that there would be some transcripts in the 1964–1968 National Security Policy volume. Humphrey agreed that if McCone had taped all his meetings, there were many the compilers had not seen.

The meeting adjourned at 4 p.m.

Closed Session, May 25

Discussion of the Future of the Foreign Relations series

Hogan called the meeting to order at 9:03 a.m. Kimball led the discussion regarding the future of the Foreign Relations series. He referred to the revised version of the Keefer-Humphrey memo proposing a plan for reorganizing the series from 1968 through 1988 (through the Reagan administration). Kimball said he hoped that the Committee would adopt his interim report and endorse the direction things are going. Once the Committee has done this: 1) Slany could make the PA leadership aware of the direction the series is going and make any necessary budgetary recommendations; and 2) the plan could then be brought to the attention of the academic community. (This would be done at the June SHAFR Council meeting by Schulzinger, who is the incoming President of SHAFR.) The Committee could then see if the general response from the academic community is supportive or not. If yes, then HO could go forward with the plan. (Rubin and Foley are concerned that the proposal not be something that will create a “firestorm” with the academic community.)

Hogan mentioned that it was too bad there would be no public session on the future of the series at the SHAFR meeting, to which Kimball responded that perhaps a session could be laid on for the AHA meeting. Hogan then asked Kimball what document he wants the Committee to approve.

Kimball replied that he wanted the Committee to approve his interim report on the Foreign Relations series (dated May 11 and located at Tab H of the briefing package). He was not asking the Committee to approve any of the individual proposals at this time (such as the one proposed by Keefer and Humphrey appended to Kimball’s report in the briefing package). The Slany proposal shown to the Committee at the last meeting is “off the table,” as it has been superseded by subsequent proposals. Kimball stated that David Geyer, Ted Keefer, and David Humphrey have put together a proposal for the Foreign Relations series through the Reagan administration. (Kimball said that he is referring to the latest version of their memo modified around May 19.) Patterson has reviewed their proposal and responded positively. Patterson, Humphrey, Keefer, Geyer, and Kimball have met to discuss the proposal. Kimball stressed that nothing, however, is final. Fine-tuning of the plan will be ongoing, as such matters as research could affect the plan. He stated that he was looking for formal approval of the concept document and general approval of the other materials.

Van Camp said she believes the Committee should look at Warren’s document as two separate documents-pages 1–9 (the mission/purpose) should be considered separately from pages 10–13 (“How Do We Do This?”), which needs further consideration by the Committee.

Schulzinger agreed that the Committee should first consider pages 1–9. He foresaw that there will be a lot of excitement among members of the academic community regarding the project and guessed that the general reaction will be similar to that of the HO historians. Schulzinger stated that two areas need to be well thought out:

  • The three C’s (Core, Crisis, and Context), because people will look at these and ask what the rules are that distinguish one from the other. Because it would be easy to put a volume into any one of these categories, a better explanation is needed of what line separates each category and how a volume is put in a particular category.
  • “Access guides” or “road maps,” which Schulzinger said would be a concern especially for the users of Foreign Relations (for example, the SHAFR members). If an access guide is prepared in lieu of a print volume, he is certain that someone will say that it is just a way of avoiding printing a volume. There needs to be a paragraph better explaining what information will be in an access guide and what it will do: provide more documents, expand, not curtail, access. The paragraph in Kimball’s paper is good, but needs to be more extensively “fleshed out.” What will an access guide look like and how will it help a researcher find more documents? How will we update these guides to indicate what is now open, etc.? Who will do the updating? Can the guides be regularly updated on the Web?

Kimball replied that he had a conversation about the access guides with Michael Kurtz of NARA, who was extremely excited about the idea and said that NARA officials would be willing to work with the HO historians to develop an approach that would complement NARA finding aids. Kimball agreed that they would need to take a closer look at the idea of updating the guides. Theoretically, the HO historians have access to everything and all sources will be mapped at the beginning, which should remove the need to update the guides.

Patterson stated that it would be difficult to track and keep up on what files have been opened. Schulzinger suggested NARA could help in updating the guides, and Van Camp pointed out that preparing guides was NARA’s job. Patterson responded that the guides would not be just a list of files, but would include descriptions and evaluations of issues and subjects that might be more difficult for NARA staff to provide.

