262. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones) to the Ambassador in the United Arab Republic (Reinhardt)1
Dear Freddie: I believe you should be filled in on our deliberations of last week concerning a possible visit to this country by President Nasser. The matter came up when Secretary Benson suggested to the President, as a result of Benson’s talks with the UAR Minister of Agriculture, that Nasser would like to come to the United States. Mr. Benson endorsed the idea of issuing an invitation.
In our reply to the President’s memorandum on the subject2 we said we could not recommend a visit now because of the strongly hostile reaction to be expected from elements in Congress and from pro-Israel sympathizers and because the current atmosphere of US–UAR relations was not propitious. We said, however, that we [Page 597] would keep the matter under continuing review in case changed circumstances later on might enhance possibilities for benefit to the United States from a visit by Nasser to this country.
On the basis of the President’s memorandum as well as remarks made to me by a member of the White House staff who had discussed the matter with Secretary Benson, we concluded that Marci had not meant to convey a request from Nasser for an invitation and that consequently no reply was required for Marci to carry back to Nasser.
Before sending our comments to the White House, we gave the matter a very searching review and weighed most carefully the pros and cons. But with the political campaign now in full swing and problems of Near Eastern affairs having attracted some attention a Nasser visit just seemed too impracticable. There are other problems. Recalling King Saud’s experience in 1957,3 we wondered if Nasser might not in the same way be refused a welcome in New York City. Elsewhere there might be a constant security problem in protecting him from hostile gestures of some of our more pro-Israel citizens. We considered seriously seeking your views before advising the President but finally decided not to since, however strongly you might feel in favor of a visit, the domestic arguments against it were too overwhelming.
We recognize the considerable possibilities for making some impression on Nasser’s attitudes by asking him to this country and the overall favorable impact of a visit on US–UAR relations. I think we probably would be ill-advised, however, to take on at any time a full-fledged, 30-day state visit. Given the feelings towards Nasser of significant elements of our population, such a prolonged encounter would run serious risk of going sour at some point, leaving us with a net loss instead of a gain.
There might come a time when Nasser planned travels to other parts of the world and when we might consider whether or not a brief detour through the US would be desirable. For example, were he to travel to the Far East he might return to Cairo via a week or ten day stopover in the United States. Such a short tour could be much more easily managed and would have a much better chance of success, providing, of course, general circumstances of US–UAR relations were favorable. They are, of course, rendered less favorable than ever right now as the result of the latest events in Jordan.
[Page 598]As Norb Anschuetz will tell you, we discussed this matter at some length with him and I think we got a good feeling of the Embassy’s viewpoint from his comments.
With best regards,
Yours ever,
- Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 62 D 435, Cairo 1960. Confidential; Official–Informal. Drafted by Thacher.↩
- Copies of the President’s memorandum, August 22, and Dillon’s reply, August 25, are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series.↩
- Regarding King Saud’s visit to the United States in February 1957, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XVII, pp. 49 ff.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