Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

261. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador Kamel’s Residence, Washington, August 15, 1960¹

Washington, August 15, 1960

SUBJECT

• Luncheon with UAR Ambassador at Residence

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Mostafa Kamel, UAR Ambassador
• Mr. Salah El-Abd, UAR Counselor
• G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Luncheon today with the UAR Ambassador and Mr. El-Abd was more tiring than any of the previous sessions I have had with him. The Ambassador did not look particularly well. El-Abd’s contribution to our talk, which lasted 90 minutes, was exclusively that of lighting cigarettes. The Ambassador evidently planned to give me a going over and hardly had I sat down when he began what he probably considered a suave diplomatic attack (I got the impression that he was performing to a certain extent for the benefit of El-Abd). Because our talk ranged widely, I will not attempt to give a consecutive account but deal with topics.

PL 480 Wheat

The Ambassador said he had already expressed his thanks to the Department but he wished to do so again in connection with the PL 480 wheat. He appreciated all the Department had done to assist him in this project.

Press

The Ambassador embarked on his favorite theme, i.e., diplomats and governments should ignore the press. Neither the US nor UAR should pay any attention to what the press of one country says about the other country.

I replied that it was the job of diplomats to deal with practical problems and the press was one of these problems. The Ambassador had had occasion to bring to the Department’s attention a number of articles and statements which he considered unflattering to the UAR. However, the Ambassador knew that in the US we have a free press, and the statements of which he complained could NOT be taken as the views of the USG. I said that the situation was somewhat different in the UAR since the passage of the press law; indeed the situation has been different for some time since a Minister of Guidance had been guiding the Egyptian press. I recalled that at the time of the Wafd Egypt had had a press with the broad spectrum running from left to right, and at that time everyone understood that when the press commented re the US the views were those of the publisher or editor. Under existing conditions in Egypt, however, I thought the Ambassador would understand that we naturally felt, when unpleasant statements regarding the US were made that there was a certain degree of government sanction behind their publication. The Ambassador asserted that the press law had resulted in an even greater freedom of expression being accorded the Egyptian press; he said that Nasser was frequently shocked with the things that appeared. I argued that under existing conditions there could be no ignoring that a certain degree of government control existed over the Egyptian press.

Iran

The Ambassador began in a portentous way to warn me against misconceptions which some of the junior members of my staff were supposed to have regarding developments in the Middle East. He said that the young men might mislead their seniors and in any case they should not “talk”. He implied that our reaction re UAR behavior toward the Shah was based on erroneous information.

I replied that I would be quite frank with him: We had been “disappointed” by the statements in the UAR press to the effect that the US instigated the alleged new action by the Shah of Iran.² We had been disappointed because we had informed a member of the UAR Embassy staff before such statements were made that the US knew nothing of the Shah’s statement and was in no way involved. (I was quite firm about this—he changed the subject.)

General Middle East Situation

Being somewhat tired of the Ambassador’s reiteration that everything is going well I remarked that “I was not at all sure” when he again insisted that things in the Middle East were going swimmingly. This remark seemed to give him pause, because he reverted to it on several occasions looking at El-Abd as he did so. He assured me that he felt great progress had been made in the past two years and that in the past six months progress had been accelerated. I said simply “in ‘shallah”.

Israel

The Ambassador proceeded to propound his theory that Israel is at the root of all Arab-US and UAR–US difficulties. He said Israel was felt to be a far greater menace by the Arabs than the US feels the USSR is to the US. Later in the conversation he compared Israel to Cuba under Castro. He emphasized to me the sensitivity felt in the UAR with regard to everything touching Israel—how the UAR felt it must “fight back” whenever things are published in the press of the US against Egypt and in favor of Israel.

I dealt with this one by saying that if American newspapers printed something which the UAR disliked, it was the privilege of the Ambassador to write a letter to the newspaper. This was the normal procedure used in the US. What we resented were the attacks upon the USG and on “Americans” launched in Cairo as a riposte to some casual article in the New York Times or the Washington Post. The USG was not responsible for the article, yet the USG and all Americans were made to suffer for it. I went on to say that there are thousands of newspapers in the US and occasionally things unpalatable to the UAR appear. They do not cause a sensation in the US; texts of such articles reach Cairo through wire or clipping services. It seemed to me that a good deal could be done in Cairo to improve US–UAR relations right at the desks of the editors, who might, in logic, scrap or play down the wire service reports of articles published in obscure American newspapers. Articles which passed unnoticed in the US, should not be allowed to cause a sensation in Egypt. However, there were instances when stories we had never heard of were played up in the Cairo press apparently for the purpose of being used for attack in the next day’s editions. (Neither the Ambassador nor El-Abd denied that this was the case.)

With regard to the all-pervading nature of Israel in the Ambassador’s exposition, I told the Ambassador that if Israel really was the “key” of Egyptian policy this might make things easier for the US. We could take for granted that the UAR would always react adversely to matters concerning Israel. However, it seemed to me that while Israel looms large in the calculation of the UAR, Israel is by no means the only motivation of the UAR’s foreign policy. Problems arise in the United Nations and other forums which had nothing to do with Israel. In a number of instances “including even our own hemisphere” the UAR embarked upon lines of policy wholly different from those of the US. El-Abd asked me to cite instances: I told him that I preferred to keep the conversation general. I had not intended to do more than have a pleasant luncheon with the Ambassador. I spoke only because the Ambassador introduced the subject of the impact of the press on US–UAR relations.

