Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

352. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs for the Latin American Policy Committee¹

Washington, January 19, 1966.

POLICY AND ACTION PAPER FOR HAITI

I. Assessment of Current Situation

A. Background

1. Political

After declaring himself “president for life” in 1964 Duvalier has consolidated his control of Haiti by eliminating or terrorizing all actual and visible opposition to his rule.

Duvalier has not recently committed so many atrocities against Haitians and foreign residents of Haiti as he did earlier in his regime, probably because there is less identifiable opposition to him than in the past and because he wishes to improve his image abroad. Extortion, corruption, and brutality still characterize his government, however, and the general economic situation has reached new lows.

The Haitian Government has cooperated with the United States on issues arising in the OAS, the UN and other international forums, but this is apparently based upon the hope of eliciting foreign economic assistance rather than an identification with U.S. objectives.

In July 1965 a group of Haitian exiles began broadcasting to Haiti in Creole from Station WRUL in New York City. Listener interest has been greater than anticipated and through the stationʼs efforts the Haitian people have performed a few acts demonstrating their opposition to Duvalier and support of the exile group but exposing the demonstrators to a minimum of retaliation. The exiles estimate, probably correctly, that Haitians believe the broadcasts are a prelude to a foreign-based operation to overthrow Duvalier, but if such an operation does not take place within six to nine months listener interest will decline and the latent non-marxist opposition within Haiti will disappear. The exiles also believe that if Duvalier remains in power another year few exiles will maintain an active interest in Haitian affairs and there will be no pro-West exile group capable of assuming power upon Duvalierʼs departure.

Haitian Communist parties are in complete disarray following Duvalierʼs arrest of a number of Haitian Communist leaders in July 1965 and the voluntary exile of others. Communist intellectual influence continues to increase, particularly among Haitian youths and intellectuals. There are unconfirmed reports of Communist training schools in the Cayes area, but it is unlikely that any significant amount of organized Communist activity can be conducted in Duvalierʼs police state.

In view of the weakness of opposition to Duvalier a successor regime will most likely be composed of one or more of Duvalierʼs lieutenants. If, however, Duvalierʼs lieutenants fight for power among themselves chaos could result which would invite a Communist bid for power.

Our Embassy at Port-au-Prince has been successful in avoiding clashes with the Duvalier regime and in executing its two-year-old mission of maintaining its presence and preventing the expulsion of its personnel. It has not been appreciably successful in influencing key elements of Haitian society except the press and the business, religious and diplomatic communities. As a result of Duvalierʼs pressure upon Haitians, United States personnel have limited contact with civilian and military officials, youth, labor, peasants, students, teachers, intellectuals and other groups most likely to provide the future leadership of Haiti.

[Omitted here are sections on economic, social, cultural, and security.]

II. Policy Objectives and Lines of Action-International Relations

Political

A. General Objective

Haitian understanding, acceptance and support for United States foreign policy objectives.

1. Specific Short-Term Objective

Continued support by Haiti for United States objectives in the United Nations, the Organization of American States and other international organizations.

Lines of Action

a. Urge the acceptance of United States objectives through personal contacts with Haitian officials, emphasizing the basis for United States positions as well as urging Haitian support for them.

b. Through public media and in contact with business, youth, religious, university and other leaders of Haitian society, publicize United States positions on key international issues and the bases for them.

2. Specific Short-Term Objective

Encourage the Haitian Government to develop and use generally recognized instruments and methods in the conduct of its foreign relations.

Lines of Action

a. Encourage Duvalier to use normal diplomatic and other recognized channels in his dealings with the United States and international agencies and discourage his use of unofficial intermediaries.

b. Discourage visits to Haiti by high-ranking officials of the United States unless such visits are clearly in the national interest and specifically coordinated with the activities of our Embassy at Portau-Prince.

c. If Duvalier should again take reprisals against United States personnel in Haiti or attempt to use Haitiʼs votes in international gatherings improperly to his advantage, insure that such actions prove clearly unproductive from his point of view.

