139. Central Intelligence Agency Special Memorandum1

No. 24–65

SUBJECT

  • Some Perspectives on the Dominican Problem

SUMMARY

The Dominican Republic is in a state of suspended revolution, and the provisional government headed by Garcia Godoy has the task, in effect, of reconciling irreconcilables. If he seems to be favoring the rebel cause, he risks intervention by the armed forces; if he leans to the other side, he risks new outbursts of rebel violence. The underlying political trend in the D.R. is to the left, which enhances the prospects of a left-of-center candidate, if elections are held as planned. If such a candidate won, his government would probably be anti-US and Communist-influenced. The military would likely seize power to keep out this kind of regime, but a military take-over would cause sizeable elements of the left to turn to systematic terrorism and guerrilla activity.

[Omitted here are sections entitled “Background,” “Political Tendencies,” and “Tribulations of the Provisional Government.”]

What Might Come Out of Elections

12.
It is, of course, too early to make any very specific election predictions. Indeed, the elections may not be held on schedule at all. If they are held, it is not yet clear who the candidates would be or what party combinations may be worked out. Although there may be a candidate or two of the extreme right (for instance, the exiled General Wessin y Wessin has been talking about throwing his hat in the ring), most rightist backing will probably be for Balaguer, running on the ticket of his Reformist Party as a center-conservative candidate. Similarly, although one of the Communist parties may produce a nominee of its own, most leftist backing will probably go to the candidate of Boschʼs PRD party. It might be Bosch himself, Caamaño, leader of the revolution, or perhaps a party figure not so well known.
13.
Some observers believe that Balaguer would win such a contest over any man the PRD could put up. They argue that much of Boschʼs old magic is gone—particularly because of his failure to return to the D.R. while the fighting was going on. They dismiss Caamaño as not politically shrewd enough. They note that Balaguer still has [Page 334] much prestige and is widely respected, and predict that many Dominicans will vote for him as the man who might bring back order and tranquillity.
14.
These are all points of some merit. But there are some broader considerations certain to have impact. We think, for example, that the expansion in size of the electorate—those who have politically awakened during the past few years and the large additional number of young people now qualified to vote—will strongly favor the left. We believe that many will vote for the “candidate of the revolution” because they see this movement as their only hope for rapid improvement in their depressed living conditions. The insistence by the PRD party and the leaders of the revolution of their determination to reinstate the Bosch constitution of 1963, with its provisions for agricultural reform and various other measures to improve the lot of the masses, provides a powerful initial issue for the campaign. Nationalistic resentment against the US intervention is also likely to favor the parties of the left. On balance, we think the candidate of the left will be in the stronger vote-getting position.
15.
If such a candidate won the election, his government would probably be anti-US and Communist-influenced. The Dominican military leaders would be likely to seize power to prevent the installation of such a government. Indeed, if the election of a leftist candidate seemed likely, the military would probably intervene before voting took place.
16.
In the event of a military takeover, or even if Balaguer or someone like him won the presidency, sizeable elements of the left (and not only the Communists) would probably turn to systematic terrorism and guerrilla activity. Although the military might be able to cope with this development initially, their repressive actions would tend to antagonize the people and to lead eventually to another round of revolution.
For the Board of National Estimates:
Sherman Kent
Chairman
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XII, 10/65–11/65. Secret.