Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

164. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

CG–136

Washington, August 13, 1960—6:23 p.m.

Following receipt Ankara Embtel 124 of July 20² reporting that Turks declined participate approach to Palestine refugee problem suggested in Depcirtel 1602,³ Dept has once again carefully considered alternative candidates who might undertake reconnaissance mission instead of Turk. This review concluded that any non-PCC representative such as UN Secretariat official or neutral (e.g. Scandinavian, Indian or Yugoslav) only likely to propose some unsatisfactory and impractical course of action such as a gigantic Near East development program or simply endless continuation of UNRWA.

Review reaffirmed conclusion new approach should be made and should be carried out within framework of PCC, thus permitting US Government which has largest financial stake to maintain some measure of control. Of PCC membership, French are automatically disqualified since they do not have diplomatic relations with a number of the Arab states directly concerned. They are regarded by Arabs as Israel sympathizers and GOF has indicated they not anxious have PCC activity in area. With respect to US, we convinced Arabs would place “Made in Israel” label on any US initiative. Furthermore, it is our view that UNPCC facade which is clearly advantageous if any success is to be achieved, would be obscured if US Government were to undertake reconnaissance mission.

Thus our deliberations point again to wisdom of having Turks undertake the proposed sounding mission. We doubt that quiet reconnaissance mission by Turk, such as Kural, acting as representative of PCC (not GOT) would produce “very bad effect” predicted by Sarper in Ankara’s Embtel 124. Moreover, we believe it is incorrect to assume that reaction of Arabs or Israelis or both is bound to be sharply adverse. In our view there exists reasonably good chance that both sides if given opportunity make their views known to PCC may see merit in so doing and in restudying problem.

Accordingly, Dept believes we should not accept first “no” as Turk answer. Unless you see strong reason to contrary, Dept suggests you speak to Sarper and perhaps even to Gursel along following lines:

1. Within next year or two Palestine refugee problem due to reach critical stage. Despite great US sympathy and Dept’s best efforts to persuade Congress to continue to provide funds for UNRWA, prospects quite clearly are that Congress will not provide the $20 to $25 million necessary to continue Arab refugee program (USG contribution is 70% of UNRWA’s total budget). We foresee serious consequences not only in terms of curtailment of UNRWA’s operations but inevitably in terms of stability in Near East area. We believe GOT will share our view that such instability in Near East should be avoided.

2. It is our view that Turk as PCC rather than GOT representative would not impair the attainment of the desirable GOT objective of improving its position in Arab countries as well as Israel. In our view the raising of Alexandretta issue by Nasser’s National Union was UAR domestic political maneuver designed by authors to cheer up unhappy Syrians but quite obviously without serious intent. We think firm Turk response has again committed this subject to its proper pages of past history.

3. We believe Turks are in unique position to make vital contribution toward solving Palestine refugee problem. As one of three members of PCC, Turks can parry any unfavorable reaction by describing this approach as of PCC not Turk origin. As stalwart and mature member of Middle East family of nations, holding respect of Arabs as well as Israel, Turks in this instance have enviable opportunity to demonstrate their capability and effectiveness in exercising whole some constructive influence in cause of Middle East and world peace.

4. USG not seeking to pass the buck. We would readily have an American undertake reconnaissance mission. However, as Turks must know, Arabs would undoubtedly suspect we acting in Israel’s behalf particularly during an American election year. Thus mission would be doomed before it started. Third PCC member, the French, would be similarly suspected. We would be willing to entrust this important mission to some other neutral official except for likelihood based on past experience that such emissary would return with unacceptable recommendation that UNRWA be continued interminably or that some vast Mideast economic development program be launched. Latter concept unrealistic, particularly if USG to maintain its extensive support to its Free World allies.

5. While we have impression Kural would be suitable choice for such mission, GOT may have other qualified person or persons who, for reasons of its own, it might prefer use.

6. We would like to urge GOT reconsider this matter. If time is not propitious at moment we agreeable deferring initiation of mission for few weeks. We convinced this excellent opportunity for new GOT to display to world its ability to assume constructive responsibility in best tradition of Turkish statesmanship in Free World family of nations.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/8–1360. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Meyer; cleared with Jones, Ludlow, Wallner, H, U/MSC, GTI, and WE; and initialed by Herter. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Damascus, Athens, London, Paris, and USUN.
2. Document 159.
3. Document 154.
4. On September 9, the Embassy in Ankara reported that the Turks had again decided not to become involved in the PCC investigation. (Telegram 461; Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/9–960)