87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo1
127. For Charge from Secretary. Deptel 100.2 I have become increasingly concerned at possibility Gizenga could emerge as Prime Minister in view of fact that, in absence of Tshombe’s Conakat parliamentarians, the votes Léopoldville moderates may count as certain are very close to those of Gizenga, leaving control to fence sitters. Unless Kasavubu in next day or two appoints strong moderate formateur like Adoula or unless signs favorable to government controlled by moderates become considerably more clear in immediate future, believe you should urge Kasavubu to ask parliament to turn to matters other than new government while he calls meeting factional leaders for purpose attempt attain true national unity.
Fully appreciate fact that, pursuant instructions dating back over one month (Deptels 2357 and 2374),3 you have done your best persuade Kasavubu of importance he and associates agree on strong formateur and cabinet slate before meeting parliament. Also understand narrow limitations our influence on situation and possibility Congolese method sort out new government may be palaver presently on course. However, stakes so large, for reasons spelled out below, I wish you resort to delaying tactics along foregoing lines too soon rather than too late.
Kasavubu in his call for such a meeting of leaders should refer to the continued absence of Gizenga, Katangan Conakats, and other absentees. Kasavubu should stress his role as builder of national unity which would have great appeal both in Congo and in rest of Africa. You might also suggest he consider in addition calling for an African solution by seeking the advice and assistance of the Monrovia powers or in alternative asking for return of UN Conciliation Commission. In view Belgian fears of a parliamentary meeting without Conakats, you might wish enlist the aid of selected Belgian advisers in Léopoldville to persuade Kasavubu to call such a meeting of Congo leaders. You may have other suggestions along these lines, which we would welcome. Consultation with British and French Ambassadors would be desirable.
Any dilatory tactics adopted should, if possible, avoid those which would place Léopoldville moderates in position of appearing to oppose [Page 173] will of parliament; otherwise they run risk of becoming discredited in the eyes of the Afro-Asian nations. This would probably result in worsening UN–GOC relations and return to situation where it would be difficult to stabilize the Congo. In discussing reasons Gizenga-led government would be undesirable, you should stress following line. Gizenga would probably prove as disruptive an influence in Congo as Lumumba because he does not have the support of majority of the tribally divided Congolese. Congolese army around Léopoldville would probably attempt coup against a Gizenga-led government and Abako would be likely revive its dreams of independent Lower Congo Republic, joining Katanga and South Kasai in secession. On other hand, Gizenga as parliamentary-confirmed Prime Minister would have support of large majority of nations and UN would be under pressure recognize him thus placing US in extremely difficult position. A coup and inter factional fighting might involve direct clash with UNOC forces.
Your latest estimate of possibilities Gizenga-controlled government emerging in near future and report of your efforts persuade Kasavubu appoint Adoula formateur requested soonest.
For London and Paris: You should approach Foreign Ministries immediately informing them of foregoing instruction Léopoldville expressing hope, if such tactics considered necessary avoid establishment Gizenga government, they will join in supporting them. Brussels and USUN being instructed separately.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2661. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Vance, cleared by Buffum and in draft by Fredericks and Blue, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to London and Paris and repeated to Brussels and USUN.↩
- Document 85.↩
- Telegram 2357 is printed as Document 77. Telegram 2374, June 29, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–2961)↩