Economic

B. General Objective

A mutually advantageous economic relationship designed to promote the long-term interests of the United States.

1. Specific Short-Term Objectives

Increasing mutually satisfactory trade with the United States.

Lines of Action

a. Urge Haiti to provide improved facilities for tourists and to avoid incidents which discourage tourist travel to Haiti.

b. Assist Haiti in obtaining fair prices for its exports in international markets.

c. Encourage Haiti to diversify and improve the quality of its exports through meaningful contacts with reliable international traders.

d. Encourage American business to help Haiti in the production and export of winter vegetables, particularly from the Antibonite Valley.

e. Urge Haiti to improve its climate for productive foreign investment.

f. Approve applications for investment guaranties where such applications meet AID criteria.

g. Continue visits to Haiti by United States naval vessels, subject to advance clearance by the Embassy in each case.

2. Specific Short-Term Objective

Security of American lives and property in Haiti and respect for legitimate contractual obligations with American interests.

Lines of Action

a. Conduct appropriate representations with the Haitian Government to protect American lives and property.

b. Maintain contact with American private interests in Haiti to keep informed of their problems.

c. Maintain consular protection and related services.

d. Impress upon Haitian officials and business leaders the necessity of maintaining the sanctity of contracts and concessions under the norms of international law.

Social-Cultural

C. General Objective

Understanding among all segments of the Haitian public of American culture and institutions.

1. Specific Short-Term Objective

Widely disseminated information on American domestic and foreign problems and progress in resolving them.

Lines of Action

a. Continue present USIS information and cultural programs, targeting them not only towards urban educated groups but to potential leaders among the peasants, labor and students.

b. Increase our facilities for teaching English and other cultural center activities in order to influence the younger generation and the intellectuals towards American ideals and objectives.

c. Encourage Haitian youth to develop a knowledge of the principles and methods of the Alliance for Progress and their relevance to Haiti.

d. Publicize the progress being made by and in behalf of American negroes in the United States.

Security

D. General Objective

A Haitian society opposed to Communist influence, maintaining friendly relations with neighboring countries and capable of self defense against external aggression and internal subversion directed from abroad.

1. Specific Short-Term Objective

Effective countering of any attempts to subvert the Haitian Government by direct action from abroad.

Lines of Action

a. Maintain continuing close observation of activity in the two small Communist groups in Haiti, seek the elimination of pro-Communist members of the Haitian Government and counter other forms of Communist influence in Haiti.

b. Disassociate the United States from any exile attempt to invade Haiti or any exile plot against Duvalier except under extreme provocation.

c. Maintain close surveillance over Haitian, Cuban and other exile groups to prevent the illegal use of United States territory to launch an attempt to overthrow Duvalier.

2. Specific Short-Term Objective

Increased Haitian resistance to any extension of influence over its internal or external policies by the USSR, Cuba or other Communist countries.

Lines of Action

a. Discourage Haiti from extending its political or economic relationships with the Soviet Bloc (Poland is the only Bloc country with which Haiti maintains diplomatic relations).

b. Watch carefully for any signs that Haiti has any type of contact with Cuba and move immediately to urge the Haitian Government to cut off any such contacts.

c. Continue dissemination of anti-Communist information among literate Haitians through cultural centers and missionary organizations as well as through mass media.

d. Persuade the people of Haiti, especially youth and intellectuals, that communism is a system incompatible with their own legitimate aspirations and that Cuba is the focal point of Communist danger in the Western Hemisphere.

3. Specific Short-Term Objective

Encourage normal relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Lines of Action

a. Encourage the Haitian Government to maintain its present neutral attitude toward the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic.

b. Persuade the Haitian Government to move toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic when an elected government has taken office there.

4. Specific Short-Term Objective

Prepare and maintain on a current basis plans for possible implementation upon the departure of Duvalier from the Presidency.