Arms

No doubt the Ambassador was sincere when he volunteered (as though it was the next item on his agenda) that he considered expenditures of armaments were a waste of money. However, he said that the UAR had to have arms in order to defend itself against Israel. The UAR would never attack Israel, but it was convinced that Israel would attack the UAR. Israel was already better armed than the UAR, consequently the UAR must seek arms. “You will not supply us with arms—we must go to the USSR”.

I reminded the Ambassador that in 1953–54 we had planned to assist the UAR with some of its spare parts requirements, but just before shipment there had been trouble along in Gaza which made it impossible for us to act. I said that the truth of the matter is that the Israelis feel about the UAR just as the Ambassador had said that the UAR felt about the Israelis: Israel states it will never attack the UAR but the UAR is certain to attack Israel and already has a military capability far in excess of that possessed by Israel. I said that I was afraid that this unhappy arms race was bound to continue. One way to solve the matter would be for the UAR to announce that it was prepared not to seek more arms if Israel would announce the same thing. I remarked that there was a great deal of discussion of “disarmament”: I thought the UAR and Israel could show the world a useful example if they would forego strengthening their armed forces, naturally under arrangements involving adequate inspection. The Ambassador and El-Abd appeared to take seriously this sally: they seemed doubtful Egypt would embark upon such an adventure in disarmament.

I volunteered to the two men that it was the Cairo and Damascus radios which contributed most to Israel’s military strength: wild statements made on both radios were of great service to Israel since they were taped and used in efforts by Israel to obtain more arms. I pointed out that the Israeli radio did not directly attack Israel’s Arab neighbors but the UAR attacks on Israel literally helped fill Israeli arsenals.

The Ambassador said that he thought the situation was “better” but he did not know what “those Syrians might have said”.

Refugees

When the Ambassador advised me strongly to “freeze” the situation with regard to Israel saying that this was the only way to make progress in US-Middle Eastern relations. I replied that there are certain dynamics which defy freezing. For example, I doubted that five years from now the American Congress would be prepared to appropriate any funds to keep the Arab refugees alive. This was a fact which would have to be faced. The Ambassador replied: “In five years, who knows?” He said that in that time it might be possible to “work out some kind of solution”.

Normalization

When the Ambassador went out of his way to give me a lecture about going slow, and having remarked to me that “Rome was not built in a day”, I added that I thought the US had amply demonstrated its patience and its willingness to take positive steps towards the normalization of US–UAR relations. I pointed to the recent PL 480 wheat deal and the fact that we had invited three Egyptian Ministers to come here in the near future. I said these were positive acts and that these were the kind of things I had in mind when I testified before the Congress that “progress had been made in the normalization of our relations with the UAR”.³ It would not be long before I would again have to appear. I could tell the Congress the positive steps which the US has taken during the past 12 months to improve our relations with the UAR. My position would be stronger, however, if I could cite a similar list of positive steps taken by the UAR in favor of the US. One such step was the recent offer of two scholarships which we appreciated.

The Ambassador said quickly that Ghalib of the Foreign Office had “told one of your people” at the time of the Summit collapse that the UAR did not wish to see the USSR dominate the world situation. I told the Ambassador that I did not recall the statement, but it was made privately. If President Nasser said something of the same kind publicly this would have a much greater impact. I said that, given the disposition to do so, I was sure the UAR could find many opportunities in which without violating cherished principles it could take a more forthright position toward the US.

Access

The Ambassador at another point claimed that he was working night and day to make Cairo understand that the American press did not express USG policy: however, in this connection he needed the help of the American Embassy in Cairo who should “see people and explain”. It is a big job and the Embassy should help him in his “pro-American” efforts.

I suggested delicately that I was sometimes not sure that the problem was a failure in “understanding” regarding the character of the American press. There were instances when it seemed to me that misunderstandings might have been deliberate on the part of the journalists in Cairo for obscure reasons.

I said that I could assure him that his stalwart efforts were being seconded by the American Embassy in Cairo which, I was sure, lost no opportunity to work along the same lines. However, the situation in Cairo and the situation in Washington were not exactly the same. Here we were having one of our series of friendly luncheons. He and the personnel of his Embassy know that every hour and every day or night they were most welcome in the Department to discuss any subject. I could recall a time during my own service in Cairo when we of the Embassy used to do business not only on the official premises but also at cocktail parties in American homes which would be attended on all levels of the Egyptian officialdom. I remembered showing our telegrams to interested individuals in the Egyptian Foreign Office in my own house as part of the exchanges normal between friendly states. I understood that the situation in Cairo had “somewhat altered” since I left in 1955; it appeared that he and his Embassy enjoy in Washington a greater degree of access than is customary in Cairo these days.

Final note

Upon departure the Ambassador accompanied me all the way to the car during which time I thanked him for the luncheon. We agreed to lunch again, and next time he would be my guest. El-Abd hovered in the background.

When he reports to Cairo I do not know how the Ambassador will handle my refusal to play “Pollyanna” with him. However he reports, I doubt that it will have much effect. If he reports accurately he could sum up our talk in a few sentences: “The attitude of the State Department continues to be friendly and cooperative with me but I have detected a slight lowering of the temperature which probably stems in part from our asserting that the US instigated Iran–Israel recognition affair. Moreover it appears to me that having done a good deal for the UAR lately along the lines of improving relations (aid, etc.) the US is wondering what we are going to do in return. Jones didn’t say so but he implied it was a two-way street”.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 62 D 435, Cairo 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. A briefing memorandum for the conversation, August 12, is ibid., Central Files, 601.86B11/8–1260. On August 20, Jones sent a copy of the memorandum of conversation to Reinhardt.
2. Reference is to the Shah’s announcement on July 14 recognizing Israel.
3. Jones’ testimony has not been identified further.