Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, June 27, 1961, 8:58 p.m.

2357. A. Léopoldville’s 2550, rptd Brussels 1037, USUN 1020, Elisabethville 375.²B. USUN’s 3392, rptd Léopoldville 359, Elisabethville 21, Brussels 144, London 89, Paris 128.³

Press reports Tshombe speech Elisabethville do not appear augur well for South Katanga participation parliament and apart from numerical vote value, inability Léopoldville leaders secure Tshombe support may have bandwagon effect favoring Gizengists. Additional views all addressees will be welcome, however unless you perceive objections following actions should be taken now:

Leopoldville: Appears essential strong, generally acceptable formateur be appointed soonest. If in your view the man is Adoula, you should approach Kasavubu, Mobutu and other appropriate leaders urgently this basis. Mobutu would appear one of few Léopoldville leaders in whom Tshombe places degree confidence. You should suggest he obtain Tshombe agreement postpone constitutional issue until government formed so that neither Tshombe nor Léopoldville would have to yield at present. View fact Tshombe has alienated Consulate Elisabethville, we also wonder in what form US could make approach to Tshombe directly, or with help other Western power, in attempt convince him his interest lies in support of moderate Léopoldville front. Your views solicited this point, particularly whether Scott or Charpentier⁴ might usefully undertake such an approach.

Brussels: Welcome your approaches GOB and Societe Generale on Katanga problem,⁵ and hope Muller able exert effective pressure on those Katanga Belgians who still urge Tshombe along path separatism.⁶ You should urge Spaak give Muller maximum powers bring full weight GOB to bear on Belgians whose conduct and advice contrary to direction USG and GOB want see taken by Katanga and suggest as well that Muller be instructed make strong approach Tshombe elicit his cooperation Léopoldville. You should also informally inquire of Rothschild ⁷ or Van den Bosch if Longerstaey views expressed reftel A⁸ represent Belgian party line, observing they somewhat at variance Belgian views expressed to Embassy Brussels and Department.

Elisabethville: Unless you consider possible results warrant, you should not approach Tshombe, however you should suggest to O’Brien ⁹ and UK and French colleagues they attempt convince Tshombe that if he does not support Léopoldville moderates at this point, may well find central government dominated by Gizengists which would only exacerbate instability in Congo about which Tshombe has long complained. Would also increase isolation Tshombe and pressure on him since UN and whatever GOC eventually formed will not tolerate separate Katanga and if Tshombe plans renege completely on Léopoldville agreement, demonstration such bad faith will cost him dearly in international standing. We believe useful suggest to him that in interests political moderation Congo he should send parliamentarians to Léopoldville now and reserve constitutional question Katanga relationship to Congo for discussion at later date when can be undertaken without complication presently posed by Gizenga faction.

Paris and London: You should approach appropriate officials along above lines with suggestion they instruct representatives Elisabethville appropriately.

USUN: You should approach SYG urgently, express our gratification he working along lines indicated first para reftel B, and suggest, since presence Katanga reps parliament may be essential to goal we both seek, he instruct O’Brien, Nwokedi or both make strong approach Tshombe on above lines.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–2661. Secret. Drafted by Woodruff, cleared in draft by Wallner and Officer in Charge of Swiss-Benelux Affairs Galen L. Stone, and approved by Director of the Office of Central African Affairs Sheldon B. Vance. Also sent to Brussels, Paris, London, USUN, and Elisabethville and repeated to Khartoum by pouch.
2. In telegram 2550 from Léopoldville, June 26, Charge G. McMurtrie Godley commented that it was still necessary to exert all efforts to effect a firm rapprochement between the Elisabethville and Léopoldville authorities. (Ibid.)
3. Document 75.
4. Ian Scott, British Ambassador to the Congo, and Pierre-Albert Charpentier, French Ambassador to the Congo. For Scott’s recollections of the Congo, see Tumbled House: The Congo at Independence.
5. Telegram 2123 from Brussels, June 20, reported a conversation between MacArthur and Spaak in which MacArthur urged speedy withdrawal from Katanga of a number of Belgian “advisers” and at least some Belgian “mercenaries.” (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–2061) Telegram 2080 from Brussels, June 12, reported that MacArthur had been urging the Societe Generale, Union Miniere, and other private companies with interests in the Congo to use their influence with the Katanga authorities to encourage rapprochement with Léopoldville. (Ibid., 770G.00/6–1261) Telegram 2152 from Brussels, June 23, reported a conversation along these lines between MacArthur and Herman Robiliart, President of Union Miniere and a director of the Societe Generale. (Ibid., 770G.00/6–2361)
6. Telegram 2123 from Brussels reported that Spaak was sending Charles Muller of the Belgian Foreign Ministry to Katanga to see that Spaak’s withdrawal policy was carried out. Muller was arrested by the Katangan authorities on July 7 and expelled from Katanga. Canup reported the incident in telegrams 34, 36, and 37 from Elisabethville, all July 8. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–861)
7. Robert Rothschild, Spaak’s Chef de Cabinet.456
8. Telegram 2550 reported that Belgian Charge Longerstaey had expressed distrust of the U.N. officials in Léopoldville.
9. Conor Cruise O’Brien of Ireland had recently become U.N. representative in Elisabethville.