299. Editorial Note
On September 16, President De Gaulle gave a speech outlining French policy on Algeria. The address, which was televised in France and the French North Africa departments, proposed that Algeria’s inhabitants determine its future in an election held no more than 4 years after the region was pacified. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pages 1096–1099. At Secretary Herter’s Staff Meeting September 16, Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite “expressed the hope that the President would not make public comment too soon regarding De Gaulle’s statement.” When Herter noted a recommendation must be prepared for Eisenhower’s press conference the following day, Assistant Secretary Merchant suggested it be “no comment.” Satterthwaite agreed. (Record of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting; Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D75)
[Page 671]Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commented as follows at the September 17 National Security Council meeting:
“Mr. Dulles said President De Gaulle’s September 16 speech on Algeria was disliked both by the colons and by the FLN. The speech, which holds out the prospect of independence for Algeria after a four-year period of pacification, was as generous an offer as it was possible for De Gaulle to make while still retaining the support of public opinion in France. Mollet would support the De Gaulle propositions and Soustelle would probably do so. De Gaulle’s proposals, however, would be subject to attack by two sets of extremists, the Algerian rebels and the French colons.
“The President noted that De Gaulle, before making this speech, had held meetings on Algeria with the French military authorities and with representatives of the colons, and had also received assurances of Moslem support. De Gaulle did not want to deal with the FLN. Mr. Dulles believed that De Gaulle’s references to various alternatives for Algeria would be attacked by the FLN as amounting to a proposal for the partition of Algeria. The President remarked that the French had never admitted that the Sahara was a part of Algeria. Before the coming of the French, no Algerian national government had ever had authority over the whole of Algeria; subsequently no one except the FLN had exercised sovereignty over the Sahara. The President added that De Gaulle was hopeful that his Algerian proposals, which would also be the subject of a major French speech in the UN, would elicit US–UK support and provide an opportunity for UN ‘electioneering’ designed to dissuade Algeria from getting a resolution of censure against France passed by the UN. Mr. Dillon remarked that one of our more difficult problems was what to say about De Gaulle’s speech in press conferences. While we are sympathetic to the De Gaulle proposals, we cannot go so far publicly as to bless them in their entirety.” (Memorandum of discussion at the 419th Meeting of the National Security Council; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
When asked about De Gaulle’s proposals at his press conference later that morning, President Eisenhower made a statement that reads in part as follows:
“It is a far-reaching declaration, containing explicit promises of self-determination for the Algerian peoples and as such, completely in accord with our hopes to see proclaimed a just and liberal program for Algeria which we could support. I am greatly encouraged by General De Gaulle’s courageous and statesmanlike declaration. It is our hope that it will lead to an early peace. And I might add that it is a plan I think is worthy of General De Gaulle’s efforts.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, page 1100)
Two days later, Herter reported from the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York that the U.S. Delegation was receiving numerous queries about its position on General Assembly discussion of Algeria, and that Foreign Minister Couve de Murville was pressing for a public statement that the United States would vote with France [Page 672] on this item. Herter had demurred, stating Eisenhower’s comments represented the basic U.S. position. He was impressed, however, with arguments that an additional U.S. statement would “hearten those who are opposed to immoderate” General Assembly action and “might well temper otherwise more violent public reactions” from Algerian supporters. He therefore proposed issuing the following statement:
“In the light of President Eisenhower’s statement of September 17 on Algeria, the United States delegation to the present General Assembly of the United Nations naturally hopes that no action will be taken here which would prejudice the realization of a just and peaceful solution for Algeria such as is promised by General De Gaulle’s far-reaching declaration with its provision for self-determination by the Algerian people.”
Merchant, Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Wilcox, and Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Berding concurred. (Cahto 1, September 19; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9–1959) Herter included this statement in a September 22 luncheon address before the U.N. Correspondents’ Association in New York; see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pages 1100–1101.
That evening, Acting Representative at the United Nations Wads-worth reported that upon receiving advance copies of Herter’s statement, the African delegations had disliked the phrase “no action will be taken,” since it appeared to endorse De Gaulle’s comments completely. Several noted the omission of any reference to the FLN in De Gaulle’s statement and suggested Herter’s remarks sanctioned it. Most liked the reference to self-determination, but some felt its impact was diminished because it was mentioned after De Gaulle’s address. Guinean Representative Diallo noted the emerging African nations would examine the U.S. comments with great care, and would probably interpret them as endorsing France. Tunisian Representative Slim and Moroccan Representative Aboud feared the U.S. statement would harden Egyptian and other extremist opposition and thus make moderation more difficult for the North African states. The Arab delegations had no reaction. (Delga 38, September 22; Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/9–2259)