41. Transcript of Teleconference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the Dominican Republic1
Participants:
- Deputy Under Secy. Mann, Ambassador Bunker, Asst. Sec. Vaughn.
Subject:
- Dominican Situation.
- Santo Domingo Ready.
Present: Amb Bennett and Connett.
Washington Item 1.
- 1.
- Our assessment here is that a rebel victory would probably lead to a pro-Communist government. Do you agree with this?
- 2.
- If this assessment correct then we feel it essential to take whatever action required to forestall this result. Do you think that direct military action is likely to be required for this purpose and to protect American lives?
- 3.
- If so you should not hesitate to recommend whatever types of action you feel are needed.
- 4.
- Obviously we wish to avoid military action as long as there is reasonable chance junta forces can prevail.
- 5.
- Please comment.
[Santo Domingo] Item 1.
Agreed.
[Page 95]- [1.]
- The extremists might according to some reports we have name Juan Bosch for appearance sake but they would dominate him and probably discard him quickly.
- [2.]
- Communications continue to be appalling inadequate but weakness of leadership and lack of coordination is fundamental in problem. You can see sorry situation we are dealing with. While forces of left know what they want and have performed with great tactical and strategic proficiency.
- 3.
-
We are in full concurrence with additional Marine landings now taking place. Others more qualified than I to decide nature and size of forces needed but obviously now that we are in this we must do the full job as needed.
[name not declassified] has joined telecon along with ArmAtt and NavAtt.2
- 4.
- Perhaps additional Marine support will spur counter forces on we will continue do our best prod them. End Item 1.
Washington Item 2.
Define by streets the area controlled by rebels. (Use ESSO map if you desire.) What is strength and morale of rebel forces?
Are there any other significant rebel elements outside this defined area and if so where?
What is disposition of alliance forces, their strength and their morale?
Why have alliance ground forces not closed with rebels?
[Santo Domingo] Item 2.
- 1.
- Texaco map in Spanish of DomRep, is one we have used and marked. Area under heavy rebel activity bounded to north by Pedro Livio Cedeno, on west by Avenida Maximo Gomez, to south by Caribbean, and on east by Ozama River. Southeast portion of above area is rebel stronghold.
- 2.
- There no significant rebel elements outside this area, although there are groups of snipers.
- 3.
- TA air force and Wessin forces just west of Duarte Bridge, less than 1000 men. Rivera Cuestas forces are in northern part of city just west of Maximo Gomez Avenue, number unknown. Portion Montas force occupies palace. Another Montas-Peguero force along coast between fair grounds and conservatory of music; [garble—another [Page 96] principal] concentration of navy force are of 150 at fair grounds; also naval vessels, available for shore bombardment. Morale is generally low among all units.
- 4.
- Discussed in some detail under item 1 para 2.
To summarize: Junta ground forces have not moved toward rebels because of tired unfed troops, lack of adequate communications, and interservice bickering. It looks that way as result weakness inefficiency and indecisiveness of local military leadership as indicated in fact they failed today to take any significant action to close out the situation. Wessin has done little or nothing for last three days but now pleads weariness mechanical troubles with tanks many of his people shot up and troops exhausted. Other commanders take same position and Montas shows complete disorganization as supreme chief of forces. De los Santos has been steadfast but reluctant do any more bombing except in direct support of troops and no action of that type “little or no” has been forthcoming. Army Attaché returned short while ago from San Isidro. His report about same as that of Air Attaché who spent last night there and returned early this morning. Army Attaché found everyone there dead on feet and arguing among themselves as to how job should be done. This is repeat of yesterday (snipers are busy at US again and lights have just gone out). Army Attaché gave those present briefing on classic tactics for securing urban areas they appeared interested and heartened by his briefing and as he was leaving they were actively discussing the points he had made. Whether this means they will do more than talk is somewhat problematical in view of inactivity of yesterday and today despite superiority of forces. At this stage their troops have flagging morale and attachés do not doubt they will be defecting in some numbers tonight. Inaction and indecision has been characteristic of most military commanders on junta side during this crisis. There has been also some San Cristobal political activity going on and with Marine landing yesterday I frankly think they have some feeling—at least some people like Montas Peguero and perhaps Wessin that they can sit back now and let US do an efficient job for them. We should resist getting drawn in this way to maximum extent possible which would not cause operation to fail. In sending Air Attaché to San Isidro a few minutes ago to talk with leadership I instructed him to tell them, in connection with our landings this afternoon, that we do not intend to do their job for them. We can discuss more of that later. When they asked Air Attaché to come to San Isidro just now De Los Santos asked him to set down behind hangars at distance from headquarters this might imply further deterioration in relations between De Los Santos on one hand and Montas group on other. We probably wonʼt know more bout this until Fishburn returns. Naval Attaché returned short while ago from meeting with Navy Chief Rivera. He was with [Page 97] Imbert Luna and Col Casado (in charge 200 men in National Palace). Morale of these officers much higher and they attempting clean up attack toward east with or without approval Montas. Officers complaining their forces are not adequately equipped to fight tanks and automatic weapons. They appear eager to fight and if given proper equipment and means of communication.
