Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

300. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, January 16, 1963.

McGB:

Given all the anti-Sukarno emotionalism rampant these days, I was delighted to find the Governor¹ thoroughly statesmanlike (I didn’t have to do any selling). He says we’re just going to have to “sweat out Sukarno”, alternately using the carrot and stick, but essentially living with this guy and trying to box him in. He agrees that we must turn Sukarno off Malaysia by (1) working harder to get the Phils to stop serving as a talking horse for Indos in Borneo; and (2) making more of a political demonstration of our interest in Malaysia. I did a cable for him to send Mike who’ll begin the educational process on Sukarno.²

Incidentally, Averell blew up at Guy Pauker’s latest RAND memo.³ He asked me to tell you that he can’t understand how a former pupil of yours could be so dim. We agreed that Guy’s policy prescriptions were ideally suited to bringing about the precise thing he seeks to avoid, an Indo tie-up with Moscow. All these guys who advocate “tough” policies toward neutralists like Nasser and Sukarno blink at the fact that it was precisely such policies which helped influence these countries to accept Moscow offers in the first place. The best way to keep Nasser or Sukarno from becoming prisoners of the USSR is to compete for them, not thrust them into Soviet hands.⁴

I can see we’re going to have a tough time defending our Indo policy for the next few months (especially with the Brits taking a “head-insand” attitude).⁵ I fear for the $50–75 million we ought to invest in an Indo stabilization plan if they buy IMF terms. Yet at a time when we are spending hundreds of millions to hold SEA mainland, it is sheer folly not to protect its seaward flank (unpleasant as the owner of this real estate may be).

For your memory book, Averell feels we’ll have to let the Bung have Timor in 2–3 years at outside. He wants to beat up Salazar. When I said “Azores” he countered that we should have NATO-ized it years ago. We’ll now have to sweat out Sukarno and Salazar too.

Bob K.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. III, 1/63–2/63. Secret.
1. Harriman.
2. See Document 301.

3. On January 11, the Rand Corporation submitted Guy J. Pauker’s memorandum, RM–3481–1–PR, “The Stategic Implications of Soviet Military Aid to Indonesia.” Pauker concluded that continued acceptance of large-scale Soviet military aid after the settlement of the West New Guinea issue endangered the Indonesian Army, increased the influence of the PKI, and encouraged Indonesian expansion into Portuguese Timor, North Borneo, and possibly other areas. Pauker recommended a tough U.S. stance toward Indonesia in enforcing the West New Guinea settlement and in protecting Timor, Borneo, and Malaysia. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Rand Studies, Part C)

   At Harriman’s request, Hilsman commented on Pauker’s report. In RM–3, Hilsman stated that INR disagreed with the conclusions and found that they obscured rather than clarified U.S. policy toward Indonesia. (Ibid., Vol. III, 1/63–2/63)

4. In a memorandum to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, William Bundy of ISA stated that Soviet military aid to Indonesia appeared “excessive to the legitimate defense needs of the Indonesian armed forces.” Such aid, in ISA’s view, encouraged Indonesian expansionism and posed a threat to Indonesia’s neighbors. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, DOD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Indonesia 092–333, 1963)
5. In a January 11 aide-mémoire, Lord Home informed Rusk of the United Kingdom’s “grave concern” about Indonesia and the need for tripartite talks among representatives of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Lord Home believed that Sukarno’s territorial ambitions were not satisfied with West Irian and constituted a real danger to Borneo, Timor, greater Malaysia, and the rest of New Guinea. While he understood U.S. policy in Indonesia, Home questioned whether it would not aid Indonesian expansionism. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. III, 1/63–2/63) In delivering this aide-mémoire, British Ambassador Sir David Ormsby Gore discussed it with Harriman. (Memorandum of conversation, January 16; Department of State, Central Files, 798.00/1–1663)