Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

31. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation¹

Washington, April 28, 1965, 5:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Mann
• The President
• Secretary Rusk
• Mr. Bundy

Mr. Mann said that he thought the consensus here is that we have got to go with the judgment of those on the spot. The military commanders would have to decide on the best place.

Mr. Bundy asked if Mr. Mann could telephone the Ambassador and make it the Ambassador Hotel. Mr. Mann said he thought we should make a statement saying we are there to evacuate the 2,000 Americans and any other nationals who want to leave. Second, call on both sides to send representatives to wherever we land—the Ambassador Hotel or wherever—to negotiate terms of a cease fire and agree on the way we restore law and order and a democratic government.

Mr. Bundy asked if we wanted to take on the role of peace maker. Mr. Mann said there is a possibility that the mere landing of Marines will serve to strengthen the will of the Wessin side. The first thing is to go in and say we are there to evacuate. The second thing is to let them come and negotiate.

The President said that we were not going to announce anything until they have landed. Mr. Mann said that was correct. The President said we did not want them waiting there to shoot at US when we landed, like they did to the Belgians in the Congo.

Mr. Bundy asked who was holding the Hotel Ambassador now, and added that he assumed it was the friendlies.² Mr. Mann said we could not be sure because the Ambassador is saying that the loyal troops cannot guarantee the route from the Hotel to Haina. Mr. Bundy said in any event the recommendation was clear: we give the order and then we begin to draft the statements.

The President said he would tell the commanders to take off in the helicopters and he would tell the riders to get their statements prepared so when they do land we can say they are there to evacuate and to bring these citizens of ours out and then he would follow up with the riders. He would have the airplanes over the islands immediately—he would have the helicopters off and we would have people drafting their statements explaining we were there to evacuate.

Mr. Bundy said one thing they wanted is a clear message to Bennett asking him to get the request rephrased in these terms and not in terms of the communist threat.

Mr. Mann said he had not recognized the new Junta. He said there are political problems and we may want to call in both sides.

Mr. Bundy said if we could get the Junta to inform US that they cannot guarantee to protect the Americans.

The President said that we could say that help is on the way in response to his request to evacuate the Americans. We have been informed that the Junta can no longer do it.

Mr. Mann said that what the President wanted was a clear statement that they could no longer protect the American lives. The President said that this has already been said but he would say help was needed to protect the lives of the Americans and not refer to the communist angle. The existing government says that it wants US know it can in no way be responsible for American lives, it has reached a point where these lives are in danger, and therefore help is urgently requested. He added that in the meantime they will be on their way.

Secretary Rusk said that he thought Mr. Mann should consider giving an alternative to the Hotel Ambassador if, as a matter of fact, they cannot get in without serious losses. He said he thought the military commander should have some discretion. Mr. Mann agreed.

Mr. Bundy said that the military [illegible—and the?] military commander—and the Ambassador—should be in touch about that before they land. Mr. Mann agreed but said that we do not tell them anything until we are there. Mr. Bundy said except to coordinate with the friend-lies who are holding the area. Mr. Man said if we told them it would leak all over town. Secretary Rusk said that we would not tell them until they are actually coming in.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14, 1964–April 30, 1965. Extra Sensitive. According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary, Johnson was in the lounge of the Oval Office from 4:45 to 6:01 p.m. on April 28 meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Moyers (Ibid.) Presumably this 5:45 p.m. conference call occurred during this time.
2. The Constitutionalist forces.