86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State 1

1894. For the President from Bundy.

1.
In two hours with Benitez and one-and-a-half with me, Guzman today flatly refused to propose departure of three leading rebels or even to allow Benitez to propose it. He is honestly convinced that any such move would cost him the confidence of the people and, after battering him at length, Benitez and I are convinced he would quit before he would accept it.
2.

I told Guzman this attitude raised in my mind serious questions since it showed his unwillingness to take any action now to control rebel general staff. I added that this was doubly difficult for us because we do not know who really runs that group. Guzmanʼs bright young factotum, Salvador Jorge Blanco, denied this by asserting Caamanoʼs clear control. I expressed doubts which Guzman did not contest. I asked him for full list of rebel military leaders and remarked that in our judgment there were Communists among them—real Communists and not simply leftist idealists. When they asked for details I agreed to provide them. (We are reviewing composition of this group and will report available facts and impressions in a separate telegram tomorrow.)2

He agreed completely when I described his position as that of a man who did not think he would have the public and political strength to attempt any split of rebel military leadership at the outset.

3.
I told Guzman this decision would be very disappointing and that we would have to report it to Washington. He understood but held his ground.
4.
On all the evidence I do not believe Communists now control the general staff or that general staff will control the government. But if we substitute “influence” for “control” I think both propositions will be true. I think degree of influence can be acceptably low in both cases, especially if we can strengthen cabinet. But it will be present, and it will be observed. On the other hand Benitez visited rebel headquarters [Page 217] this afternoon and said afterward that Communist issue was laughable. He reports they are really adolescents with guns. I think he may be right.
5.
This series of talks reinforces a growing conviction that Guzman is both good and weak. He really understands Communist problem and he has stood firm against a cabinet job for the doubtful Hector Aristy. But he is not going to go against those who are seen as heroes of the revolution.
6.
If we are to go ahead nonetheless—and this is my own firm recommendation—we must plan to give maximum attention to building continuing intensive U.S. relations with Guzman and with his non-Communist military.
7.
This of course is only an important special example of general proposition that Guzman government will at best be caretaker affair, terribly dependent on U.S. handholding.
8.
We intend to make up on cabinet swings what we have lost on the departure roundabouts. It will be hard work to broaden Guzmanʼs base, but we plan to seek Moraʼs help. We are aiming for number of outstanding independents, and we also aim to plan with Guzman for best joint approach to possible members. We have already softened up de Leon and Postigo by private feelers and believe both will serve.
9.

We discussed possible cabinet grouping with Guzman tonight made up as follows:

  • Presidency—Ramon Ledesma Perez (PRD)
  • Armed Forces—Colonel Jose Antonio de Leon Grullon
  • Interior and Police—Eduardo Read Barreras (IND)
  • Foreign Relations—Hector Garcia Godoy (PR)
  • Education—Julio Franco y Franco (PR)
  • Without Portfolio—Julio Postigo (IND)
  • Attorney General—Miguel Angel Brito Meta (IND)
  • Labor—Virgilio Mainardi (PRD)
  • Public Properties—Jose A. Brea Pena (PRD)
  • Agriculture—Tomas Pastoriza (IND)
  • Health—Dr. Tabare Alvarez (PLE)
  • Public Works—Emilio Almonte Jimenez (PRD)
  • Finance—Milton Messina (IND)
  • Industry and Commerce—Eduardo Leon (IND)

Guzman was generally receptive, although obviously had some difficulties with Read for Interior and Police and Franco y Franco for Education. Leon, whose presence on cabinet would be welcome in number of sectors including military, was Guzmanʼs own proposal in place of our suggestion of Andres Freites. This cabinet would provide strong representation by political independents, would offer [Page 218] undoubted competence in some key fields (particularly Messina in Finance) and would lay reasonably solid base for credible claim that Guzman formula does represent call to national unity. Remains to be seen if Guzman will be as agreeable after consulting with Caamano group and if most attractive candidates (Garcia, Pastoriza, Messina and Leon) could be persuaded to join.

10.
All this leads me to conclusion we are reaching moment of truth on Guzman solution. I believe it is still best available. I think I can get Mora to back it strongly. It will have to be pushed down the throats of Imbert and military, but Mora, Vance and I can do that too if we are told to do so. We can even get UN help if we swallow a little hemispheric pride.
11.
Apart from all the ups and downs of fun and fatigue and fantastic reporting, the dominant political facts of life here are four:
(1)
Guzman solution is nearest to desire of people that we can find.
(2)
The responsibility of decisive choice is ours.
(3)
Delay now favors Imbert who represents most primitive form of cunning feudal strongman.
(4)
Because of our massive presence, we have any number of continuing weapons to use against danger of communism.
12.
The other possibilities that remain are two. One is Imbert. We could probably help him to general temporary victory today and with less cost in life than I thought before northern victory. We can probably also get from Imbert much wider and stronger cabinet than he now has. Imbert will be hard and genuine anti-Communist and also pro-American. He will also become hated—though he is not now—because he is a superior man of force and fraud, and knows it, and shows it. I am against him.
13.
Second remaining possibility is person unknown, somewhere between Guzman and Imbert. This middle man is not in sight. I think we cannot afford to wait for such an unknown. There is sense in which both Guzman and Imbert are temporary and relatively moderate choices. Imbert is the choice of fear, and Guzman is the choice of hope.
14.
As you know, I am a hopeful type. Vance generally concurs. Bennett submitting comments.
Bennett
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Nodis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received in the Department of State at 6:53 a.m.
  2. Telegram 1902 from Santo Domingo, transmitted a list of the proposed Guzman cabinet. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65)