86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1
187. Deptel 1002 received 0850 July 24. Due priority traffic decryption not completed until 1800 same day.
Deeply appreciate latitude Department giving me. Discussed reference telegram in detail with Linner last night. Linner endeavoring see Kasavubu this morning. Will follow line set forth Embassy telegram 1783 re Gizengistic plying US support. If appropriate will cite facts mentioned [Page 171] by Carlucci to Kamitatu as reasons4 and will also tell President UN as well as US concerned re position of Presidency if Gizenga comes to power. May, depending on atmosphere, express UN fears that Gizenga-led government will result in military coup. After this introduction will discuss possible ways thwarting Gizenga and on basis Deptel 725 will again broach question of summit provided Conakat Deputies accompany Tshombe or Munongo (Conakat Deputies obviously today less of asset than they were prior Munongo’s recent declarations).
Linner will be able spokesman for he deeply concerned re potential plot and thus we find UN policy and that of UN representative here identical but for possibly slightly different reasons.
Linner, myself and Embassy staff in complete agreement that it would be unwise for me at this moment to see Kasavubu. I have made strongest pitch possible, namely telling him we are convinced Presidency itself at stake in present crisis. Kasavubu presently busiest Congolese in country. I cannot see him discreetly. His national stature and independence of foreign pressures is one of our better assets. If for some unfathomable Bantu reasoning he himself considering naming Gizenga, there is nothing even our highest authorities could do to convince him otherwise. Notwithstanding foregoing I have repeated to Linner and Kasongo and word has been sent to Kondolo and Ndele6 that if there is anything I can do to help I am prepared to do so.
Have not mentioned it earlier but Kasavubu’s statement Sunday calling upon Conakat and others to come Léopoldville resulted from suggestion I made to Kasongo late Friday afternoon which I followed up with evening chat with Linner who supported it Saturday morning when he saw Kasavubu. This I am convinced is most effective way to operate for moment. Everything may of course change depending on Linner’s talk this morning with President and meeting I am having at 10:30 this morning with Kasongo. Mobutu is still remaining quiet.
Since dictating foregoing CAS has just returned from early morning meeting with Kondolo who states “the group” i.e., Nendaka,7 Ndele, Cardoso, Kasongo, himself continue to be convinced that Kasavubu will name Adoula as formateur.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2561. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.↩
- Repeated to USUN. Document 85.↩
- Telegram 178, July 24, reported Godley’s meeting that morning with Linner, Khiari, and Gardiner, in which Khiari told Godley the Stanleyville group was alleging that the United States would welcome Gizenga as Prime Minister. Godley told Linner and Khiari to indicate, when Linner saw Kasavubu and when Khiari returned to Lovanium, that this was not true and that the United States would find it difficult to collaborate closely with a Gizenga-led government. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–2461)↩
- Telegram 178 also reported that Carlucci had met with Kamitatu, who was returning to Stanleyville to try to bring Gizenga to Léopoldville. He had told Kamitatu that Gizenga’s detention and expulsion of Carlucci during the latter’s visit to Stanleyville in June, his recent arrest of American missionaries, and his recent reception of Soviet and Soviet bloc diplomats did not endear him to the U.S. public. He had pointed out the importance of U.S. public opinion and its influence on Congress.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 83.↩
- Albert Ndele, President of the National Bank of the Congo.↩
- Victor Nendaka, head of the Congolese Surete.↩