Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, November 19, 1959—10:05 p.m.

Gadel 131. Re Algeria (Delga 415 and 431).² Department fully agrees that it would be much better from US point of view if no GA debate was held on Algerian item. Main reason is that, even though parties principally interested appear be in moderate mood, it will be difficult for many avoid temptation afforded by public forum to make statements of contentious character and thereby upset presently favorable developments. Feasibility of avoiding GA debate will depend in large measure whether French and Algerians have succeeded in making contact either directly or indirectly.

Department believes DeGaulle proposals represent highly important substantive effort toward resolution Algerian problem. Moreover, prestige and leadership of DeGaulle are behind them. Such considerations have led to US statements made by President on September 17 and Secretary on September 24 [22] as follow up to DeGaulle proposals. Moreover, November 10 DeGaulle press statement is in our view another important step forward as is moderate reaction expressed by Bourguiba in his November 12 press statement.³ We believe every opportunity should be given for process set in motion by DeGaulle proposals to be carried forward and we do not see how GA debate can contribute to this end.

Department believes that if French and Algerians have arranged for contact prior GA consideration Algerian question US should exert its influence through consultations with Tunisians, Moroccans, UAR, and others as may be appropriate, to avoid GA debate on Algerian question. In this connection, you will have noted in Deptel 420 (rptd Paris 1820, Tunis 553, Rabat 715, Algiers 137),⁴ that Slim has expressed view that this would be possible “if official contacts already established between French and PAG before debate scheduled”.

More likely situation in which we are apt to find ourselves at time Algerian item comes up is that no official contacts have yet been established but that efforts by those concerned are continuing to this end. In these circumstances, Department would still strongly prefer that no GA debate take place, while recognizing that achievement this not too likely in light Afro-Asian views. In these circumstances, we believe it will be both desirable and necessary, in view of statements by President and Secretary Re DeGaulle proposals, to exert our influence so as to avoid substantive resolutions of character which our judgment would adversely affect future positive developments.

In light foregoing, Department requests that, unless you perceive serious objections, you see Berard and make following points on strictly confidential basis:

1. US agrees in principle that it would be desirable if GA would decide not debate Algerian item. Whether this possible will depend in large measure on whether Algerians accept French offer of contacts. If such contact made, among other things, it would be strongest possible argument in favor avoidance UN debate on Algeria. In such circumstances, US would be prepared exert its influence in manner which we deem appropriate, including consultations with Tunisians, Moroccans, UAR and other selected Dels, to bring about desired result in GA.

2. We have already sought exert our influence in direction of no debate by expressing this view to Tunisians (Deptel 420). While we would be prepared express this view once again to them and to Moroccans and UAR in next few days if French desire, our best judgment is that such approaches by us would be more effective at such time as question of contacts is clarified and at time shortly prior to scheduled consideration of Algerian item. At this moment appears Algerian item will be considered last and therefore there are at least two weeks before question comes before Political Committee.

3. If by time Algerian item scheduled for debate Algerians have not accepted French offer of official contacts, we believe it is not likely in light of expected Afro-Asian views, that debate on Algerian item can Be avoided. While US would wish make final assessment in light of then prevailing situation, we would hope to be in position in those circumstances (provided efforts at making contact are continuing) to exert our influence so as to avoid substantive resolutions of character which in our judgment would adversely affect future positive developments.

4. Believe it important that US and France keep in close consultations on this matter. In this connection, essential that French not reveal our position to other delegations. US strongly believes that we should do this ourselves in circumstances we believe appropriate and in light of developing situation.

5. You requested inform UK of foregoing, informing French of our intention to do so on confidential basis.

FYI. In discussion with Berard, important avoid impression US pressuring French toward contacts with Algerian leaders, and particularly that US favors any specific formula or arrangement for contacts. This is especially important in that solution Algerian problem is primarily matter to be arranged between French and Algerians and because ball is now in Algerian court since De Gaulle press conference. Should confine comments this subject to simple observation of fact that effort call off debate more likely be successful if contacts already established than otherwise. When we have report of your conversation with Berard, we will wish consider what steps we should take with North Africans.⁵ End FYI.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–1359. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco on November 17; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Wilcox, Satterthwaite, Calhoun, and White; and approved and signed by Herter. Repeated to London, Paris, Tunis, Rabat, and Cairo.
2. Delga 415, November 13, reported that Algerians at the United Nations wanted the UAR Representative to speak first on Algeria, and that they had asked him and the Irish Representative to praise De Gaulle’s plan. (Ibid.) Delga 431, November 14, reported that Berard had asked the United States to help prevent a debate on Algeria. (Ibid., 751S.00/11–1459)
3. Regarding Eisenhower’s and Herter’s statements, see Document 299. For text of De Gaulle’s November 10 assessment of the Algerian situation and prospects for a ceasefire, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964 (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division), pp. 62–65. A summary of Bourguiba’s November 12 statement is in telegram 683 from Tunis, November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 772.11/11–1359)
4. Telegram 420, October 29, transmitted the substance of Slim’s October 28 conversation in the Department of State, during which he stated he would try to establish a moderate tone in the debate on Algeria. (Ibid., 751S.00/10–2259)
5. Delga 500, November 21, advised that Lodge objected to a conversation with Berard and recommended instead that he suggest to him that a debate on Algeria would be easier to avoid if contacts between France and Algeria were established. (Ibid., 751S.00/11–2159)