Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

51. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 2, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Meeting on the Dominican Republic—May 2, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary McNamara, Mr. Vance, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Mann, Mr. Greenfield, Mr. Crockett, Mr. Solomon, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Moyers, Mr. Chase

Attached is a list of the decisions taken at the meeting.² The following points were also made, although it should be noted that this may not be a comprehensive report in view of the fact that I was out of the meeting room on several occasions:

1. Information—Mr. Bundy and others noted that the President is very keen to get an information operation going at top speed in the Dominican Republic. A number of ideas were discussed. For example, CIA should turn its transmitter over to USIA. Second, we should talk to the appropriate people about broadcasting from Puerto Rico; in this regard, we should probably use the station that Bosch is using since people are already listening to it. Third,DOD should supply USIA with any additional equipment that USIA might not have readily available. Fourth, we should take some action with respect to jamming rebel broadcasts.

One object of the information operation should be to make it clear that we are not tied closely to Wessin. This is hurting US with the Dominican people.

2. The Military Situation—It was reported that the President wanted to get two more battalions of troops into the Dominican Republic as soon as possible. In this regard, Secretary McNamara said that the troops in question would be in the Dominican Republic by May 3.

Mr. Vance gave the details on three possible plans to isolate the rebels. Plan A would be the tightest perimeter and would close most of the rebels off in the southeast corner of the city. This would take two divisions to set up, 7 days to complete, and involve heavy casualties. Plan B, which would start a little north of the bridge and move west-southwest, would give the rebels more room. It would take one division to set up, 24 hours to complete, and involve medium casualties. Plan C, which would give the rebels all of Santo Domingo, would take 3 to 5 days to complete and one division and one brigade to hold. It would involve the fewest casualties.

Mr. Vance reported that General Wheeler recommended Plan B, and after considerable discussion, the group agreed. Among other things, the heavy casualties made Plan A unacceptable. Among other things, Plan C would give the rebels the whole city; they could credibly declare a provisional government. Among other things, Plan B was quick, militarily the soundest, and, in fact, could be accomplished by less than a division. It would close in most of the rebels; if there was a subsequent problem, Plan C could be added on to Plan B.

3. Role of the OAS Commission—The group discussed in detail the ways and means of making Plan B politically acceptable. The group agreed that we should try to get the OAS Commission to recommend the establishment of a “line of communications.” This recommendation could be a part of a series of such recommendations as the following: (a) a request for a cease-fire; (b) a call for all civilians to turn in their arms; (c) a request for the provision of relief.

4. Relief—The group talked about setting up a relief operation in the city. Tony Solomon was chosen as the man in charge and it was agreed that he should receive energetic support from DOD. In this regard, one of the main objectives of the relief operation is to make it clear that our soldiers do other things besides fire weapons at Dominicans.

5. Political Problems in the Dominican Republic—The group discussed the political problems brought about by the present crisis. Here are some of the points which were made:

(a) It might be desirable to get a team of such people as Betancourt and Figueres to go to the Dominican Republic and to act as advisors to whatever government is put together.

(b) As a start towards establishing some order, Mr. Mann mentioned the desirability of establishing three councils of the provinces. One advantage would be to ensure that there would not be places in the hinterlands where the rebels are the only points of authority.

(c) The group discussed the problem of how we move away from the Junta. It was generally agreed that, while we need a civilian government and while we are not enamored by Wessin, we may not yet want to go too far in leaning away from the Junta; it would probably break completely whatever authority the Junta still has.

The group agreed that we ought to guard against giving the rebels any political stature at this time.

(d) In discussing possible Dominican leaders, the name of Tony Imbert came up. Mr. Mann said that, even though he is no jewel, he might be one of the best of a sorry lot. While he has played footsie with the Communists, Imbert is not a Communist, is tough, and could never be accused of being a Trujillo man; in this latter regard, he was the man who pulled the trigger on Trujillo.

The possibility of using Balaguer was discussed. Mr. Fitzgerald made the point that if Balaguer were used as an interim provisional leader, he would be out of the running as a long-term leader in the future; this would be too bad. The group decided, however, that the situation is so critical that options involving Balaguer should be explored further.

(e) The group agreed that Bosch should not go to the Dominican Republic. Instead, he should be requested to broadcast, from Puerto Rico, his call to Dominicans to lay down their arms.

6. Press Handling—Mr. Greenfield urged that we more openly discuss the Communist angle of the Dominican situation; our evacuation fig leaf is just not all that credible. Most of the group, however, believed that, on May 3 at least, we should speak relatively softly on this angle and concentrate attention on the relief aspects of the Dominican operation.

GC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings on the Dominican Republic Planning Group. Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Drafted on May 4 by Chase. This is a record of a “Dominican Task Force” meeting. Although no time appears on the memorandum, Document 49 indicates that a meeting of this group was scheduled to take place at 9:30 a.m.
2. Attached but not printed.