260. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Meyer) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hart)1
SUBJECT
- Reasons For Nasser’s July 9 Criticism of the United States
Cairo Embtel 152 (attached)2 sets forth three major reasons which in the opinion of the Embassy probably account for the generally pro-Soviet and anti-US attitude which President Nasser and the UAR regime have adopted publicly during the past few months. We are in full agreement that the two most significant reasons for the current UAR attitude are: (a) the UAR desire to acquire MIG–19s; and (b) the general worsening in UAR attitudes toward the US resulting from the Ben-Gurion visit, the “Cleopatra” case, the “Douglas–Hays amendment” and statements regarded as pro-Israel by public figures in this country. It occurs to us that the following factors may also have influenced the current UAR attitude:
- 1.
- The worsening economic situation in the Syrian Region and rumors of popular criticism of the military in the Egyptian Region may be causing the regime more concern than is apparent. In this situation, it might appear desirable from the regime’s standpoint to resort increasingly to anti-Western propaganda as a means of regenerating popular support.
- 2.
- Anti-US elements in Nasser’s entourage may still be seeking, by propagating misleading reports such as the alleged flour contamination case, to set Nasser’s foot even more firmly on the path of UAR-Soviet cooperation.
- 3.
- The U–2 incident, President Eisenhower’s inability to visit Japan, and other recent US reversals may also have contributed to the hardened line in UAR propaganda, since the Arabs love to be on the winning side.
While Nasser is undeniably irritated at continuing Jordanian propaganda attacks, we are not inclined to regard this as an important contributing factor to the recent anti-US trend in UAR pronouncements. However, the recent exploitation by the Jordanian authorities of an Iraqi Air Force defector, earlier believed to have had contacts with UAR Intelligence in the Syrian region, must have created some doubts in Nasser’s mind about the security and efficiency of his own intelligence apparatus. This uncertainty might be particularly marked in association with the considerations noted in numbered paragraph one above.
In sum, we believe the current atmosphere in the UAR and in UAR relations with some of its neighbors has probably been a factor in the recent increase in anti-US propaganda, as well as the UAR desire for supersonic jets and desire to react to recent developments in this country.