Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

133. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, September 16, 1965, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Called by McGeorge Bundy on 16 September 1965 at 10:00 A.M. to Discuss the Dominican Republic Situation

PRESENT

• White House
  • Chaired by McGeorge Bundy
  • Mr. William Bowdler
• State
  • Ambassador Bunker
  • Mr. Robert Sayre
• FBI
  • Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
• AID
  • Messrs. Bell, Engle and Lauren Goin²
• CIA
  • Messrs. FitzGerald and Broe

1. Mr. Bundy opened the meeting stating that the two subjects for discussion were (1) the vetting of proposed members of the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic and (2) a report of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] AID team which recently traveled to the Dominican Republic.

2. Mr. [name not declassified] was requested to report on the teamʼs findings. He began reviewing the United States program to assist the Dominicans to combat and control subversion and insurgency that had been agreed upon at the last meeting,³ [9 lines of source text not declassified].

3. In regard to the DNI it was explained that it was not possible to persuade Garcia Godoy from reconstituting the DNI as he strongly desired to have such an organization and, in addition, the agreement reached between Garcia Godoy and Ambassador Bunker was for the most part based on having this specific organization. The Country Team had approved the planned development of the DNI. [1 line of source text not declassified] no complete action could be taken until a Chief of the DNI was appointed. Garcia Godoy had advised [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that his choice was Enrique Rafael Valdez Vidaurre, Chief of Staff of the Navy. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

4. [4 lines of source text not declassified] It was pointed out that although the Country Team had approved the overall AID [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] approach to the National Police it had taken exception to the establishment of a mobile group. The objection to the mobile group was twofold: (a) United States military were basically against placing a unit they firmly believed performed a military function in the police and (b) the general consensus was that due to the current sensitivity of the Dominican military aggravated by the Wessin y Wessin affair it would be impolitic to request Garcia Godoy to place in the police a function that the Dominican military considered a military function. This would appear to them as additional denigration. It was explained that a compromise plan had been proposed to use the personnel of a 300–man Air Force paratroop unit which had been trained by the United States Special Forces building into it a channel for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] National Police intelligence input by the participation of some police with the unit. The Country Team has been discussing this proposal and a report was expected momentarily.

5. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

6. While the meeting was in progress two Country Team reports arrived. One giving final approval to the whole program except the mobile force and the second discussing the Country Teamʼs approach to counterinsurgency, i.e., the first line of defense lies with the police and military garrisons and when they cannot cope and a military situation arises the “Mella” Battalion would be used. The second message was discussed and not found satisfactory. It was decided efforts should go forward to insure a fast reacting force in the pre-military phase of the counterinsurgency situation in the Dominican Republic.⁴

7. Mr. Bundy then introduced the subject of vetting. Ambassador Bunker described his discussions with Garcia Godoy re vetting and pointed out the variety of difficulties surrounding this subject. Mr. Bundy raised the question as to the soundness of the information furnished Garcia Godoy pointing out that the Dominican Republic was a small community and character assassination prominent. He requested Mr. FitzGeraldʼs views concerning the information that can be furnished. Mr. FitzGerald reviewed the criteria the Agency had prepared (copy attached) and stated in category A (active membership) information would be hard but in the other gradations of involvement of leftist activity it would be more difficult to have hard information. Mr. FitzGerald discussed the Agencyʼs concern as to the trend of the Garcia Godoy appointments pointing out that the pattern in the Judiciary is extremely worrisome.

8. The subject of criteria was discussed at length. Mr. Bundy agreed there should be a set of criteria, not for Garcia Godoy, but as a guide for the United States team in the Dominican Republic to assist them in their efforts with Garcia Godoy. Mr. Bundy asked that a set of criteria be established by CIA in conjunction with State and FBI. Mr. Broe was asked to have such a list drawn up and coordinated with State and FBI.

9. Mr. Hoover expressed his concern regarding the leftist elements being accepted by Garcia Godoy especially the appointment of three cabinet members with questionable background. He also stated that he had had his people contact Wessin y Wessin in Florida. He read a report concerning this contact.⁵ (The only information not already surfaced concerning Wessin y Wessin was fact that he was planning to move to Puerto Rico and establish himself in San Juan.) He also stated he had another report of Juan Bosch returning to the Dominican Republic, this time on September 25.

10. Ambassador Bunker queried whether it would not be wise to prevent Wessin y Wessin from settling in San Juan. Mr. Sayre suggested that steps be taken to keep all such type individuals out of San Juan. Mr. Bundy was of the opinion this was not feasible.

11. Mr. Bundy spoke to Ambassador Bunker stressing the fact that it was most important that the Communists do not gain a prominent position in the government. He stated he would be looking forward to the Ambassadorʼs return from the Dominican Republic (he leaving that P.M.) next week for his views concerning what is being done to keep communists out of the government and suggestions as to other steps that might be taken.

12. Mr. Bundy commented on (a) the importance of not allowing the three major communist elements to coalesce and join forces and (b) his concern regarding the situation in the University in Santo Domingo.

William V. Broe ⁶
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment⁷

CRITERIA

Degree

A. Membership in either the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD), the Partido Comunista Dominicano (PCD), or the Agrupacion Politica Catorce del Julio (APCJ) [current membership in latter]⁸ will serve as a bar to governmental employment in all levels of the government.

B. A significant range of Communist affiliation and association (including family ties) but no known membership will serve as a bar at all levels of sensitive ministries, i.e., Defense, Interior, Justice, Propaganda, Education, and the Judiciary, but may be permitted in limited quantity in non-sensitive ministries.

C. Where there are some reports of limited reliability of Communist associations and/or attachments balanced on whole or in part by favorable reporting, individuals would be barred only from the top echelon of sensitive ministries.

It should be clearly understood that as we get government employees beyond the second level in ministries, there will be less likelihood that our files will contain traces.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 303. Secret. Drafted by Broe on September 17.
2. Lauren J. Goin, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Public Safety.
3. See Document 129. The [text not declassified] AID team departed for Santo Domingo on September 8.
4. Neither one of these reports was attached; however, a “Summary Report of the AID [text not declassified] Study Team,” September 15, 1965, lists the teamʼs recommendations including an overall expansion of the public safety program, improved police service prior to the Presidential elections, and the establishment of a quick reacting counterinsurgency group within the police force. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65)
5. Not attached and not further identified.
6. Printed from a copy that indicates Broe signed the original.
7. Secret.
8. Brackets in the source text.