Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand⁰

Washington, December 1, 1963, 6:04 p.m.

863. In view of Cambodian proposal to UK and USSR of new conference on Cambodia,¹ Department believes it important to commence process consultation with Thailand and South Viet-Nam on this subject. UK has solicited Department’s reaction to its proposed reply to RKG which would accede to Cambodian proposal of a conference. We have told UK that we wished to consult with RTG and GVN before they replied. We also pointed out that we could not participate as long as Cambodian charges against US remain outstanding, particularly in view of indirect repetition of charges in RKG note proposing conference.

Embassies Bangkok and Saigon are instructed approach RTG and GVN at appropriate high level conveying US views as indicated below and soliciting their reactions urgently:

1. While U.S. does not look forward to new conference we believe it will be difficult avoid conference at this time. British and French already inclined agree and Communist Bloc will surely do so. India, Canada, Burma and Laos cannot be expected exert effective influence against conference.

2. Failure obtain some international statute at this time would probably be followed by rapidly increasing Cambodian reliance on Bloc which might give Cambodia Communist guaranty. Sihanouk’s precipitate actions and statements indicate feeling of desperation which motivates him. With termination US aid free world influence has declined.

3. It would be extremely dangerous risk free world security in SEA on a gamble that situation will change within Cambodia if left alone. Moreover, as indicated Deptel 837,² free world has great stake in South Viet-Nam and Laos which would be undermined if Cambodia were left open to increasing Communist influence.

4. There are considerable advantages in going to a conference and seeking to mold the result, rather than becoming isolated by refusing participate and removing all restraint on Sihanouk.

5. Agreement to participate does not involve commitment in advance to any formula contrary to their national interest. While we would seek to reach agreement, we would not accept any terms merely for sake of agreement. We should have at least certain essentials agreed to with Sihanouk in advance such as no consideration of SVN.

6. If agreement could be reached, free world could maintain considerable political influence in Cambodia through international neutralization machinery, whereas a Cambodia dependent on Bloc support and guarantees would afford little opportunity for free world influence.

7. US commitments to Thailand and South Viet-Nam and determination to meet them would, in any case, remain absolutely unimpaired and our ability to play an effective role in maintaining peace and security in Southeast Asia would be enhanced by satisfactory Cambodian neutralization statute.

In course making above presentation, emphasize US has not come to any final conclusion regarding a conference, and as an ally, US desires consult and coordinate with RTG and GVN but feels obliged speak frankly. You should say US believes that on balance it would be more to advantage US, RTG and GVN to agree to conference than to become isolated by refusing, particularly when refusal may well result in further precipitate reduction free world influence in Cambodia. We hope RTG and GVN will agree but, if not, we would welcome constructive alternative ideas. We are not asking either Thailand or South Viet-Nam to agree in advance to any formula that may be produced in conference. The various possible formulae are subjects to be negotiated and, in any case, there should be continuing intimate exchange of views between US and RTG and GVN on all facets of problem beginning now. Finally, you should indicate that while idea of new Geneva type conference not appealing, nevertheless if in long run the Geneva formula serves to stabilize situation former French-Indo-China, it will be in interest of free world.

Because of urgency, we solicit Thai and Vietnamese views at earliest possible date so that UK can reply suggesting 1962 powers be invited. Important not to delay in view affirmative attitude Communist side.

For Bangkok—We anticipate strongest resistance from Thailand which will not wish accord ICC any role on Thailand—Cambodia border. We have in mind that possibly some special formula might be worked out with respect to Cambodian frontier with Thailand, perhaps under UN auspices rather than ICC. With this in mind, you should, if possible, combine this approach to RTG with démarche to be made under instructions Deptel 837. After suggesting Thai investigation Khmer Serei in cooperation Gussing Mission, you could lead into subject possible conference by pointing out that successful Khmer Serei investigation with Gussing Mission’s blessing would vastly improve free world position with respect to proposed conference. If for any reason no conference should be held, free world position would be stronger for having demonstrated effectiveness of Gussing Mission in dealing with Sihanouk’s charges. If a conference should take place free world would be in stronger position to insist on provisions protecting Thailand from unwanted ICC interference.

For Saigon—In view forthcoming attitude being taken by new government, we are hopeful GVN will take flexible attitude toward conference; nevertheless you will, of course, bear down heavily on the advantages of having a strong ICC active along Cambodia border with Viet-Nam and Laos for purpose sealing against Viet Cong.

Since above drafted, Phnom Penh’s 435³ and 438⁴ received. In strictest confidence you may draw upon applicable portions these messages reflecting Sihanouk’s attitude toward conference.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Hannah; cleared by Koren, Czyzak, and Harriman; and approved by Hilsman. Also sent to Saigon as telegram 884 and repeated to London, Paris, Vientiane, Ottawa, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, and Moscow.
1. On November 24, Cambodia formally requested the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina to convene a 14-nation conference in a neutral Asian nation in order to consider increasing the resources of the ICC to better assure the neutralization of Cambodia. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 742.
2. See footnote 5, Document 120.
3. Document 123.
4. See footnote 1, Document 124.