Tucker said that guides become outdated quickly and she wondered how HO could get the access guides cleared if the documents cannot be cleared for publication. Kimball replied that there will be cases where the subject itself is classified, but most likely the general subject is known or can be declassified but not the specifics, as in the case of issues before the High-Level Panel. Tucker responded that there have been cases in the past when individuals or agencies do not want the public to know how or where to find certain information. (She gave the CIA as an example.) Kimball stated that there has been increased cooperation between HO and CIA, including considering jointly funding a State employee for assignment to the CIA.

Tucker said that she sees the problem with the CIA differently from most of the Committee. Her view is that the major problem is declassification. One of the things Kimball says in his proposal is that the new Foreign Relations plan will result in fuller, easier access, but how will that help with declassification?

Kimball replied that he is not saying declassification will get easier. But broadening the scope of the Foreign Relations series will put more pressure on the declassification process. He explained that research by HO historians will be broadened and the results of that research (i.e., dissemination) will also be broadened, which will put more pressure on the declassification process. Putting more information into the declassification process will then increase the amount of information declassified, which is a principal goal of the Foreign Relations statute.

Hogan stated that the print volumes are now being slowed by declassification problems. If, under the new plan, the volumes will continue to move along and the information being withheld is disseminated later electronically after it is declassified, how will that put pressure on the CIA? Won’t the CIA be happier if the information does not appear in the print volume and, therefore, decrease the pressure? Kimball replied by explaining his concept of the series as one ongoing volume documenting American foreign policy. The three mediums (print volumes, electronic publications, and access guides) are all part of the Foreign Relations series-part of an integrated whole. Electronic publications will not be on a different or slower publication schedule than the print volumes.

Hogan asked if Kimball were answering the question, which would likely be asked at the SHAFR meeting, whether electronic and print volumes will come out simultaneously. Kimball responded that there was no guarantee of this. He said that everything should come out as soon as possible, but he noted that he believes Hogan was making a distinction between electronic and print volumes that he (Kimball) does not agree with.

Tucker said that the Committee used to use books as leverage: the volume would not be printed if the information could not be declassified, and thereby embarrass an agency into declassifying the information. She asked if the Committee was proposing that HO print the volume without the information and then put it on the Web later when it is released. By doing this, we are decreasing our leverage. Kimball stated that it is a two-fold process. There is and will be a body of intelligence information that everyone accepts as being legitimately withheld. Ultimately when that information becomes available it can be placed in a special volume on intelligence published at a later date. This does not mean that HO will not continue to put intelligence information into current volumes (print or electronic) and thereby keep the pressure on.

Tucker asked how this will be accomplished. Will there not be a temptation to go ahead and publish the volume and just put the information on the Web when it is declassified? She said she is concerned about publishing partial volumes. Kimball said he knows the Committee needs to address the whole issue of how to use intelligence information in the Foreign Relations series. The Committee needs to address the issue of how to use intelligence information to keep the pressure on the declassification process.

Van Camp stated that this is not a change in wanting to include documents, but just in how to disseminate them and how the information is organized-in print or electronically. Tucker said she was just concerned about decreasing leverage and negatively affecting the print volumes.

Kimball said that the Core and Crisis print volumes will focus on major foreign policy issues. The most critical problems with intelligence information will occur with the print volumes. Using a specific example, he said that the release of this information would provide an opening or “wedge” into a lot of covert actions involving U.S. interference in foreign elections. Kimball said the print volumes will be on the “cutting edge” of opening up such subjects.

Zelikow said the Foreign Relations process should involve two phases: 1) compilation and 2) editorial judgment as to whether the information be in a print or electronic volume. He said that the present plan was an “excellent effort” and a significant improvement over where we were previously. The projected Core volumes are strong and promising.

Patterson said that he wanted to know how the plan will lead to increased, earlier, and easier access unless compilation is also speeded up (which he does not believe will happen) or declassification is speeded up (which is also not likely to happen, even with the additional declassification authorization as a result of the High-Level Panel).

