353. Draft Contingency Plan1

HAITI CONTINGENCY PLAN

I. Introduction

1.
The LAPC paper, approved January 19, 1966,2 sets forth the current situation in Haiti and the bases for the assumptions made in this contingency paper. It also sets forth some actions which prepare for contingencies described in this paper, including:
a.
Accelerated efforts to broaden our contacts in Haiti in order to influence potential successors to Duvalier.
b.
An intensified effort to obtain greater information on personalities and power relationships within Duvalierʼs entourage.
c.
Regular consultations with the representatives of selected members of the OAS to exchange ideas on the current situation and possible actions to be taken in contingencies. Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico will soon be consulted.
d.
Continued contact with non-Communist Haitian exiles.
e.
Encouragement to United States press and other mass media to report frequently and impartially on Haiti in order to influence Duvalier and the members of his entourage to the extent possible.
2.
In addition, US agencies will prepare and keep up-to-date lists of persons with experience in Haiti from which to select persons to serve on temporary duty in a crisis situation.
3.
In the existing situation, it is not possible to identify clearly the competing groups that may emerge when Duvalier falls. Lists are available of possible Haitian successors from the military, the VSN, civilian politicians and other potential power groups.

II. United States Objectives in Haiti

1.

The United States should insure that a non-Communist government is established in Haiti and preferably a government that will permit the orderly political, economic and social progress of the country.

The U.S. would prefer a successor government that:

a.
Is able to gain and maintain effective control of the country.
b.
Governs with the minimum recourse to violence and repression.
c.
Takes effective steps to begin to improve the economic and social life of the country.
d.
Continues to cooperate with the United States and other non-Communist countries on international issues.
e.
Accepts the international obligations of Haiti.
f.
Takes effective measures to eliminate any Communist influences.
g.
Commits itself to restore representative government.

2.
On the other hand, the US might have to accept a government that is able to maintain effective control of the country and is non-Communist.

III. The Problem

1.
a. When Duvalier leaves the presidency of Haiti, whether by voluntary departure, death, or forceful overthrow, the United States will want to influence the character of a successor government.
b.
If Duvalier loses control of the situation in the country, the U.S. might be required to take action to stabilize conditions and obtain an acceptable successor government.
c.
If a Cuban-based group entered the country while Duvalier was in power the U.S. would also want to take action to stabilize conditions and obtain an acceptable successor government.

IV. Assumptions

1.
There is not at present an effective force in Haiti prepared to overthrow Duvalier. However, disaffection of key followers might result in his loss of control of the country with anarchy a result. Given the lack of an effective internal or external opposition, Duvalier may be succeeded at least initially by one or more persons close to the center of power, including the military, no matter how his departure from office takes place.
2.
A struggle for power among two or more groups within the Duvalier regime may also occur. If long continued, this struggle could result in chaos and a power vacuum that would invite Communist exploitation.
3.
There is no exile group, Communist or non-Communist, capable of eliminating the Duvalier government without transport and logistical support from third countries.
4.
No third country will invade Haiti except under the most extreme provocation. Despite the known strength and determination of United States military power in the Caribbean and the limited value of dominating a country so poor and disorganized as Haiti, a Cuban supported invasion using trained Haitian exiles is a possibility. The Dominican Republic, the only other nearby country capable of mounting [Page 824] a successful invasion, is likely to be so concerned with its domestic problems that it will not mount nor permit a serious invasion effort during the foreseeable future.
5.
Communist countries would like to exercise strong influence over any new government of Haiti and can be expected to promote internal chaos if they are unable to exercise such influence.
6.
In a power vacuum or a chaotic situation in Haiti, the lives of American citizens and other foreign nationals would be threatened.

V. Summary of Contingencies

A.

1. Duvalier falls: An acceptable individual or group immediately assumes control of the country.

2. Acceptable members of Duvalierʼs entourage, being close to the source of power, might easily assume power. They would be likely to want an early accommodation with the United States.

B.

1. Duvalier falls: An unacceptable non-Communist individual or group quickly assumes control of the country.

2. Our actions in this case would be designed to promote the establishment of an acceptable government by measures short of military action. If acts of violence against American lives occur, E & E action would be required.

C.
1. Duvalier falls: Chaos follows; a struggle for power ensues between non-Communist groups.
D.

1. Duvalier falls: Chaos follows; a struggle ensues between two or more groups, one of which is dominated by the Communists or is otherwise unacceptable.

2. In Contingencies B, C and D United States actions will depend in large measure on the nature and extent of the civil disorder. These Contingencies offer a chance for effective OAS actions in a Haitian crisis. For Contingency D, United States action will, of course, depend on the nature and strength of Communist involvement.

E.

1. Duvalier falls: An individual or group in Haiti controlled by Communists quickly assumes control of the country.

2. Should this contingency present itself, the U.S. would take decisive action to install an acceptable government in its place.

F.
1. Duvalier remains in office: though anarchy and chaos result, no group moves to take power.
G.
1. Duvalier remains in office: A Cuban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invades or attempts to invade.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the plan comprising 27 pages of courses of action spread sheets and 16 pages of annexes, covering memoranda, and briefing papers.]

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263. Secret. Forwarded under an April 29 covering memorandum for consideration at the May 3 meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG). The paper indicates it was the third draft; see footnote 3, Document 351.
  2. Document 352.