407. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

SUBJECT

  • Draft Letter from the President to Prime Minister Sarit

As you will have seen from Secto 114 from the Secretary,1 in spite of the arguments I gave him in Tosec 94 against a letter from the President to [Page 855] Prime Minister Sarit,2 the Secretary still feels such a message would be desirable. The President briefly spoke to me last night in this regard. While he was not enthusiastic about sending such a message, he was willing to consider one and I promised I would have a draft for him on his return today.

My own views have changed somewhat because of the necessity of our accepting the “three-delegation” formula at Geneva. This will clearly further upset the Thais and I now believe a letter from the President to Sarit might well be useful. (In this connection, see Bangkok’s 2053 of May 14.)3

Accordingly, a draft is attached. If this is approved by the President, I would propose transmitting it by telegraph to the Vice President for delivery. The text will also give the Vice President guidelines for his discussion with Sarit on this subject.

UAJ

Attachment4

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER SARIT

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have asked the Vice President to visit you and deliver this message in order to inform you personally and directly of my full appreciation of the understandable concern which you and your countrymen feel over developments in Southeast Asia. He will also tell you of the additional concrete steps which we are prepared to take with you to strengthen the national security and economy of Thailand.

We are meanwhile seeking to deal with the grave situation in Laos on both the diplomatic and military fronts, each of which must complement the other. Although a cease-fire now seems to have gone into [Page 856] effect, we have no intention of relaxing our military vigilance against a possible renewal of hostilities. We likewise seek to assure that no concessions will be made to the Communists at the conference which would result in merely establishing a cover for a progressive Communist takeover of the kingdom. In this endeavor we stand greatly in need of Thailand’s continued stout support and of the wisdom and experience that your distinguished Foreign Minister could provide for this purpose at Geneva. As in the past, I rely on your comprehension of the magnitude of the problems we jointly face and the importance of concerting our counsels and our efforts to this end. The long record of our friendship has repeatedly proven the value of our close and confident cooperation in dealing with problems of common concern. This special relationship was never more important than it is today.

What the Vice President will say to you will faithfully reflect our unchanging convictions with respect to the immense importance, to us and to the entire free world, of the freedom, integrity and welfare of Thailand, and I shall await with great interest a report of his conversations with you.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy5
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Thailand, Vol. I, 1/61–5/61. Secret.
  2. In Secto 114 from Geneva, May 14, Rusk stated: “Believe a short message from President to Sarit would help Vice President especially in view of messy situation in Geneva.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1461)
  3. In Tosec 94 to the Secretary in Geneva, May 14, U. Alexis Johnson stated that he did not urge a Presidential letter because “it seemed difficult to me to expand on what had already been said.” Johnson thought the Vice President could adequately assure Sarit in his discussions based on briefing papers provided him. (Ibid., 379/5–1461)
  4. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–1461)
  5. The draft letter was approved without change and sent to Bangkok in telegram 1788, May 15. (Ibid., 033.11–JO/5–1561)
  6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.