Lines of Action

a. Keep up to date United States plans for Emergency and Evacuation actions as well as plans designed to restore order in Port-au-Prince and Haitiʼs other important population centers. These plans might include possible use of our IAPF units in the Dominican Republic to secure the Haiti–Dominican Republic frontier in cooperation with Dominican forces, intense surveillance of the sea and airspace between Haiti and Cuba and between Haiti and other Caribbean islands, and the provision of emergency medical and food relief to the Haitian civilian population.

b. Until the OAS establishes a mechanism for dealing with anarchy and chaos in hemispheric countries, conduct continuing discussions with influential and receptive OAS member countries regarding the current situation in Haiti and plans for dealing with possible contingencies that might arise in Haiti. We would hope to elicit the cooperation and support of these countries, particularly when formal OAS action is desired.

c. Continue to maintain contact with Haitian exiles who might be useful in a severe crisis in Haiti without encouraging them to believe that they are the chosen instruments of the United States.

III. Policy Objectives and Lines of Action–Internal

Political

A. General Objective

A Haitian political system, non-Communist in orientation, with prospects for development along democratic lines and providing for the regular, orderly transfer of political power.

1. Specific Short-Term Objective

Influence of the Duvalier government in any move, however slight, toward a more democratic outlook and a lessening of its repression of the people.

Lines of Action

a. Seek opportunities for a substantive dialogue and meaningful contacts with officials of the Haitian Government, as part of the process of arriving at a level of mutual accommodation which will best promote United States interests and objectives.

b. Continue the present USIS information and cultural program and encourage United States mass media to report frequently and accurately on Haiti.

c. Disseminate through mass media, books, periodicals and personal contact descriptions of democratic societies and free social and economic systems.

d. Continue book presentation program among Haitian opinion leaders.

2. Specific Short-Term Objective

Build resources for our relations with any future government and our ability to influence it.

Lines of Action

a. Develop contacts with such potential leaders as may be identifiable among Haitian youth, intellectuals, students, labor, peasants, and military and civilian officials.

b. Promote low-cost book, magazine and pamphlet distribution preferably in French and directed towards Haitian youth and intellectuals.

Economic

B. General Objective

A healthy Haitian economy with self-sustained growth providing increasing standards of living for all elements of its population.

1. Specific Short-Term Objective

The establishment and maintenance of sound monetary and fiscal policies and practices by the Haitian Government.

Lines of Action

a. Support the IMF in its efforts to balance the Haitian budget, maintain the convertibility of the gourde and amortize the Haitian internal and external debt (including payments to private American citizens, Eximbank, AID, etc.).

b. Encourage the Haitian Government to modernize its customs and tax collection services with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund or another appropriate international agency.

c. Continue to urge through CIAP and other economic assistance agencies the incorporation of all the Haitian Governmentʼs collections and expenditures into its regular budget system.

d. Refrain from granting emergency or budget-supporting assistance to Haiti in the absence of some overriding consideration of political expediency.

2. Specific Short-Term Objective

A meaningful Haitian development program achieving a maximum of self help in its implementation but avoiding support to the Duvalier regime.

Lines of Action

a. Make clear to the Haitian Government that its economic development program and other self-help plans, by means of which Haiti would participate in the Alliance for Progress, should be evaluated by the CIAP, and, if Haiti is found eligible for AFP assistance, the Government of Haiti should look primarily to the Inter-American Development Bank and other lending organizations.

b. Insist that the Haitian Government refrain from improper interference in Haitian development agencies such as IDAI (Agricultural and Industrial Development Institute) and CAMEP (Port-au-Prince water supply project), suspending disbursement of loan funds if necessary to achieve this end.

c. Make necessary representations to protect legitimate American investment in Haiti from harassment and intimidation by Haitian officials and their agents.

d. Defer resumption of large-scale, government-to-government assistance until Haiti has made the necessary administrative and fiscal reforms and has demonstrated its readiness to cooperate fully in the development activities of international organizations.

Social-Cultural

C. General Objective

A unified Haitian society, free of racial antagonism, with equal opportunity for the members of all classes and undivided by language barriers.

