Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, November 23, 1959—8:43 p.m.

2190. Department is calling in Alphand with regard Debré’s remarks (paragraph five, Paris 2245)² concerning French fleet matter. Without over-dramatizing issue, Department (Kohler) is planning take following line:

1) Matter issuance visas to PGAR leaders has been exhaustively discussed with Debré before and also with Alphand by Secretary and others. We are aware French dissatisfaction this matter and that it is bilateral US-French problem to which there appears no ready solution as events over past several years have proven. We have given Debré exhaustive legal study on this problem and endeavored, we regret apparently unsuccessfully, to convince French of our bona fide reasons for believing, after considerable soul-searching at high level, need to issue these visas.

2) Fact UN Headquarters are in New York multiplies difficult decisions in visa matters. However, our visa policy must and does transcend these UN cases. In this case admission of Algerians is not linked with our position on Algerian item.

3) However we are disturbed Prime Minister has chosen to associate French cooperation in NATO with dissatisfaction at US action in issuing visas. French fleet matter affects not only US and France but also thirteen other countries. We remain profoundly attached to NATO as bulwark of Western security and as framework for maintenance of US forces in Europe. Therefore, French actions detrimental to NATO, as in case withdrawal their Mediterranean fleet, adversely affect all other members of alliance, including France in our view. Such action makes more difficult our not inconsiderable task of keeping our major units in Europe. French obviously aware our balance of payments and other related problems which represent new factor in our ability to keep our forces in Europe.

4) To link issuance of these visas to French cooperation in NATO appears to us irresponsible action unjustified in the circumstances, damaging to alliance as a whole and to Western security. These are views we hold deeply.

5) We have read deGaulle’s speech to Ecole Militaire on November 3³ which appears to outline French views on NATO. We regret of course see in this speech reflection General deGaulle’s stress on national nature French defense mission which is at variance with basic approach to NATO defense which is broadly accepted by all other NATO governments. This basic concept had, as stated above, provided framework for US forces in Europe. However, this divergence should not, in our interpretation, lead to linking purely bilateral problems such as visa question, with common defense problems such as withdrawal French fleet from NATO.

6) We also note that Debré discussed fleet issue in National Assembly on November 19 (which date is after French were informed there was good chance we would issue visas) and said motivation of fleet action connected with fundamental objectives of French national defense mission.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.13/11–2159. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McBride; cleared by Wallner, Kohler, Calhoun, Fessenden, and in substance with Porter; and approved and signed by Herter. Repeated to USUN.
2. Telegram 2245, November 21, reported Debré’s protest regarding a U.S. decision to issue visas to three PGAR members wishing to attend the U.N. debate on Algeria as members of the Tunisian Delegation. Paragraph 5 noted that Debré had stated this decision made it necessary for France to operate its Mediterranean Fleet independent of NATO. (Ibid.)
3. A copy of this speech is attached to a December 1 memorandum from Herter to Eisenhower. (Ibid., 751.11/12–159)
4. Telegram 2215 to Paris, November 24, reported on Kohler’s conversation with Alphand, which proceeded along the lines outlined in this telegram. (Ibid., 751.13/11–2459) Herter stated the U.S. position on visas for FLN members at a November 24 press conference; for text of his statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, p. 1102.