12. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Dominican Political Situation

PARTICIPANTS

  • Joaquín Balaguer, ex-President of the Dominican Republic
  • Kennedy M. Crockett, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs
  • Harry W. Shlaudeman, Chief, Dominican Affairs

(Note: The substance of this conversation was reported in the Departmentʼs telegram #146 to Santo Domingo.2 This memorandum amplifies that message and covers additional points of interest in the conversation.)

1.

Following an exchange of pleasantries, Dr. Balaguer said that he particularly wanted to talk about what he regards as the grave general situation in the Dominican Republic. In his view, the Reid regime [Page 34] completely lacks popular support. As a consequence, there is a continuing state of unrest in the country. The people are uncertain of the future and suspicious of Reidʼs intentions. On one point a real national consensus exists: the government must announce elections. Elections represent the only solution to the problem.

Mr. Crockett asked Dr. Balaguer if he were suggesting that elections should be held immediately. Dr. Balaguer said he realized this would be impossible but saw no reason why they should not be scheduled in three or four months. Dr. Balaguer then went over much the same ground as previously with regard to the absolute necessity for an electionsʼ announcement. However, he ended this time by offering the opinion that perhaps eight months to a year would be a good time frame. Finally, in the face of no response from Mr. Crockett, and after several additional assertions that the announcement of a firm date is the most important thing, Balaguer settled on December, 1965 as possibly the most appropriate time for elections. The elected government would take office in February, 1966, thus giving the Reid regime some 18 months to work on the nationʼs problems.

2.

On several occasions Balaguer sought to elicit an indication that the USG would be prepared to intervene in the problem of elections. He suggested that we would be in the best position to bring pressure on the Reid regime to announce elections. Mr. Crockett painstakingly explained our position, going over it twice in Spanish and once in English so that there could be no misunderstanding: (1) The United States hopes for a return to representative government as soon as feasible and the present Dominican government is fully aware of this position. (2) We cannot, however, become involved in the strictly internal problem of how this return is to be accomplished. The Dominicans themselves must work out the details. (3) Once a reasonable plan has been evolved with the support of the majority of responsible elements in the Dominican Republic we are certain that public opinion here and throughout the hemisphere will strongly approve.

Balaguer indicated that he understood this position. He would, under the circumstances, not wait for the US but would himself take the initiative. It was at this point that he brought up the plan (described in Deptel 146) to call a meeting in the United States.

3.
With regard to Bosch, Balaguer used the word “obstinate” (terco) on two occasions. He also referred to Bosch as a “romantic.” In his view, there is no possibility that Bosch would agree to a formula for elections, even if all the other parties were to fall in line. Bosch inflexibility holds the position that only a return to constitutionality in the form of reinstating the 1963 Congress can be accepted. In all honesty, Balaguer remarked, the position does coincide with Boschʼs own personal political interests inasmuch as he could scarcely participate [Page 35] in elections. Balaguer added, however, that representative leaders of the PRD can be prevailed upon to join in an agreement on elections.
4.
Asked what other parties he would expect to be represented in the proposed meeting of political leaders, Balaguer mentioned Luis Amiamaʼs PLE, Read Vittiniʼs PCD, Ramón Castilloʼs PPDC and other undesignated “legitimate” parties. He dismissed Juan Isidro Jimenes Grullón [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and asserted that there would be no reason for UCN participation inasmuch as whoever came on Reidʼs behalf would also automatically represent that party. In his opinion, the government and the UCN are one and the same. Balaguer remarked that all the parties he had mentioned (including the UCN but apparently not the PRD) are minuscule and of no real importance as political entities. He had a kind word for Read Vittini as a young man of some substance. Castillo, however, is another [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
5.
As for his own plans, Balaguer said that he would return and participate in the campaign once there is agreement on an electoral formula. He spoke, in the manner usually employed on these occasions, of his duty to his supporters. Subsequently, however, he commented that as a political figure he must think primarily of his own political interests. Thus, his public pronouncements should not always be taken at face value, bearing in mind the necessity for preserving a political position.
6.
Balaguer made only one passing reference to the Dominican military during the conversation, remarking that nobody can be sure just what is now the real position of the armed forces.

Comment

Neither Balaguerʼs manner nor what he had to say gave cause for surprise. He appeared anxious to please and to show himself as a reasonable man. It remains to be seen how far this will go. Past history indicates that Balaguer can really only be relied upon to pursue his own interests.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Shlaudeman. Copies were sent to ARA/CAR, INR, and the Embassy in Santo Domingo.
  2. Dated September 1. (Ibid., POL 14 DOM REP)