123. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State0

435. Dept for Harriman, Hilsman, White House pass Bundy. Bangkok for Ambassador. Saigon for Ambassador. From Forrestal.

Strongly urge we make immediate and intense effort locate and suppress KS radio and political activities Son Ngoc Thanh. Believe GVN willing cooperate, but we must make absolutely clear that this is our policy and in interest SVN and free world. Generals Kim and Don specifically asked Trueheart and myself that US make its position clear this point.

If cessation of jamming by RKG required in order locate transmitter, believe they will cooperate, but there must be very close coordination between Embassies Saigon and Phnom Penh in order avoid misunderstandings and failure of effort which could be dangerous. Would be ideal if radio could be located by other intelligence.

RKG going through extremely emotional and tense period brought about by accumulation of irritants. Trend must be reversed very soon to avoid unforeseeable consequences. Sihanouk’s ill-advised request for termination US aid is bound produce additional friction as implementing negotiations continue. Therefore it is essential that US begin immediately a series of actions designed provide continuing reminder our basic good will. Ambassador strongly concurs.

First and, I hope, easiest step is real effort improve relations SVN.

Second step is serious and essentially favorable consideration Sihanouk conference proposal. Realize many mechanical traps exist but I am impressed with essential political realism underlying Sihanouk’s theatrical demand. He did not emphasize guarantees this time, merely recognition of Cambodian neutrality and placed his hopes on an effective ICC which would have complete support his government unlike ICC in Laos. He recognized need firmly to exclude extraneous questions such as SVN before meeting and assured us of no further Cambodian polemics. We should answer his proposal favorably and soon.

In meantime aid cessation will hurt. Do not believe Sihanouk will give us reasonable opening to resume in near future on any but unacceptable terms. Therefore important chivvy French into some new gesture in economic and military field. Eventually and perhaps before long we may be able come back with much reduced program.

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But during period of withdrawal there will be grave dangers of misunderstanding compounded by our own problems with Congress and US opinion. Some of these have already started.

In short all is not lost here but matters have slipped to edge of precipice.

Sprouse
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB-S.VIET. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 11:36 p.m. and repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. Passed to the White House at 12:20 a.m. on December 1.