Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

299. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Bell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)⁰

Washington, January 4, 1963.

SUBJECT

• General Nasution’s Position on the Role of Indonesian Armed Forces

With reference to INR Research Memorandum RFE–67, December 28, 1962 on Soviet Military Aid to Indonesia,¹ you raised the question of General Nasution’s position today. The military aid figure of $1.3 billion, incidentally, is an approximation, and of this amount approximately $800 million has been used already.

We estimate that when the chips are down General Nasution will support Sukarno in whatever action he may decide to undertake. Nasution would attempt to have a moderating influence before the decision was made but would not oppose him on something already decided. In the case of Brunei, Nasution has himself stated publicly that Indonesia sympathizes with the Azahari² uprising, and the Army has engaged in covert training and other activity in support of the Azahari rebels.

General Nasution’s own power position appears to remain very strong. There is no evidence to date that his switch from Chief of Staff of the Army to Chief of Staff of all the armed forces has reduced his power. Indeed it has been reported that he should be able to consolidate his power over all three services (four, counting the police) while retaining the loyalty of the Army. Nasution and General Jani, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] recognize the need for closing forces in the face of attempts by civilians like Subandrio to assume Army prerogatives as in West New Guinea. [3-2/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Certainly General Nasution recognizes the crucial impact on economic development that the size of the armed forces, their equipment and the purposes their use will have. The most recent statements on the planned size and purpose of the Army emanate more from Jani than from Nasution but they appear to have Nasution’s sanction. According to these statements, the Army plans to stabilize its strength at 200,000 conscripts over the next two or three years, with no new intakes except for technicians and cadets for the Military Academy. There is a definite interest in economic development and civic action, and a number of construction battalions for various developmental projects are being formed. Aware that a large portion of the $1.3 billion worth of military equipment from the U.S.S.R. is superfluous to Indonesia’s needs, General Nasution might be expected to attempt to obtain cancellations on many of the items which have not yet been shipped. In the final analysis, however, such cancellations, and the still more important question of whether Indonesia plans to use its armed forces for defense and development or for expansionist goals, depend on President Sukarno rather than on General Nasution. General Nasution has had ample opportunity to oppose Sukarno at crucial points in the past and has not done so. We have no reason to think that there is any essential change in this relationship now.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 798.551/1–163. Secret. Drafted by James B. Freeman of SPA.
1. In this attached report, December 28, 1962, INR posed two questions: 1) What were Indonesia’s motives and intentions in accepting Soviet military aid, and 2) how would the Soviet Union respond to Indonesian efforts to secure more favorable terms for repaying Soviet debt incurred for military aid? INR concluded that Indonesia’s acceptance of $1.3 billion in modern Soviet military equipment was to help acquire West New Guinea and increase general national prestige and influence, not to seek territory concessions in Portuguese Timor or British Borneo. Sukarno and the Indonesian military saw Soviet military aid as to their advantage; the PKI considered that it contributed to the party’s influence. The Soviet Union was likely to grant Indonesia more favorable terms of repayment for fear of driving Indonesia into the U.S. or Communist Chinese camp.
2. A pro-Indonesian dissident.