40. Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and President Johnson 1

Bundy: Have you seen the over-night things or had a chance to talk to Tom Mann?

President: I have not talked to him.

Bundy: There is no real news. Itʼs perfectly clear that the rebels have dug in down in the city with in-town guerrilla techniques—bazookas and mortars. There is going to be a very tough fight unless they are starved out. We donʼt know very much about the tactical situation. Our own people are all right. Bennett doesnʼt want more than the 400 he has got at the moment. We are backed up with good strong forces that are available at intervals of up to about 8 hours now for more battalions from outside the area. We have got another 1,000 men right offshore if we want them, and 2,000 more 8 hours away and another 2,000 at one day intervals from there on. We are not going to need that force unless Buzz Wheeler is very much surprised. But the political front is the one that is hotting up. There will be a meeting in the OAS this morning. Leoni has pitched in pretty hard with the clear implication that we are against dictatorships on both sides. If there is this kind of violence by Castro-types in the city, I think we can expect very good support in the OAS because it is just what about two thirds of those governments are afraid of. The Castro people have taken out after US pretty hard on the radio and the Soviets are beginning to do so, although they havenʼt yet zeroed in very hard.

We have a problem with a request for asylum from Reid and Caceres, who are two of the triumvirs who have been thrown out. We are trying to get them taken care of either by the Papal Nuncio or by some other Embassy so we wonʼt be in the particular position of protecting unpopular people but they would get stabbed in the back by the Commies if they were caught so we have a certain obligation there. We will simply be dependent upon information from there as the day goes forward. My guess is that we now have a sufficient force on the ground. We will have to wait and see if the Dominicans can handle it for themselves with this moral support. But weʼll have to keep a sharp eye to [Page 92] be ready to take stronger action if it looks as if the Communists were beginning to win. Our own people of course have only perimeter defense and evacuation orders. They have taken 2 or 3 hundred people out as of last night. That still means, if my figures are right, 800 odd Americans who arenʼt ready to leave or who havenʼt asked to leave or who are not in an area where they can be removed. We have enclaves at the Embassy, Hotel Ambassador, polo field. The Task Force Commander is sending a senior officer ashore, probably has him there now, to be in touch both with the military authorities, the friendly ones and with the Embassy. Our situation in terms of our own position is strong, but the situation on the other side is simply indeterminate. That at least is the way it reads to me after talking to people around town this morning.

President: Do the rebels have much strength? I thought the General [Wessin y Wessin] had done pretty well with his tanks.

Bundy: But one of his tanks got knocked out, and they arenʼt in a hurry to go through the town as I understand it now. I think that weʼre in a situation where the rebels are pretty well into pockets. But if the police lose their courage or if the rebels extend their holdings in the city, you could have yourself a very tough cleaning up operation. And it wouldnʼt be a happy decision to have to ask the Marines to do that, but I donʼt think it will come to that in the course of the day. Iʼll be surprised if it does.

President: We want to be very, very careful not to sit here and let them augment their forces. Where are these Castroites coming from? The inside?

Bundy: This is all inside as I understand it so far. And Iʼm quite sure I think we ought to make sure the Navy is watching. But I will be very surprised if the Cubans try anything in the way of an invasion. We certainly ought to watch for it because itʼs not a surprise we want to have get away on us.

President: I sure donʼt want to wake up a few hours later and say weʼre awaiting developments and find out Castroʼs in charge. Now who are we depending on to avoid this? Bennett?

Bundy: Bennett and the Agency; we have a double check. Now the Agency was extremely slow in informing US yesterday and we climbed up and down their back. Itʼs not Rabornʼs fault but some of his technical people were protecting their goddamn codewords and it took one of their very important messages 5 hours to get here. Bennett, fortunately, was not interrupted; it was very, very good work by Bromley Smith who was feeding that stuff into US yesterday afternoon that allowed US to take those decisions so the troops were in before nightfall. It would have been damn hard to have put them in if we hadnʼt done it that fast. So we just made it yesterday and weʼve got all those wires who have been skinned and bruised during the night.

[Page 93]

President: They tell me they have been expecting this and anticipating it and CIA has been telling US about it every day. Is that true?

Bundy: Iʼll have to do a check, but Iʼll have to say that there was nothing in it that gave me any sense of alarm.

President: Letʼs do that.

Bundy: The first I knew of it was when Bennett came up here.2

President: Theyʼre already saying I told you so.

Bundy: You can count on it. Thereʼs always some bastard who wants to play that game. Iʼll have Bromley do a re-check on that.

[Omitted here is a short discussion about Bundy and the Presidentʼs schedule later that day. Bundy tells the President that he is expected in New York for lunch but offers to stay in Washington if that is what the President prefers. Johnson decides that Bundy should go to New York as planned.]

Bundy: I really think weʼve got the contingencies taped here so that it is a matter of picking off the order. The only tough part is how to be sure which is the right order. But we canʼt be absolutely sure. Weʼll never be sure that they wouldnʼt have won without the United States. We only know that we could not take that chance. That will be the same shape of the decision from now on out.

President: I donʼt think we could have been wrong yesterday, I think we will be wrong when we donʼt do enough, or we go in and do too much. We havenʼt done anything now but evacuate. But if we become a party to the fact …

Bundy: Our problem is to have our force operate as potential and not as operational. Thatʼs the exact shape of the problem. And, therefore, there ought to be plenty on the scene and visible so the moral effect will be decisive.

President: Why did he [Bennett] just want 400?

Bundy: I guess he feels thatʼs enough at the moment. I honestly havenʼt seen the detail of his report.3

President: It looks like to me that thatʼs the only weakness thing; I can well understand why he doesnʼt want them buzzing around. I would certainly raise the question if you are going to have any moral effect, if you are trying to dig out our own people, and if youʼre trying to locate them in the hinterland.

Bundy: … if you want it perfectly clear whoʼs strong …,

President: … and if you want excellent intelligence, I donʼt see why you keep them on a carrier where they canʼt see anything.

[Page 94]

Bundy: The politics of 400 and of 1,500 are identical it seems to me.

President: I would let them get my intelligence. Iʼd let them know this and that. You might get some of them killed, thatʼs the only thing. I would think we would likely know more about whatʼs happening, likely to be a greater deterrent; seems to me everything would be in favor of having more people aboard because we could get our people out better, and round them up better.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcript of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.11, Side B, PNO 2 and 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. President Johnson placed the call to Bundy; they talked for approximately 10 minutes.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 23.
  3. Not further identified.