Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

102. Record of Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs (Crockett) and Former President of the Dominican Republic Balaguer¹

June 4, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Dr. Joaquin Balaguerʼs Views as of June 4, 1965

I met with Dr. Balaguer for several hours this evening. I gave him our line. I heard and discussed his views. The bare bones of the conversation can be summarized as follows:

Balaguer believes:

1. Bosch is no longer capable of being a constructive force—it is now clear his aims and ends can only be destructive.

2. Despite the risks involved, an electoral solution offers the only apparent way out at this time.

3. An apolitical interim government capable of winning general national support must be formed and installed as quickly as possible—preferably within the next few days.

4. Such a government will not be supported by Bosch or the Joaquin Balaguerʼs crowd in Ciudad Nueva.

5. It will not be possible to talk Joaquin Balaguerʼs and his crowd out of Ciudad Nueva—it would be a mistake to shoot them out.

6. During the interim period, they should be left alone, but contained in Ciudad Nueva. Time, attrition and the people will dissolve them in a matter of weeks once an interim government of national consensus is installed and has gained recognition.

7. At best, any interim government will be weak and capable of holding office for only a limited period—a year at the outside, but perhaps no longer than six months.

8. Elections should be delayed until the climate is more propitious—at the same time, elections must be held as soon as possible. The trick is to delay the holding of elections for a period which can be gauged as the probable effective life expectancy of the interim government.

9. There can be no assurance who will win when elections are held, but it seems highly unlikely Bosch will run. Barring a sudden and extreme surge of nationalism, the eventual winner will probably be someone capable of heading a government not unacceptable to the US.

10. Although illiterate and unsophisticated in politics, the Dominicans can learn and have learned a good bit from their unhappy experiences since Trujilloʼs death. This is reassuring.

11. The military establishment must be greatly reduced in size and completely restructured. This should be accomplished, to the extent possible, during the tenure of the interim government and while the IAF is still in the Dominican Republic.

Balaguer will take the following actions:

1. Support any movement which offers promise of gaining national acceptance and which is not unacceptable to the U.S.

2. Urge his contacts and followers to establish liaison with like-minded groups and come to the OAS committee with concrete proposals, including a slate of names from which a single interim Chief of State might be selected.

3. Impress upon all of those with whom he is in contact that they should make their views and proposals known to the OAS committee, regardless of whether they are able to agree on a common plan of action.

4. When and if a national consensus is judged by the OAS committee to have emerged, Balaguer will fall into line if it is at all possible for him to do so, regardless of whether his supporters have at the point in time thrown their lot in with the group heard by the OAS committee.

Balaguer estimates:

1. Viriato Fiallo² is no longer the power he once was, in the Cibao or elsewhere. He might capitalize on a wave of nationalism.

2. Bonnelly³ is an elder statesman—heard but no longer heeded.

3. “Youth” in the Dominican Republic is restive and looking for a change. They want work and stability just as much. Both ends cannot be achieved fully and simultaneously—but the problem must be recognized. One way of partially dealing with it would be to include young, progressive but non-communist elements in both the interim and elected governments to the extent reasonably competent individuals can be identified and recruited.

Augusto Lora, who heads Dr. Balaguerʼs party in the Dominican Republic, is now in the U.S. He will carry Dr. Balaguerʼs message to the Partido Reformista faithful and other sympathetic groups in the D.R.

KMC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. VII, Cables, 6/1–6/14/65. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Vaughn, Bunker, and Ward P. Allen (ARA/RPA). Another June 4 memorandum by Crockett covers the transcript of a half-hour telephone conversation between Crockett and Balaguer, who was in New York City, on May 26. This memorandum explains that Vaughn, returning from a May 26 meeting at the White House (see Document 97), instructed Crockett to contact Balaguer to: “(1) bring him up to date; (2) sound him out; (3) ask him for additional names acceptable to him; (4) see if he has any new strategy to suggest and (5) keep our line to him open and active.” Also attached to this memorandum is a May 27 FBI report of Balaguerʼs summary of the conversation sent from Hoover to the President. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL DOM REP–US)
2. Dr. Viriato Fiallo, leader of the Union Civica National (UCN) party; hero of the struggle against Balaguer and Ramfis Trujillo.
3. Rafael F. Bonnelly, President of the Dominican Republic and the Consejo de Estado (Council of State) that governed the Republic during 1962 and in 1963 until February 27.