101. Memorandum for the Record1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting in the Cabinet Room at 1700 on 2 June 1965

PRESENT WERE

  • The President
  • For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, Mann, Bunker, and Vaughn
  • For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance
  • For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Moyers, and Bromley Smith
  • For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms
1.
The first action taken by the President when he joined the meeting at 1730 was to approve the Department of State telegram to Santo Domingo containing Ambassador Bunkerʼs instructions. A copy of this cable is attached.2
2.
Mr. Rusk introduced a discussion on the problem of an interim provisional government in the Dominican Republic with particular reference to when the United States would lose control of the situation and when, therefore, general election should be held. It was debated inconclusively as to whether sixty or ninety days would be too soon and whether some provisional arrangement should be established which would hold off elections for six months or so. There was concern expressed that an election coming too soon might give skilled Communist agitators the edge in a campaign. It was conceded that no one had any very clear idea on who the candidate would be or what their election prospects were.
3.
The President spoke in some detail regarding his change of view with respect to a Bosch-Guzman solution to the Dominican politician problem. From having been in favor of Bosch, he indicated that he had become thoroughly disenchanted with him as to character, decency, behavior, and integrity. He said that he was now convinced that the establishment of a Guzman government would have been a disaster. He repeated that he had the gravest misgivings about Bosch and his followers.
4.
There was some informed discussion regarding the respective merits of the 1962–1963 Constitutions in the Dominican Republic. It was pointed out that the 1963 version had certain clauses which might be rather difficult to defend before an American congressional committee.
5.
We were asked again to check on the number of weapons available to the rebels in the down-town area and also on the status of Radio Santo Domingo. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]
6.
There was inconclusive discussion of how to handle the Dominican armed forces. It was recognized that they are the only stabilizing factor in the country. It was left to Ambassador Bunker to take a reading on this problem after he had been in the Dominican Republic for a few days.
7.
At Ambassador Bunkerʼs request, it was agreed that the Agency would provide him with daily intelligence from all sources. (DDI and DDP are together on this as of a.m. 3 June and will provide [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], for passage to Mr. Bunker, a full report, including FBI, COMINT, and other material.)
8.

It was reported that CBS was broadcasting that Ambassador Bennett was to be replaced. The President authorized an oral statement to CBS to the effect that Ambassador Bennett would remain at his post.3

[Omitted here is discussion of operation Rolling Thunder XVII in Vietnam.]

Richard Helms 4
Deputy Director
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic, Folder 302. Secret. Prepared by Helms on June 3. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)
  2. Not attached. Ellsworth Bunker arrived in Santo Domingo on June 2 to take part in the negotiations to resolve the Dominican crisis.
  3. Not further identified. Ambassador Bennett remained at post until April 13, 1966.
  4. Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.