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  4. Document 108

108. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, June 14, 1965, 11:35 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Meeting With the President at 11:30 A.M., June 14, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President, Thomas Mann, Robert Sayre, McGeorge Bundy, Gordon Chase

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the attached two cables from Ambassador Bunker regarding a political solution in the Dominican Republic.2

[Page 272]
1.
General—The group agreed that the best we can do is to give Bunker some general guidance; we should not try to outsmart him.
2.
Elections—Mr. Bundy explained the various positions on the timing of elections. Bunker was in favor of a period from 6 to 9 months; Mr. Mann would ideally prefer a longer period but did not feel strongly about it. Mr. Bundy went on to say that he agreed with Bunkerʼs proposal to use the elections as the initial and basic element of a political solution. The President said that we should tell Bunker that the elections should be held no sooner than six months and not later than a year. He added that we are in trouble if the Dominicans elect a Communist.
3.
Communists—With regard to guidance for Bunker on this subject, Mr. Bundy said that we can stand on the guidance we gave to Bunker in our recent cable (Deptel 1427—attached).3
4.

Military—Mr. Bundy and Mr. Mann said that we should let the regular military establishment produce a slate of names to fill the top command jobs; these should be professionals who are untainted by the present conflict and who will not be an easy propaganda mark for the rebels.

While we should treat the military with dignity, we should press to get something in exchange for permitting them to fill their top command posts. For example, they should support the provisional government and assist in bringing Imbert around to a conciliatory position.

Mr. Mann and Mr. Bundy said that we should try to drive a wedge between the military and Imbert. Mr. Mann added that, in general, we should try to drive a wedge between the moderates and extremists on both sides.

5.
Constitution—Mr. Bundy said that the more we can show that the basic law is in response to the notion of constitutionalism, the better will be our chances of reducing the resistance downtown. Mr. Bundy went on to say that he and Mr. Mann differed slightly on the constitutional question. While Bundy would press the military not to fuss too much over a piece of paper, Mann would probably press less on the grounds that the issue is terribly emotional with the military. Mr. Mann interjected that his position was not really very far from Mr. Bundyʼs and that he would not mind seeing the basic act called something like the “1963 Constitution, as amended.”
6.
OAS Procedures—Mr. Bundy said that there is the question of whether or not we submit the Ad Hoc Committeeʼs solution to the OAS so that it can take a vote on it. In this regard, the group generally preferred [Page 273] that the OAS be fully informed on the solution but that it not be given the opportunity to vote on it.
7.
Rebel Resistance—The group discussed briefly the problem of rebel resistance after a political solution is found. In this regard, the group noted the recent reports of dissension and dissatisfaction in the rebel ranks.
8.
Assistance to the Dominican Republic—The President said that we ought to put the remainder of the unobligated Alliance for Progress funds ($23–$30 million) into the Dominican Republic. He added that the remainder of AIDʼs unobligated funds might also be used for the Dominican Republic. He said that, before we are through with the Dominican Republic, it is liable to cost us about $250 million.
9.
Communists and the Public Case—Mr. Mann said that he had recently spoken to 7 or 8 Congressmen about the Communist problem in the Dominican Republic; they were skeptical and feel we are hiding the facts. It would be helpful to give certain Congressmen a full rundown on the problem, including the whole spectrum of classified documents, FBI reports,CIA reports, etc. The President expressed reluctance on this plan. In general, we should be careful of investigations; investigators have a vested interest in finding fault. Congressmen should not get information acquired from wire taps; they will make wire taps the issue. Congressmen wonʼt keep quiet on sensitive matters; they are liable to get sources killed. In sum, the President said that Congress should not get access to raw data and should get only summaries. Mr. Bundy added that, whatever we give to the Congress, it should be very hard information. If it isnʼt, it will get picked to pieces and we will get clobbered.

[Omitted here is paragraph 10, a discussion of four separate points: activities in Panama, an assistance package to Vietnam, a Fulbright speech, and a request by President Johnson that none of his advisers travel abroad while the Dominican Republic and Vietnam areas were “hot.”]

GC
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings with President Johnson on the Dominican Republic: Fallout. Secret. Drafted by Chase on June 15. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting are from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.)↩
  2. Documents 106 and 107.↩
  3. Document 105.↩