Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

87. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 22, 1965, 1705Z.

1896. For the President and the Secretary.

Following are some pros and cons relevant to your decision:

1. Pro: Solution meets real desires of people.

Con: In Guzman we may be buying a sizeable pig in a poke. While it is the kind of liberal-looking solution we would all like to see, some would not give it much survival value.

2. Con: We all accept that Guzman is a good man, but weak. And he has very little political experience. He himself admits he cannot now control the military group at headquarters and even PRD civilians with firebrand credentials such as Pena Gomez and his group confess they have lost power to influence situation. This headquarters group is very shadowy; we do not really know focus of its control. There is rather general agreement that it is not Caamano.

To put a good but weak man up against a group of strong and determined men of dubious motivations and objectives is to provide a set-up for take-over. An honorable man might well choose to get out, but the damage would have been done.

Pro: Headquarters group will not be real center of power after Guzman is in, and while we do not know as much about them as we would like, there is no reason to credit them with superhuman skills for day-to-day action after battle ends. Takeover by real Communists is impossible while we are here and we need not leave until we are satisfied it is safe.

3. Con: What happens to the Dominican military, a group for whom we have no great admiration but which does represent an organized authority which has had its uses in holding country together this past month against strong undertow and active efforts from Ciudad Nueva. Our forcing them to take Guzman and co. is going to be very messy, public affair, and it may well leave armed forces shattered and fragmented. Destruction of up-country military detachments in reflection of divisions in capital could have most serious consequences nationally and could precipitate breakdowns in towns around country which have thus far been avoided. There is nothing extreme left would like better than to see armed forces rent asunder (and filled with resentment against us) while arms are loose in the streets in such great quantities as at present. We have seen painful results of this elsewhere.

Pro: We have means to prevent this result. Morally we have great authority with Guzman and we can have it also with new military chiefs. No one says any of these proposed new authorities is pro-Communist, and we are the ones with logistics, transport and communications.

4. Con: Some of us cannot accept Benitezʼ assumption that the men at rebel headquarters are “adolescents with guns.” There are indeed too many kids with weapons wandering about terrorizing the public and shooting things up for the hell of it—the classic revolutionary tactic of passing out weapons indiscriminately to the “people” was one of the most serious things done here last month. But we have seen too much here these past four weeks to consider the problem merely as a simple one of exuberant youth.

5. Con: It is regrettable we cannot now look forward to departure of any rebel military. If we are to take at face value the notion that the heroes of the revolution are butchers of the Caamano, Montes de Arache and Pena Tavares variety (the first two have been killers since Trujilloʼs day and have been so employed—Montes for instance was sent to Venezuela to do in Betancourt, while Pena is perhaps a Communist if reports are to be believed), not to mention worthies such as Aristy and Cury, then the moral base of the revolution and of Guzmanʼs government is sadly compromised. On this view, with all their faults, reasonable competent and professional officers such as Rivera Caminero, Jimenez and De Los Santos are preferable. Incidentally, we all agree Wessin must go—and soon.

Pro: The key to this is not in who leaves for a few months. The key is in gradual reassertion of legitimate authority, including that of Guzman above all and then of de Leon and service chiefs. Some of us are now convinced that we can do this job better by not forcing departures even if we could—which is very doubtful indeed.

6. Con: The alternatives of leadership are bleak, and in the situation which has developed in past week here they lead back to Imbert. We all distrust Imbert. He is tricky (although within limits) and he is no move forward. However, to some of us he seems less a step backward than Balaguer, whom so many regard as the electoral answer next time. Imbert has a certain national consciousness, a quality rare among Dominicans; and he has guts, even more rare here. He is not without some appeal in the north and east of country and he has been picking up support as he has been winning. While the people of the country have very burning frustrations and we must move massively to meet their legitimate social and economic aspirations (whatever the governing group), political support for the PRD can be exaggerated. (And not all of it necessarily transferable to Guzman, who is not a widely known public figure.) After all, both Trujillistas and the military voted in bloc for Bosch in 1962 out of fear of reprisals in event of UCN victory. They would not do so again. Recent polls showed Balaguer running well ahead of Bosch, and an admittedly inconclusive polling of “constitutionalist” prisoners taken here by our forces has shown a preference for Balaguer by just over 50 percent of those interrogated.

Pro: There can be no real doubt—as Postigo told us yesterday—that strong majority of people will prefer Guzman to Imbert.

7. Con: It should not be too difficult to broaden and strengthen Imbertʼs cabinet to give it more appeal and competence. (He already has one Bosch man.) Judicious handholding, help and pressure by us could influence him in right directions. He is pro-US but can go off reservation and get ugly if he feels himself pushed into corner.

Pro: There is truth in this, but the passion for power in Imbert is strong, and such men usually manage to take us into camp because they cheat and we do not. Imbert will be as hard to manage as Aristy would be.

8. Con: Washington may consider Imbert too difficult a proposition to sell to US press and to some good neighbors. We recognize his very real handicaps in this regard. In an ideal world no one would choose Imbert; however, our situation here and our prospects are about as un-ideal as possible. Imbert is at least a going concern and, despite admitted marks against him, is picking up strength. Guzman has appeal but he has not left the post. And getting him onto the track is going to be difficult.

Pro: The apparent strength of Imbert and the apparent weakness of Guzman can be turned around dramatically when decision is made and some authority delegated. And selling Imbert as final result of US intervention is job some of us think US could never succeed in doing.

9. Whatever your decision it will have unanimous and unreserved support of Bennett, Bundy, Vance and Palmer.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 1:58 p.m.