Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

129. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 1, 1965, 4 p.m.

WITH

Director Raborn, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Broe, Mr. Vance, Mr. Mann, Mr. Sayre, Administrator Bell, Mr. Engel,² Director Hoover, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Chase

SUBJECT

• Communists in the Dominican Republic—Meeting at 4:00 p.m. on September 1, 1965

1. General Situation in the Dominican Republic

(a) Director Raborn described the situation in the Dominican Republic as a mess. There are caches of arms up country, there is training of Communist groups, and there are numerous other signs of Communist activity. We are going to need plenty of help to cope with this problem.

(b) Mr. Hoover confirmed Director Rabornʼs analysis. He said that four or five emotional candidates running around the country stirring up the candidates will provide excellent fodder for the Communists. He added that, conservatively speaking, there are probably 200–300 hard-core, skilled, trained Communists in the Dominican Republic who will try to recruit malcontents. The Provisional Government must identify these Communists and take them out of circulation right away; they have no guts if you pick them up and lock them up.

(c) Mr. Mann noted that the election will present a special problem in that we can probably expect the candidates to court the Communists for political support.

2. Police Needs

(a) The group agreed that the job of dealing with the Communists is a police job and not a military job. In this regard, Director Hoover commented that, generally speaking, the military in Latin America are too heavy-handed and ill-trained for this type of work; a strong national police is the answer.

[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. Relations With the Provisional Government

(a) Mr. Bundy said that it is crucial that we treat our relations with the Provisional Government very carefully. The Provisional Government, by instinct, will not be brave on the Communist issue and we want to be in a position of doing more than simply telling them that they should be brave. We want to be able to show the Provisional Government specifically how they can do what needs to be done.

(b) Mr. Mann said that we should make it plain to the Dominican military that we are building a police force that will be anti-Communist and not anti-military; the group agreed that this should be done. In this regard, it was noted that there have been indications from certain members of the military already that they are not instinctively opposed to a vigorous police force in the area of handling Communists.

4. Coordination in the U.S. Government

[3 paragraphs (25 lines of source text) not declassified]

5. Summary of Decisions Taken

(a) A special informal committee, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], should be set up in Washington to handle the Communist problem. In the Dominican Republic, a similar committee should be set up [1 line of source text not declassified] and which would be under the general direction of the Ambassador.

(b) There should be one voice to Garcia Godoy from the U.S. Government on the Communist problem. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], under the general direction of the Ambassador. Mr. Mann agreed to send a cable to Ambassador Bennett advising him of this decision.³

(c) [name not declassified] will coordinate with AID on a plan for the development of the Dominican police. In this regard, Mr. Bell agreed to send immediately to the Dominican Republic an AID man, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], to do some work on planning.

(d) FBI agreed to provide training and other facilities as needed for use in the Dominican effort.

(e) The group agreed that, at an appropriate time, an effort should be made to talk Garcia Godoy out of the establishment of the DNI.

(f) The group agreed that, at an appropriate time, the Dominican military should be reassured that the build-up of the police forces does not constitute a move against the military.

(g) Mr. Bundy agreed to clear with the President the Governmentʼs organization plan for dealing with the Communist problem in the Dominican Republic.

GC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by Chase. William V. Broe of the CIA drafted another account of this same meeting on September 4. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 303)
2. Byron Engle, Director, Office of Public Safety, AID.
3. Not further identified.