SecState Item 2
Para 4 was answered in sense that ground forces have not moved toward rebels because of tired unfed troops, lack of adequate communications, and interservice bickering. End item.
Washington Item 3.
If our forces secure area north and west of area defined by you as controlled by rebels could Dominican forces secure area controlled by rebels? If not, why not?
What is situation in rest of country? Should we consider sending forces to Santiago, for example?
[Santo Domingo] Item 3.
- 1.
- No, unless remedies are found for reasons stated in item 2 paragraph 4.
- 2.
- Situation in remainder of country presently not grave, but dependent on immediate success or failure of junta forces in capital. We should not consider further deployment at this time.
Washington Item 4.
- 1.
- We are considering plans for Marines to establish an international safety zone that would enclose an area including the Embassy and polo grounds and the water front between those two points. Do you think this is feasible and useful?
- 2.
- Purpose of such an international zone would be to assure safe area for all foreigners. What kind of statement would you recommend be made for the Dominican people when zone is established?
- 3.
- What other steps would you feel were necessary to give status to this zone?
[Santo Domingo] Item 4.
Believe safety zone of kind described would not be desirable as announced policy because area involved comprises residential area inhabited mostly by upper classes, this would discriminate against Dominican residents of poorer districts. Same purpose could be achieved by representing our advance as logical move stemming from presence our forces in western outskirts of city in cooperative effort with [Page 98] Dominican forces proceeding from other directions. Regardless of how mission publicly represented, believe it would not be possible to establish completely secure area of size contemplated with forces presently available.
Item 4 paras 2 and 3 not applicable in view of foregoing.
SecState Item 5.
Correct list of confrees following have just arrived:
- Secy. Rusk
- Under Secy. Ball
- Secy. McNamara
- Gen. Wheeler
- Adm. Raborn End Item 5
SecState Item 6.
On basis confused situation do you have a recommendation as to action we should take within next 6 to 12 hours?
Answer this question prior all others. End Item 6.
[Santo Domingo Item 6].
Most important action which can be taken within next 12 hours is to commit sufficient troops to do job here rapidly and effectively. This should be complemented by immediate action for large scale logistical supply for needs Dominican people, including military, which suffering from critical shortages of food and medical attention and supplies. This need will increase to very large proportions if present situation is prolonged.
SecState Item 7.
- 1.
- We would like your political judgement and military judgement of task force commander as to feasibility of operation tonight to seal off downtown section containing heaviest Communist concentration.
- 2.
- Would additional forces be needed for operation?
- 3.
- Political concept would be to create cordon sanitaire thus establishing enforced cease fire. OAS would then be asked to negotiate political settlement between conflicting sides with United States influence applied to avoid Communist solution.
- 4.
- Would appreciate your comments. End Item 7.
[Santo Domingo] Item 7.
- 1.
- From purely political standpoint would be very desirable to seal off downtown section tonight. Military judgement task force commander not available to US since he located on [USS] Boxer and we cannot [Page 99] communicate with him rapidly except by non-secure voice channel. Suggest you communicate with him directly.
- 2.
- Chief MAAG and NavAtt, both Marine officers, consider additional forces would be needed.
- 4.
- [sic] We had ourselves been thinking of operation to seal off downtown section, leaving clean-up there to Dominican forces. However, must emphasize that this western section of city is infested with roving bands and snipers. Marines have just killed fifth of latter on perimeter Embassy grounds. As for negotiation political settlement, bitterness of struggle has hardened both sides against negotiation. We should bear in mind that we are dealing with mad dogs now as regards leftist forces. We should avoid any settlement which would give this group status or foothold in arrangements looking toward legitimate government.
Police Chief Despradel tells US he has been informed from La Romana (south Puerto Rico sugar town) that all is secure there. There is some street fighting but situation under control. 175 there have requested evacuation and we will arrange have boat put in there on route Puerto Rico. Despradel states situation Santiago and other areas apparently secure at this time. He has not heard from Fortaleza Ozama and our military see no way supply it with food.
Situation Latin American Embassies slightly improved through information just received that Imbert furnishing two hundred his men as guards. Ecuadoran told me short while ago he had no one at his Embassy despite many asylees then commented perhaps it just as well to have no one outside to draw attention. He was thinking of police.
SecState Item 8.
Nothing further from this end.
If you do not have anything further to send US Washington wishes terminate conference as of 30/0035Z
Advise immediately.
Conferees this end wish you all best of luck.
[Omitted here are comments from Santo Domingo indicating that telephone service was to stop at midnight and a query regarding the arrival in Santo Domingo of an OAS committee.]