Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

140. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, November 3, 1965, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Called by McGeorge Bundy on 3 November 1965 at 9:30 A.M. to Discuss the Dominican Republic Situation

PRESENT

• White House
  • Chaired by: McGeorge Bundy
  • Mr. William Bowdler
• State
  • Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
  • Under Secretary Thomas C. Mann
  • Assistant Secretary Jack H. Vaughn
  • C. Allen Stewart, Director, Caribbean Affairs
  • Mr. David Bronheim, Counsel to the U.S. Coordinator
  • Assistant Secretary Anthony M. Solomon
• Defense
  • Deputy Assistant Cyrus R. Vance
• AID
  • Mr. William S. Gaud
• CIA
  • Director of Central Intelligence
  • Chief, WH Division

1. Ambassador Bunker reviewed the situation in Santo Domingo during the period from the night of 22 October to the present. His review covered the activities of Garcia-Godoy, the OAS Committee and the military which had been reported in detail by Embassy and Agency reporting. Items of interest that had not come out clearly in the previous reporting were as follows:

a. Ambassador Bunker is of the opinion that the military (CEFA, the Air Force and specifically the Chief of Staff, General Jacinto Martinez Arana) had a connection with the clandestine radio that attacked Garcia Godoy on the night of 22 October.

b. Garcia-Godoy had requested the use of the IAPF to support him against the military chiefs and Ambassador Bunker had refused.

c. Commodore Emilio Jimenez exhibits the most sense of all military chiefs and was mainly responsible for keeping the military chiefs within bounds.

d. Garcia-Godoy especially distrusts the Chief of Staff, Arana as he claims Arana has lied to him on more than one occasion.

2. Ambassador Bunker believes that Garcia-Godoy will carry through with the “package deal”² i.e., removal of the military chiefs, the moving out of Colonel Caamano, Manuel Montes Arache, Hector Lachapelle, Hector Aristy and Franklin Dominguez, removal of the Attorney General Morel Cerda and Judge Abelardo Vicioso and the closing of Radio Santo Domingo. The Ambassador stated the timing is the significant problem. It cannot be done by November 3rd, the date planned, but he expects it will be done in “about a week to ten days.” According to the Ambassador, he further expects that Garcia-Godoy will agree to the use of the IAPF in conjunction with the National Police to attempt to pick up the arms, as it is obvious that current arms sweeps are in no way successful. The thorniest problem is still the reintegration of the rebel military into the Armed Forces. No accepted solution has been reached as yet. The Ambassador stated it was most important that the camp housing the rebel military be closed out as it is a source of potential trouble.

3. Ambassador Bunker stated the securing of the rebel zone was well done. In this connection, he described General Alvim as a continuing serious problem saying that, “everyone is a Communist to him.” The tanks have been removed, the two daily newspapers have opened as well as the banks and other business establishments. Balaguer and Bosch have now come in with statements endorsing the Provisional Governmentʼs actions.

4. Ambassador Bunker described the Dominican Ambassador to Washington, Messina, as a problem. He changes the text of statements to the OAS after Garcia-Godoy and Ambassador Bunker have agreed on them. The Foreign Minister, who serves in New York with the UN, may come to Washington to take his place.

5. Secretary Mann raised the point that Agency and FBI reporting from Santo Domingo indicated that the Leftists could win an election. He advised it was his opinion that, if there was a strong possibility the known Leftists could come into the government through an election, we should take steps to postpone the election especially as we are behind schedule anyway. He asked Ambassador Bunker for his opinion. The Ambassador agreed that we are behind schedule. He stated Garcia-Godoy is “too good” to be President, really has no supporting cabinet as all the worthwhile people refuse to take jobs and Garcia-Godoy is “killing himself.” The Ambassador stated that he is of the opinion we should make no decision now in regard to postponing the election. We should wait until the “package deal” is completed, at which time he expects things will approach normalcy and then we can make up our minds regarding the election.

6. The DCI presented and discussed a list prepared by the Agency of persons with varying degrees of Leftist connections who should be removed from the government.³ He advised he would furnish the list by memorandum to the interested agencies. Secretary Mann asked Ambassador Bunker if he thought Garcia-Godoy would really take action against the Leftists, such as action on the subject of the University. Ambassador Bunker stated he hoped so but he really didnʼt know. McGeorge Bundy asked whether the appearance of so many suspect individuals in the Judiciary was a part of a definite plan to take control of the Judiciary. Ambassador Bunker stated, in his opinion, it was not a definite plan. The Director pointed out that many of the persons on the list that he had previously mentioned were employees of the Judiciary.

7. Secretary Mann stated that he was generally concerned that the military will be neutralized. He wondered if Jimenez, if he replaced Admiral Rivera Caminero, could find capable military leaders. McGeorge Bundy stated the hardest single job is “getting the military set up.” He asked if there was any way we could force worthwhile people to work for Garcia-Godoy. The DCI stated Garcia-Godoy had been steadily making concessions in favor of the Left. It is time he redressed the balance and put pressure on the Left to reach the desired and necessary agreements.

8. Ambassador Bunker pointed out the Papal Nuncio is a problem as is the UN Representative, Mayobre. The Ambassador stated the most important issue is the completion of the “package deal” as soon as possible and he was of the opinion he should return to Santo Domingo as soon as possible to do everything he can do to aid in its completion.

9. The remainder of the meeting was taken up with a discussion of the immediate economic steps that should be taken to put the Dominican economy on its feet.

William V. Broe ⁴
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 78–3805, Box 1, Folder 29, Dominican Republic. Secret. Drafted by Broe on November 8.
2. The components of this “package deal” were transmitted in telegram 531 to Bunker in Santo Domingo, October 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 DOM REP)
3. See Document 141.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Broe signed the original.