301. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia0
682. Personal for Forrestal from Harriman.1 Important that in addition to your underlining to Indonesians urgent importance their taking adequate stabilization measures if U.S. is to contribute, you should take opportunity to discuss frankly with Sukarno and others Indonesian territorial ambitions particularly Malaysia.
Bearing in mind Sukarno’s vanity, his strong nationalism, and his known admiration for President Kennedy, suggest, in consultation with Ambassador Jones, appropriate line might be to refer to statements over the years by leading Indonesians that the real threat to Indonesia is ultimately the ChiComs and that in last analysis the Indonesians rely on U.S. military strength in Pacific to protect them against this threat. We agree that the real threat to Indonesia and rest of Southeast Asia has been amply demonstrated in India. As Sukarno knows, we are heavily engaged in trying to preserve peace of area also in Viet-Nam and Laos and are fully committed to prevent Chinese Communist expansionism. Our effort on Mainland Southeast Asia to contain ChiCom expansionism is certainly as much in Indonesian interest as our own. Best political move to deter this expansionism further in direction of Indonesia is development of a viable buffer state insulating Indonesia from the threat from North. We cannot conceive of a healthy Malaysia ever becoming a [Page 659] threat to Indonesia or Indonesian interests. We have considered various ways of the Borneo territories making the transition from colonialism and are convinced that only feasible way to build strong opposition to ChiComs and their expansionist tendencies is through development of a Greater Malaysia. We have no doubt that British are sincere in wishing to liquidate this vestige of colonialism in a manner which in long run will prove of greater benefit to the Indonesians. For these reasons we believe he should not attempt to block Malaysia which we intend to support vigorously. You may find an appropriate moment to point out that he needs President Kennedy’s good will since if he bases his foreign policy on “go it alone” with only Russian backing, he will find himself in their clutches.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 101.2/1–1663. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bell, cleared in draft by Harriman and in substance by Komer, and approved by Bell.↩
- Forrestal, along with Hilsman, undertook a fact-finding trip in Southeast Asia December 28, 1962–January 15, 1963. The majority of Hilsman’s time was spent in Vietnam, but he also visited Indonesia, Laos, and Thailand.↩
- In telegram 1117 from Djakarta, January 20, Forrestal reported on a meeting he and Jones had with Sukarno on the morning of January 19. Sukarno told Forrestal he had achieved his goals of “unification, internal security, and West Irian.” His remaining goal was “economic stability and growth.” Forrestal encouraged this emphasis. When Sukarno asked: “how much and how soon?”, Forrestal responded that the United States was prepared to assist, but was waiting for a demonstration of Indonesia’s willingness “to make a political act of faith in support of sound economic policies.” Sukarno expressed willingness to address Indonesia’s economic problems and noted that his primary interest was economics. (Department of State, Central Files, 798.11/1–2063)↩