Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

107. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, June 14, 1965, 0515Z.

2406. From Bunker. Ref Embtel 2405.² Following are additional comments on points raised Deptel 1427.³ Numbers correspond to paragraphs in that tel.

1. Question of target date for elections covered in our reftel. We have not reached firm conclusion on best method of handling constitutional issue within electoral framework. Separate elections for Constituent Assembly prior to general elections do not, however, appear desirable under existing circumstances. Interim government is likely to be weak and assembly might well provide focus for agitation against it. Confusion as to where ultimate authority lay would also arise. If vote for Assembly did not indicate clear national consensus, country could again become caught up in bitter constitutional controversy without any better prospect of a final decision than we now have.

Other possibilities are: a. the 1962 formula of convoking Congress as a National Assembly after elections but prior to presidential inauguration; b. holding separate Assembly elections under the “institutional act” after inauguration of an elected govt; c. allowing the elected Congress to resolve the problem as it saw fit. As in 1962 (a) appears simplest and cleanest but (b) or (c) might represent wiser approach now.

2. Fully agree that political solution urgently needed to prevent further economic deterioration and to avert emergence here of strong nationalistic sentiments hostile to US and OAS. As Dept will readily appreciate, however, establishment of new interim govt will not of itself solve these problems. They will persist as long as rebels keep city of Santo Domingo divided and country as a whole on edge of political turmoil. Caamano and company have made it abundantly clear that they are no more prepared to accept “middle way” or “third-force” regime of type proposed by various civic groups than they were to accept Imbert. Time and internal dissensions may well be eroding their support but I believe it essential to assist this process by offering “constitutionalists” and their sympathizers the real alternative of elections to continuing the struggle. As explained reftel, firm commitment to elections represents best hope in this regard.

3. Names you suggest are on our lists, along with numerous others. Believe generally acceptable people will prove available once it apparent OAS and US have decided back specific solution based on elections.

4. Believe technical and economic support for interim government should be provided by and through OAS to maximum extent possible. Both PAU technical assistance program and CIAP facilities should prove useful this connection.

5. In essence constitutional issue is largely symbolic and not fundamentally concerned with specific provisions of 1963 Constitution or any other. (Guzman privately told Shlaudeman yesterday: “You could pick any constitution, call it the Constitution of 1963 and it would be acceptable.”) It has been converted by rebel propaganda into a “mystique” which in minds Caamano followers really means economic and social justice. I do not believe it advantageous, as Dept suggests, to accept that 1962 constitution is still in effect. I believe preferable to adopt attitude that constitutional issue remains to be resolved by the people in a free vote.

6. Agree that 1963 Constitution would not at this point be acceptable. Reinstatement, even with subsequent suspension of articles not applying present situation, would meet most bitter resistance from Imbert and armed forces.

7. As indicated reftel, my view is that best way out of constitutional morass would be promulgation of “institutional act” on basis of which interim government could administer country. Would appreciate Deptʼs suggestions as to procedures that might give such action highest possible color of legality.

8. I doubt that efforts restructure military establishment would meet with much success under present circumstances. Use of kind of pressure necessary to force significant changes would only drive military back into Imbertʼs arms and present US with solid front in support of GNR as presently constituted. In any case, ranking military may now be dug in so far as to make real changes impossible until this crisis has passed. We should move on Wessin at first opportunity and this may be possible soon.

9. Concur.

10. Concur.

11. Agree that guarantee of free elections with way clearly open to restoration of constitutional, democratic government represents best possible appeal to rebels. I am not, however, overly sanguine about quick collapse of rebel movement under any circumstances except application of force. Believe substantial defections will occur as fact that reasonable alternative is available sinks in. However, hard core of movement is made up of extremists, armed youngsters, and bitter men of one kind or another who seem convinced they little or nothing to lose by going on to the end. Prevalence also of romantic vision of revolution and willingness to go on even in a “lost cause” is psychological factor to take into account. Concept is obviously irrational but we believe it must be recognized as obstacle to peaceful solution.

12. Provisional govt can only deal effectively with Communist problem when rebels have laid down their arms. Should not be difficult obtain the cooperation on this problem Dept desires from type of provisional govt we envisage. Deportation has been standard practice here and will probably turn out again to be most practical method of dealing with known Communists.

13. Agree that we should move rapidly to get economic program underway soonest once interim govt in power. Also hope OAS–CIAP will play prominent role.

14. Our current estimate of time frame in which implemented contained in ref Embtel.

Bennett

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VII. Secret; Immediate;Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 2:28 a.m. and passed to the White House,DOD, and CIA.
2. Document 106.
3. Document 105.