Van Camp stated that a lot of work has gone into Kimball’s interim report and the Keefer-Humphrey plan and she is very impressed. It is her view that the new method will provide better, faster, and easier access. She explained that the current method only allows for X number of documents and X number of footnotes to appear in any given volume. The new method with its integrated approach through print volumes, electronic publications, and access guides will provide a better way of identifying and locating the larger record. That is the access avenue that will make it possible for scholars to get more information easier and faster.

Kimball stated that he knows resources and the declassification process are a problem and that the new plan will increase declassification by the sheer volume of material. He said to take just the concept of electronic publication by itself, which alone has increased the usage of the Foreign Relations series tremendously. He said that resources and priorities would affect the process, but hopefully, declassification would be hastened. He envisioned an integrated concept of information transfer as the World Wide Web increased worldwide access and instant availability increases ease, speed, and amount of access. (Baker and Futscher reminded the Committee that many Foreign Relations volumes are already available on the Internet.)

Tucker expressed concern about the struggle between functional and regional areas in the proposed compilations, which mirrored the ongoing struggle among State Department policymakers. She emphasized that a functional approach to an issue such as human rights might make it more difficult to collect information on specific countries or regions.

Kimball replied that planning in progress was not intended to eliminate area, regional, or bilateral coverage, although it did represent an attempt to go beyond bilateral coverage. However, major foreign policy issues since the Cold War have become global in nature, and a new approach might assist newly-minted scholars. Studying human rights in Peru required paying attention to the broader context of the Carter administration’s entire human rights policy. U.S.-China relations would be a Core area. He then asked Keefer to explain the distinction between Core, Crisis, and Context volumes.

Keefer said that he did not originate the “Core, Context, Crisis” concept. Kimball said that he had kept the guidelines vague because of his concept of Foreign Relations as all one series: “Core” equalled “comprehensive.” Keefer said that a U.S.-China volume would be comprehensive; “Crisis” volumes would be intensive, but would not cover the whole spectrum of relations with a country, only the crisis part; “Context” volumes, whether in print, guide, or electronic format, would be selective about what they covered as themes emerged over time.

Kimball said that volumes should get away from a rigid categorization by Presidential administration, although “intellectual assumption” volumes probably should be devoted to a single administration. Tucker had no objection to the “3-C” concept, but remained concerned about fluctuations between functional and regional organization. She felt that most American diplomacy was still conducted on a bilateral basis, and bilateral relations were bound to suffer when taken out of context. Kimball said that playing the “China Card” depended on the Cold War context. In the future, the Committee might serve as a pendulum weight to prevent swings to either extreme.

Geyer said that no one was suggesting that functional topics be pulled systematically out of their bilateral context. Using human rights under the Carter administration as an example, he said that there were differences in policy-making and implementation toward Asia and South America. Tucker asked how coverage of dissidents could be separated from a U.S.-Soviet volume. Kimball said that topics would be cross-referenced rather than duplicated. Tucker feared that a Human Rights volume might focus only on unimportant countries.

Zelikow considered the three categories offered useful guidance for compiling and editing. The current plan for the Foreign Relations volumes included 34 volumes for 5 years of the Johnson administration. The new plan was for 90 volumes for 1969–1990, or about 7 volumes per year versus 4-1/2 volumes per year. Kimball said that 90 volumes was an interim figure; the “working numbers” would be worked out by the staff and approved by an editorial board. Herschler said that the figure included only print volumes, not supplements. Zelikow expressed his belief that the figure of 90 volumes was a guideline that provided an approximate sense of scale, but that a more realistic figure would be 100 volumes to cover the 1969–1990 period.

Patterson pointed out that a major, although not the only, reason for revising the volume list was to expedite the series by publishing fewer volumes. Ninety seemed a desirable maximum; additional material could be published in supplements. Kimball said that his plan had not covered the question of what electronic supplements would look like; a big question was how resource-intensive they might or should be. Hogan said that in the interest of economy, they would look different. Would access guides be electronic as well? Kimball replied that access guides might be either printed or electronic, organized by topic, country, or region, and varied in length. They might even be part of a print volume. Schulzinger asked whether the access guides would be similar to the finding aids provided by Presidential Libraries. Kimball cited the guides prepared by David Humphrey at the LBJ Library as an example. Slany said that the guide to Holocaust-era Assets Records prepared by Greg Bradsher at the National Archives was another example: it consisted of a 400-page printed guide and an ever-expanding, continuously-updated electronic edition. Kimball said that scope of detail could vary greatly, as from a “country map” to a “walker’s map.”

