Office of the Historian

126. Memorandum From Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, December 2, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Cambodia

As events accelerate in Cambodia, there has been a fuzzing of a series of issues. Now it would make sense for us to separate out just what issues Snookie wants us to deal with and evaluate whether we are in a position to take action in a rational order of priority.

The following issues are of importance presently in our relations with Cambodia:

1.
Khmer Serei radio broadcasts probably emanating from South Viet-Nam.
2.
The presence of Son Ngoc Thanh in South Viet-Nam and the freedom he enjoys in propagating anti-Sihanouk propaganda.
3.
The termination of our aid: (a) what aid can be terminated immediately; (b) what aid should be phased out in a three to six months period; (c) the removal of Americans from Cambodia who are connected with our aid program.
4.
A new conference under the 1954 Geneva Agreement which would officially “neutralize” Cambodia and leave the supervision of the neutralization to the ICC.
5.
Diplomatic and border relations with South Viet-Nam.
6.
Diplomatic and border relations with Thailand.

We are dealing with someone who obviously is in an emotional state. Therefore, the order of our actions should be geared to lessening the emotional burdens on Sihanouk as he sees them.

The most emotional, but certainly not the most significant issue, is broadcasting by the Khmer Serei radio. Evidence points to transmitters being located in South Viet-Nam. In Phnom Penh 437,1Sihanouk said he would be happy to suspend jamming of Khmer Serei broadcasts if Saigon authorities were willing to attempt to locate the radio and to neutralize the utterances of Son Ngoc Thanh. We should act on this immediately and carefully coordinate the cessation of jamming with an investigation by Saigon. A telegram to Forrestal on November 15 stated that it might be possible without three days of jamming to locate any transmitters in [Page 275] South Viet-Nam. Since we have made an offer and Sihanouk has replied favorably, it would be an act of good faith to very quietly attempt to assess where these transmitters are in South Viet-Nam and at the same time obtain some assurances from the Generals in Saigon that Son Ngoc Thanh will be seriously limited in his activities and perhaps further that the South Viet-Namese Government disassociate itself from any of his actions.

At the same time we should be talking in Saigon about renewal of diplomatic relations and meeting Sihanouk’s conditions precedent since the present atmosphere is the closest thing to a détente between South Viet-Nam and Cambodia in quite some time.

A decision on whether or not we should react favorably to the reinstitution of a Geneva type conference should be made after we have tried to solve the Khmer Serei, Son Ngoc Thanh, and Cambodia and South Viet-Nam diplomatic relations problems. AID negotiations can plod ahead but should try not to rock the boat by avoiding “conflict” issues as much as possible.

Cliff
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cambodia, Vol. I. Secret.↩
  2. Document 124.↩