Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

49. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson ¹

Washington, May 1, 1965.

The General Situation at My Desk at 6:30 PM

1. I talked to Fortas,² and he talked to Bosch. His general conclusion is that Bosch is essentially out of control and probably that Colonel Camano is also out of control. Bosch is bitter and lays all of the responsibility to our failure to communicate, to Ambassador Bennettʼs vindictiveness, our failure to respond to Colonel Camanoʼs complaints of firing by our troops, and to Ambassador Martinʼs failure to communicate effectively between the Commanding General and Colonel Camano.

Abe told him that all this was irrelevant and that the essential point now is that the rebels are still firing in a time of cease-fire and that no one could answer for the consequences if this firing did not stop. Abe does not think we can expect much from this and suggested a desperate effort by John Martin to re-establish contact in the city and press for observance of the cease-fire. Earlier in the day we sent Martin a flash message to this purpose.³ Tom Mann is now sending him another.⁴

Meanwhile, both State and Defense have asked their men on the spot for their immediate recommendations on action this evening, but my own belief is that we must stick with the cease-fire, unless all hell breaks loose in a quite literal sense, until after we get the OAS Commission on the spot.

2. We have sent strong personal messages using your name to Gordon in Brazil, to Harriman in Colombia, and to Bernbaum in Venezuela.⁵ (Moscoso had his talk with Leoni and went right back to Puerto Rico, to my great astonishment.)⁶ We have no answer back but we should know more by morning. Mann has done a similar job in other countries and is sending you a separate report.⁷

3. I talked to Kilpatrick of the Post and Frankel of the Times, and Bromley talked to Gulick of the AP, to brief on our intelligence that Communists are more and more active and Boschʼs own party more and more scattered to asylum and hiding. This was all “Government sources,” not White House. Bromley gave Gulick the figure of 58—Gulick had tried 53 on him first.

We spend much of the day trying to find the first Costa Ricans for the right Liberal to speak to, and Tom Mann and I finally settled on John Reilly of Hubert Humphreyʼs office. Reilly is to go to Costa Rica at once. He is friendly with the men who are said to have most influence with Orlich,⁸ and he is to make the strongest possible pitch for token troops—Costa Rica has no Army but a few police would be a great help.

4. The task force you ordered is set up and at work. It met at 3 this afternoon and meets again at 9:30 in the morning. Its members are Bundy, Mann, Vance, Wilson, Helms, with one expert each.⁹ This afternoon we settled a number of odds and ends like gas and the draft statement. We also ordered contingent military planning for both a tight cordon inside the city and a wider cordon outside the heavily built-up area. On the political side we cleared the revised instructions to Bunker and reinforced existing efforts for longer-range planning.¹⁰ But after considerable discussion we agreed with Mann that the situation on the ground is decisive and we will have to play the political moves by ear, and day-by-day. Mann went off to see Betancourt, and I strongly urged him to give Betancourt encouragement and keep the Betancourt plan¹¹ in the air. Tom himself is very skeptical on this but he agreed not to throw cold water on the plan.

McG. B.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. X, 4/15–5/31/65. Secret.
2. On April 30 at 12:45 p.m. President Johnson informed Mann during a telephone conversation that Abe Fortas was being “transferred” to him. Essentially this meant Fortas was now to work closely with Mann and other top Presidential advisers on the Dominican crisis. (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 30, 1965)
3. Not found. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John B. Martin who left Santo Domingo on September 28, 1963, arrived in Washington from Connecticut the morning of April 30 on request of President Johnson, and met with the President and other advisers in the White House Cabinet Room from 8:30 to 10:45 a.m. that morning (see Document 42). During this meeting the President wanted Martin “to help the OAS and the [Papal] Nuncio [Monsignor Clarizio] get a cease-fire, stop the bloodshed and to report the facts to the President.” (Martin, Overtaken By Events, p. 661) It was decided that Martin would be most helpful if he were in Santo Domingo. Martin and Shlaudeman arrived in Santo Domingo at 4:45 p.m., April 30.
4. Not found.
5. A May 1 memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy indicates that these messages conveyed a request from President Johnson to Latin American governments for contributions of ground, air, or naval units to the American forces already present in the Dominican Republic. Read informed Bundy that Brazil and Venezuela had agreed to contribute troops to an Inter-American Peace Force, but Chile had not. Read also told Bundy that Colombiaʼs response had not yet been obtained by Ambassador Harriman who had just arrived in that country to speak with its President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III)
6. A meeting between Teodoro Moscoso, consultant to President Johnson and former U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress, and Raul Leoni, President of Venezuela, took place in Caracas on April 30. According to telegram 1439 from Caracas, May 1, President Leoni favored an “OAS Evaluation Committee” comprised of Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, and was very interested in the idea of an “OAS Trusteeship” for the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Dominican Crisis 1965, Background Documents)
7. Not found.
8. Francisco Orlich, President of Costa Rica.
9. A meeting on the situation in the Dominican Republic was held in the White House Cabinet Room on May 1 from 8:40–10:35 a.m. In addition to President Johnson, who joined the meeting at 9:40 a.m., the following attended: Marvin Watson, Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Carl Rowan, Bunker, Ball, General Wheeler, Mann, Valenti, Moyers, Richard Goodwin, Bromley Smith, McGeorge Bundy, and Averell Harriman, who left the meeting at 9:35 a.m. During this meeting President Johnson expressed his unhappiness with “the CIA information coming in” and wanted a task force made up of Helms, Mann, and Vance to “study the situation everyday.” Handwritten notes of this meeting taken by Jack Valenti are in the Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes, Meeting in Cabinet Room, May 1, 1965, 8:40 a.m. Participation in this task force included other high-level advisers on the Dominican Republic from the CIA, the Department of Defense, USIA, AID, and other agencies as necessitated. The “Dominican Task Force” usually met in the morning at the White House and because Bundy was its chairman it was also known as the “Bundy Committee.”
10. Not found.
11. Two telegrams, 010729Z and 810239Z, both dated May 1, from the CIA to the Director of the National Security Agency reported that José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica, and Romulo Betancourt, former President of Venezuela, discussed the previous day the possibility of introducing a motion to the OAS Council on May 1 calling for the establishment of a four-nation (Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, United States) military and governmental command in the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III) In a May 1 memorandum on the Betancourt proposal to McGeorge Bundy, Bowdler wrote: “In reflecting on this proposal, I think it is unrealistic to believe that the OAS would authorize a given number of countries to form, in effect, a government to administer the DR. The proposal would be more palatable and sellable to the Latins if it were carried out behind the facade of a Dominican Provisional Government asking for OAS administrative and military support, the lionʼs share of which we would furnish.” (Ibid., NSC Histories, Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, Background Documents)