Kimball said that volumes in the Summit series would try to focus on individual conferences. Patterson said that a more complete table of contents for the Vienna Summit would go back to March 1977 for background. Slany said that he hoped that the Summit volumes might facilitate publication of or access to Russian archival materials.

Hogan said that time was running short, and it was time to review pages 1–9 of Kimball’s plan. Kimball said that later pages would be covered in the afternoon. The subsections in pages 1–9, which dealt with the audiences of the series, had been written for the benefit of senior PA staff. Schulzinger said that he expected general approval through page 5 (purpose and intent of revision). This section summarized goals. Pages 6 onward, dealing with how to achieve them, would be more controversial.

Hogan then directed the Committee’s attention to pages 7–9. Zelikow said that the “3-Cs” concept was explicit about what had been implicit for years. He might have chosen different labels, but the division would have been similar unless the Context topic was dropped. Next would come access guides and then electronic or microfiche supplements (he preferred the former format for supplements). The “3-Cs” should be supported for now.

Hogan asked for further comments on pages 5–9. Patterson endorsed access guides in principle. He had requested compilers to take notes on files as they conducted their research, but he was concerned about compilers being distracted from the volumes or the supplements. Existing volumes already contained lists of sources. Keefer said that more research would be required if access guides were to cover records not included in a volume or supplement. Kimball said that there were no detailed access guides for each country. Compilers were presumably taking notes and designing their own road maps as they went along. Access guides might result from several compilers’ notes.

When he was asked whether access guides were the least significant part of the compilation, Kimball said that he envisioned Foreign Relations as one continuous volume from 1862 to the present. All parts were part of an integrated whole. Which part would take precedence would depend on the compilers. If a volume on Chile, for example, contained many key documents, the access guide might be more important than the printed volume and should therefore take priority. Geyer noted that access guides would be of no use until the records were opened, and Tucker commented that access guides had only limited effect on declassification. Kimball said that they might stimulate FOIA or other requests.

Hogan asked for a final comment. Zelikow noted the absence of a category for National Security Policy. Neither U.S.-Soviet Relations nor Arms Control adequately covered the underlying assumptions of the Reagan defense buildup. He viewed Foreign Relations as a crucial wedge for getting access to Department of Defense records.

Foreign Relations Declassification Review at the Central Intelligence Agency

After a break at 10:30, Hogan introduced three Central Intelligence Agency representatives: Lloyd Salvetti, Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence; Robert Leggett, FRUS coordinator, from the Office of Information Management; and Gerald Haines, Chief of the CIA History Staff.

Salvetti began by noting that he was replacing David Holmes on the High-Level Panel. His background was in the operations field, and in addition to his duties at the Center for the Study of Intelligence, he teaches at the National War College. He has a great interest in history and confidence in the abilities of Haines and Leggett.

Leggett, whose background is in the intelligence side of CIA, reviewed the CIA’s work with the Foreign Relations series over the past 2 years and the significant progress that has been achieved. First, he oversaw in August 1997 the writing and distribution of a internal bulletin in CIA to explain the series and the CIA’s legal responsibilities in connection with the series. Second, the Agency assigned a senior officer to oversee the Foreign Relations “account.” Third, on May 29, 1998, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet made a public statement on the CIA’s declassification efforts, emphasizing that the Foreign Relations series is to be given top priority among the Agency’s declassification and release programs. Fourth, he and other CIA personnel have committed to participating in quarterly meetings with staff from the Historian’s Office and to attending the quarterly Historical Advisory Committee meetings. Fifth, the CIA has promulgated guidelines for citing CIA documents in Foreign Relations. Sixth, regarding covert actions (“always a difficult issue”), the CIA has worked out a generic description on the implementation of covert action and counter-insurgency programs.