1. Specific Short-Term Objective

Identification of educated Haitians with the needs and aspirations of the Haitian masses.

Lines of Action

a. Convince Haitian leaders that Haitiʼs economic future depends upon the ability of the Haitian peasantry to produce for market, purchase goods and pay taxes.

b. Encourage a university or foundation to study means of teaching large numbers of Haitian peasants the elements of the French language.

c. Stimulate greater acceptance of Fulbright Exchange Professors in Haitian universities, including professors in the social sciences and the humanities.

2. Specific Short-Term Objective

A healthy, vigorous Haitian population, consistent in size to the countryʼs economic potential.

Lines of Action

a. Continue United States financing of the Malaria Eradication Program and provide the assistance required to carry on effective malaria controls after the present program is completed.

b. Encourage and assist religious and charitable agencies to conduct programs at the community level in health, sanitation, nutrition, education and family planning, commencing with a pilot program conducted by one or more of the voluntary agencies operating in Haiti.

c. Urge the Haitian Government to conduct similar programs in health, sanitation, nutrition, and planned parenthood, using its own resources and any assistance international organizations are prepared to provide.

d. Encourage international organizations, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Special Fund, to develop and finance sound projects in health, education, nutrition and agriculture that do not support the Duvalier regime.

3. Specific Short-Term Objective

Haitian communities capable of identifying and solving local problems through joint action.

Lines of Action

a. Encourage and assist American charitable agencies to conduct community development programs in Haiti utilizing surplus agricultural commodities for self-help projects in housing, small-scale agricultural projects, street and road maintenance and similar community projects.

b. Encourage and if necessary assist third countries such as Israel to establish and operate community development and agricultural activities in Haiti.

c. Encourage and assist American universities, foundations and charities to assign young people to Haiti to assist in community development programs.

d. Stimulate private groups and third countries to undertake humanitarian programs in Haiti, particularly hospitals, clinics, schools, cooperatives, marketing, credit, agriculture and the like.

e. Encourage one or more private foundations to provide supplies, equipment, and technical assistance which are required in community development activities by the charitable agencies concerned but which are beyond their limited resources.

4. Specific Short-Term Objective

Improved technical and professional education for Haitian youth, particularly promising rural young people.

Lines of Action

a. Encourage the Inter-American Development Bank and other international organizations to develop and finance projects in agronomy, medicine, veterinary medicine, university and professional education.

b. Encourage private agencies or an American foundation to reactivate the 4–S (4–H) movement in Haiti.

c. Urge the Haitian Government to use its own resources to rehabilitate the farm extension program.

Security

D. General Objective

Haitian security forces capable of maintaining law and order in accordance with modern police concepts.

1. Specific Short-Term Objective

The development of a professional army oriented to control by a democratic constitutional government.

Lines of Action

a. Encourage the Haitian military to accept police functions as its primary mission until the economy of the country can support more ambitious missions.

2. Specific Short-Term Objective

Amelioration of Duvalierʼs repressive security apparatus and effective controls over the secret police.

Lines of Action

a. Continue to oppose and frustrate Duvalierʼs attempts to purchase arms in other countries.

b. Defer the reestablishment of a military mission in Haiti, deny any further United States military assistance to the Duvalier regime and avoid identification with the personnel of Duvalierʼs repressive security apparatus.

c. Urge Duvalier to eliminate the excesses of his security forces as necessary to improve his image abroad, the chief obstacle to increased foreign assistance, private investment and tourism.

3. Specific Short-Term Objective

Better understanding of the political forces at work in Haiti and the part played by Haitian exiles.

a. Strengthen our reporting capabilities in Haiti to insure that we will have adequate information available to us in a crisis situation.

b. Continue discreet contacts with Haitians outside the Government and with those in exile in order to attempt to build up assets for the future.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 209, Latin American Policy Committee Folder. Secret. The paper was approved by the Committee on January 19; see Document 353.