Leggett then moved to the issue of release of documents. He stated that when he took the job as FRUS coordinator, the CIA had been “delinquent” in meeting its declassification deadlines, but he has worked successfully to clear up the backlog. CIA returns its declassification reviews within the guidelines established in the Foreign Relations law. He emphasized that CIA has lived up to the spirit of the statute, and has cooperated fully with the High-Level Panel including assigning a senior Agency officer as its representative. He then summarized the results of Panel meetings to date:

The first panel discussed Italy, the Philippines, Indonesia, and one other country. While this country was “taken off the table,” the others were acknowledged and documents reviewed and returned to the Department of State on August 6 and August 28, 1998. The second panel considered Pakistan, British Guiana, and Iran. Issue descriptions and documents were sent to State on September 30, 1998. For British Guiana, CIA agreed to acknowledge an in-country presence. The third panel examined Greece, Jordan, Israel, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic. Greece was the most sensitive issue, and the CIA’s first stance was to release no documents. After discovering that relevant documents had been released previously, the CIA agreed to release about five documents. The last panel considered Bolivia and Chile. The CIA has already sent the issue descriptions and declassification guidelines to the National Security Council and the Department of State. Leggett noted that documents on these topics have been released.

The CIA’s role in Guatemala in 1954 was not submitted to the High-Level Panel, but the CIA did help write an issue description and declassification guidelines for its own reviewers. Leggett added that the CIA will return to State this week 288 documents for the Foreign Relations volume on the 1954 Guatemala operation, with about “95 percent” of the material being released. About 17,000 pages of material concerning Guatemala are under final review, and CIA is planning for a June 30, 1999, release of these documents. Most redactions are limited to names and minor geographical locations. The “declassification factory” under Rich Warshaw is working on another 80,000 pages of lower level documentation. The CIA is committed to releasing all this material by June 2000.

Leggett then summarized the results of the High-Level Panel process, stating that the Panel acknowledged 14 of the 15 issues (including Guatemala). This is great progress. In 4 of the 15 cases the CIA acknowledged an “in-country” role. For those operations where the in-country presence is not acknowledged, HO has the option to place the generic description of covert action implementation in the volumes.

Leggett concluded by asking that HO advise the CIA of any documents it locates that have already been declassified previously for Foreign Relations or under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Historians at State had located declassified documents on Greece, Bolivia, and Chile. The Chile documents were important in shaping the CIA’s response at the High-Level Panel.

Salvetti noted again that DCI George Tenet had made a commitment to declassification, with Foreign Relations as a priority. Salvetti hoped to promote dialogue with the Office of the Historian, and more clearly explain the CIA’s position. He would like to commend David Holmes for the job he did before going to his new job.

Kimball stated that he had no disagreement with the remarks made by Salvetti and Leggett. Over the course of the last 8 years there has been steady progress and the sense of the Committee was that CIA has been very helpful. Problems remain however; dialogue is helpful but is a two-way street. There were still problems that merited discussion in the Committee last Annual Report. Kimball commented that he realized that CIA was not happy with his report; he was sorry, but problems remained.

Hogan agreed with Kimball that the pace and extent of collaboration had accelerated, but the job of the Committee is to keep pushing for declassification. Salvetti noted that the CIA expects to be pushed but also expects to be recognized for the progress it makes.

Van Camp asked if all 17,000 and 80,000 pages of Guatemala documents under review would be transferred to NARA. Leggett replied they would, although he didn’t know if it would be all at once or incrementally.

Hogan asked how the 18-month extension in the declassification deadline under the Executive Order would affect CIA declassification efforts. Gerald Haines replied they would not be affected at all.

Zelikow suggested that what is needed is to restore the reputation of the CIA with the scholarly community while balancing the legitimate security needs of intelligence. Volumes on Iran and Congo did enormous damage to the credibility of the Foreign Relations series and of the CIA. For this reason attention must be kept on retrospective volumes. At the last meeting he listed issues that could serve as a vehicle for such an effort, such as a volume on Iran and a volume on Indonesia, 1958. He hoped that 4 or 5 years from now the CIA would have repaired its reputation on these past episodes while continuing to be forthcoming with current Foreign Relations volumes. Zelikow asked about the status of the tapes made in the DCI’s office and whether Department of State historians could have access to them.

Leggett replied that, speaking for Jim Oliver (head of the Historical Review Program) who could not be present, the declassification of the Office of the DCI’s files are part of the Agency Historical Review Program. He noted also that to date, the CIA has released 550 National Intelligence Estimates to NARA; 28,000 pages of finished intelligence on the Soviet Union from 1947 to the 1980s; and documents on the Bay of Pigs and Guatemala (the first two of eleven covert actions which the Agency has committed to release). The files of the Office of the DCI for the first two DCIs are being reviewed at the current time and documents should be released in the near future. Haines added that while there are some telcons for Dulles and McCone, they stopped with Helms. Leggett noted that the effort to declassify the files of the Office of the DCI is ongoing.

Zelikow noted that the relevance of the DCI files is that they could contain a lot of policy-making information. The tapes would have to be addressed in a retrospective volume. He suggested that the rumor mill had it that Helms destroyed his telcon tapes. James McElveen stated that Helms’ biographer stated that he did.

Kimball noted that the historians want to determine how covert action became part of policy-making going back to Truman. He suggested that the supplemental Intelligence volume for 1950–1960 could examine these broad patterns. Leggett noted that Jim Oliver would probably be happy to come and speak to these issues. Hogan agreed that the Committee would like to hear an overview at the next meeting of all of the DCI files and especially the tapes.

Zelikow stated that if there is to be a retrospective sweep he would like it to include Eastern Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s and Egypt in the 1950s. He suggested the Committee would like a CIA assessment of how best to undertake this: whether by CIA historians themselves, by Foreign Relations historians, or jointly. Zelikow reiterated that the CIA needs to restore its credibility by being open about 40- or 50-year old episodes.

Haines said that he thought the volume on intelligence for 1950–1960 focused on administrative and organizational issues rather than documenting specific covert operations. Kimball agreed, but the issue is how covert action becomes part of the policy-making process—a routine tool of foreign policy. Hogan asked what the CIA view of this volume is, and Haines replied that CIA is enthusiastic.

Hogan asked if there were only tapes of telephone conversations of Dulles and McCone and no tapes of other meetings. Haines replied that there are just phone tapes and transcripts. These DCIs routinely taped phone conversations and there are 93 tapes. He has no sense of the content of those tapes but he has a historian examining them.

Hogan asked whether HO historians have access to the records of the Directors of Central Intelligence. Haines answered that they have the same access as the CIA History Staff historians. Ted Keefer recalled that the few he had seen were with individuals outside the CIA. Haines thought that was the case. Patterson asked if the DCI tapes were dictabelts. Haines replied affirmatively. Kimball suggested that they seek the assistance of the LBJ library to solve technical issues in working with these tapes.

Schaller noted that in the case of Guatemala, an access guide written in conjunction with the CIA and published along with the Foreign Relations volume would steer people toward the proper records. This might be a good test case. Kimball agreed.

Leggett noted that the CIA is working on a Web page with an index of released documents, including NIEs and DI finished intelligence; eventually selections of these documents will be put on the Web page.

Kimball noted that it is the hope of the Committee that as the High Level Panel moves along, some precedents can be set that will cut down on future submissions and move the process along more quickly in the future. The process is still cumbersome and lengthy. Anything we do to move it along would be useful.

Schulzinger noted that the highest priority of the Committee is to the release of actual documents. Issue statements go part way but the Committee wants actual documents, which explains the ongoing friction. He admitted that there was a night and day difference between now and 4 years ago, but the priority of the Committee was still to have documents. Haines replied that he was very aware of this because he has to make the same arguments at the CIA.

Kimball reiterated that the Committee and the Foreign Relations users were looking for documents. He worried that issue statements acknowledging and describing a covert operation allowed CIA to be vague; he would remain wary. At this point, Hogan adjourned the meeting for lunch.

Resumed Discussion of the Future of the Foreign Relations Series

The meeting reconvened after lunch at 1:30 to continue the discussion of Kimball’s report on the Foreign Relations series in the 21st century, in particular Kimball’s proposal for an Editorial Board. He explained his thoughts behind the proposal:

  1. The Board was not intended to impose another bureaucratic level on the process of compiling the volumes. It would be a group of “resource people” on whom the compilers and managers could call to provide expert advice.
  2. The Board would not set policy unless the Committee requested it.
  3. Because the members would not be paid, the “Foreign Relations Advisory Board” should be a titled position that would confer some prestige on its members. He reiterated his belief that the Board would be a “resource body.”

Schulzinger asked if there were an advantage in having the composition and duties of the Board spelled out in such detail. Kimball said that his intention was to make a clear statement of the Board’s purpose. Van Camp said that she too was uncomfortable with the level of detail and the possibility that the Board would be a new bureaucratic level imposed on the series and the compilers.

Kimball defended his proposal: the Board would not need resources for its support; it would not constitute a turnstile that each compiler or volume must pass through; the approval of the Board would not be required at any stage of the process. Van Camp repeated that she preferred a statement or proposal that was less rigid.

Schulzinger agreed, noting that the Board’s procedures were good, but its composition should not be spelled out so specifically for fear that it would add another bureaucratic level. Hogan agreed that neither the number of Board members nor their terms of appointment should be pre-determined. The need is for people with specific skills and expertise who can serve on an ad hoc basis.

Kimball rejoined that the value in a permanent membership is continuity and an ability to evaluate long-range plans. Hogan pointed out that that is properly the Advisory Committee’s role.

Schaller recalled a discussion of 2–3 years ago about using outside experts, but Hogan reminded him that those experts would review already compiled volumes. This Editorial Board was designed to consider topics, issues, research, and ongoing historical debate prior to compilation of any specific volume. Hogan and Schaller both agreed on the need to maintain maximum flexibility, that any number of people should be available at any one time.

Zelikow asked whom the Board would advise, would it be subordinate to the Advisory Committee or to the Historian who would subsequently report to the Committee. Kimball repeated that the body would primarily help compilers to put together individual volumes and/or formulate long-range plans. He suggested another possible name: the Editorial Advisory Group. The Historian could ask people for ad hoc advice for “as long as the advice is useful.”

Van Camp pointed out that the historians are free to do that now, but Kimball explained that they do not and that he wanted it to become a more common practice. Slany said that HO can hire advisers any time it wants, and that this Board as Kimball envisions it should be subordinate to the Advisory Committee so the Committee can solicit advice or guidance from it. Kimball argued that the Board has to have some designated structure or it won’t be realized. He stressed that the group, which would not be paid, would help HO compilers and planners, not the Advisory Committee, which sets broad policies only.

Zelikow disagreed, stating his belief that the Committee’s mandate to set broad policy is indistinguishable from its overarching editorial advisory function. If the Committee does not have the capacity, for reasons of time or expertise, to get involved in editorial details, it can request help or constitute a sub-group to help it fulfill its oversight role. It is entirely appropriate for the Committee to ask questions about the content of Foreign Relations volumes, the issue of balance between topical and bilateral volumes, or the choice of electronic or print media for a particular compilation.

Hogan agreed with Zelikow, and suggested that the Committee call for appointment of “editorial advisers”: “the Committee under the new plan may as it sees fit appoint editorial advisers who will provide advice to compilers of Foreign Relations volumes.” Davis agreed that it should be kept as ambiguous as possible and he suggested the term “Publications Board.”

For the Committee’s information, Steve Phillips recounted his experience with requesting advice from outside scholars for the volume on China, 1969–1972, which he is compiling. He had called archivists, academics, and other experts, all of whom have been more than willing to provide advice and suggestions. He believed it important that the Committee perceive that he at least is not compiling Foreign Relations volumes in an intellectual vacuum.

Van Camp asked Kimball if one purpose of his Editorial Board was to compile a roster of experts available for advice and consultation. Kimball agreed with her characterization and elaborated that he wanted to identify a stable of people available to advise and consult not only on specific issues, but on concepts and structure of the series as a whole. This would institutionalize what Steve Phillips has accomplished on an ad hoc basis. Slany pointed out that Kimball was proposing a board to institutionalize what Kimball himself has done over the past few months as a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee. Kimball agreed but he did not propose to create a sustaining bureaucracy.

Zelikow emphasized again his view that it is the role of the Advisory Committee to provide this function. It is the Committee’s responsibility to be publicly accountable for the substance of the volumes so it should also be the Committee’s responsibility to create a subordinate entity to respond to requests from compilers for advice. He applauded that Kimball had asked what additional services HO needs to do its job better, and he is entirely sympathetic to the “task list” that Kimball has compiled. Van Camp agreed that HO needs advice on these big questions, but the function should not be formalized in a “board.” Kimball agreed to revise this section to reflect the Committee’s discussion.

Hogan moved to discussion of item 2, “General Comments Regarding the FRUS Project,” on pages 12–13 of Kimball’s paper. Kimball noted that this paragraph was an elaboration of his thesis that there can be no formula for the volumes, that each volume has to be specific to the subject, which will govern the editorial selection.

He concluded his presentation by advocating a long-term professional development program in HO to create incentives and improve the work product. This program would be “performance-based,” i.e., incentives, such as attendance at seminars or conferences, would be based on an individual’s performance. Zelikow pointed out that the Committee needed more information about Department of State personnel requirements and regulations before it could make detailed suggestions.

Schulzinger asked if there were seminars already available in the Washington area that HO historians could attend. Patterson pointed out that some of the historians have taken courses at the Foreign Service Institute, especially on issues such as science and technology. Slany commented that staff could and did attend local conferences, but travel was paid to out-of-town conferences only if an individual was a participant. All agreed that that is the policy at their institutions as well.

Hogan suggested that HO sponsor its own seminars. Zelikow proposed a public “roll-out” at the time a Foreign Relations volumes is published, as the British do when a volume is released. Slany pointed out that that might be a public relations problem with the PA leadership, because it might draw unwelcome attention to what is being released.

In conclusion, Kimball summarized the discussion of his paper: Schulzinger would distribute at the SHAFR meeting in June pages 1–9 (with some redrafting) and pages 12–13. The section on the Editorial Board would be withheld until he rewrote it and re-presented it to the Committee at the next meeting. He asked for a definitive Committee vote on his plan, both for PA and public purposes.

The Committee thereupon voted unanimous approval of the plan as submitted by Kimball at the meeting. Hogan adjourned the meeting, and the Committee went into executive session at 2:45 p.m.


Committee Members

  • Michael Hogan, Chairman
  • B. Vincent Davis
  • Warren F. Kimball
  • Michael R. Schaller
  • Robert D. Schulzinger
  • Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
  • Anne Van Camp
  • Philip Zelikow
  • William Slany, Executive Secretary

Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian

  • William Slany, Director
  • Rita Baker
  • Paul Claussen
  • Evan Duncan
  • Vicki Futscher
  • David Geyer
  • David Goldman
  • David Herschler
  • Susan Holly
  • Nina Howland
  • David Humphrey
  • Ted Keefer
  • Doug Keene
  • James McElveen
  • David Patterson
  • Steve Phillips
  • Joyce Schimsky
  • Shirley Taylor
  • Donna Thompson
  • Gloria Walker
  • Susan Weetman
  • Bill Weingarten
  • Shane Young

Bureau of Administration

  • Morris Draper, A/RPS/IPS/CR/IR
  • David Mabon, A/RPS/IPS/CR/IR
  • Peter Sheils, A/RPS/IPS
  • Sophia Sluzar, A/RPS/IPS/CR/IR

National Archives and Records Administration

  • Margaret Hawkins, Life Cycle Management Division
  • David Langbart, Life Cycle Management Division
  • Marty McGann, Textual Archives Services Division
  • Don McIlwaine, Initial Processing/Declassification Division

Central Intelligence Agency

  • Lloyd Salvetti, Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
  • Harry Cooper, Automatic Declassification Division
  • Gerald Haines, Chief, History Staff
  • Robert Leggett, Office of Information Management


  • Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists