Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

154. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, June 22, 1960—8:25 p.m.

1602. Depcirtel 1288² Department has received highest level USG approval for moving forward with serious conscientious approach to Arab refugee problem along lines suggested reftel. Specifically, Department favors unpublicized reconnaissance mission to Near East capitals by reliable Turk representative, preferably Ambassador Kural. In informal discussion with Lewis Jones during latter’s Istanbul visit Kural indicated he would not be adverse undertaking exploratory mission for Palestine Conciliation Commission and later told Jones he had taken initiative and tried out idea on FonMin Zorlu who had reacted favorably. Department also been encouraged by responses from Cairo (Embtel 3161), Amman (Embtel 1828) and Tel Aviv (Embtel 976)³ which suggest that discreet sounding by reliable Turk official could prove fruitful.

Department currently thinking along following lines:

1. Embassy Ankara would approach most appropriate top-level GOT official, stress importance making valid effort toward solution Arab refugee problem, recall numerous previous occasions when Turkey’s unique status afforded effective means for dealing with one or another of Mideast’s knotty problems, and seek Turk cooperation along lines suggested this telegram; i.e. making available Ambassador Kural or equally qualified Turk for unpublicized sounding sortie on behalf PCC.

2. Should Turks be willing cooperate, next step would be secret high-level talks with French who with Turkey and US form PCC. Because of special relationships between US and France as well as France and Israel we believe it would be highly desirable for us to explain urgency we attach to new efforts to resolve refugee impasse and bespeak GOF support and discretion.

3. Next step would be to inform SYG on confidential basis of our general plan and then hold secret session of PCC at behest of Turk PCC chairman (or US member if Turks consider that preferable). Turk chairman would recall UNGA resolution 1456⁴ of last December which urged that PCC renew its efforts to solve refugee problem. He would note that valid effort to make progress on refugee problem is incumbent on PCC. He would then propose reconnaissance mission to Near East capitals by single emissary with simple terms of reference such as “to visit the parties concerned in behalf of PCC to ascertain in what way PCC might be more useful to them in resolving the problems with which PCC created to deal.” In supporting Turk proposal, USRep would point out that a qualified Turk would be most logical emissary, since France has no relations with certain of the countries concerned and a USG emissary might tend automatically be suspected by Arabs as partial to Israel’s interests. Although French might be reluctant to embark on this new PCC venture, Turk and US Reps should insist that some PCC action essential. USG Rep could note in this connection that significant PCC action is essential if continuing Congressional support for UNRWA is to be expected. Presumably PCC meeting would adjourn temporarily while Reps sought instructions from home governments.

4. Assuming French raised no major obstacles, Turk Rep would at subsequent PCC meeting propose Kural or equally qualified Turk for emissary role. Plans would be approved to have Kural come quietly to New York for consultations concerning PCC activities to date as well as details of approach emissary might most effectively make in various Near East capitals.

5. Department has in mind several suggestions for enhancing effectiveness of reconnaissance mission. Department has also considered detailed steps which might be taken should mission be successful. These thoughts would be shared with Turk emissary and also with French Rep to extent this may in each case be deemed desirable.

6. After thorough briefing and preparation in New York, Turk emissary would first visit Tel Aviv to discuss on most secret basis with Ben-Gurion general plan for optional repatriation, compensation or resettlement of Arab refugees. Chief selling point to Israelis would be PCC (and US) assurances that no mass influx of refugees or serious security threat need be feared.

7. Turk emissary would subsequently visit Cairo, Beirut, Amman and perhaps Baghdad. In secret discussions re proposed plan in those capitals, he would emphasize PCC determination to uphold principle of choice between repatriation and compensation. At same time he would note that realistically repatriation would have to be on a carefully phased basis.

8. In both Israel and Arab capitals emissary would remind leaders of UNGA Resolution 1456 of last December and note that PCC will be required to report what it has done. He would express his hope that PCC report would not be required to include indications of a lack of willingness on the part of any of the parties concerned to make serious and conscientious effort toward solving tragic refugee problem.

9. Hopefully emissary could accomplish mission without publicity. He would return to New York to report results of his soundings and to assist in charting next steps to be taken. While Department has thoughts as to what such steps might be, much would depend on results of reconnaissance mission.

Department cannot stress too strongly importance USG attaches to making most effective effort possible toward seeking solution Arab refugee problem. Peaceful resolution as early as possible of Arab-Israel dispute—of which refugee problem is a key element—is one of prime objectives US policy Middle East. Moreover, as addressee posts know there is growing sentiment in Congress demanding specific USG measures to press for solution Arab refugee problem. Leaders of Senate Foreign Relations Committee which over the years has staunchly supported UNRWA program and appropriations have expressed doubts that Committee will be able to continue such support.

Accordingly, unless Embassy Ankara sees over-riding objections it should in manner it deems most effective approach Turks with view to obtaining Turk agreement to proceed along lines suggested above. It is recognized that initial Turk reaction may be less than enthusiastic, particularly in view of recent Turkish internal developments. Nevertheless, Department earnestly hopes Embassy Ankara will be able persuade Turks (who hold Chairmanship) of urgency of PCC action and of demonstrable logic and feasibility characterizing approach suggested above. In outlining proposed approach to Turks importance of maintaining secrecy should be emphasized. Department would not wish specify timetable but hopes strongly that proposed mission could get under way with minimum delay and that initial PCC meeting could be convened within next month.

Except for Ankara as instructed above, this message should be treated by all recipients on Noforn basis.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/6–2260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Meyer on June 17; cleared in draft with Jones, Wilcox, Ludlow, GTI, H, and WE; and approved by Herter. Sent to Ankara and repeated to Cairo, Athens, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, London, Paris, USUN, Jidda, and Damascus. Two earlier drafts of this cable, June 10 and 14, are ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 62 D 435, Palestine Refugees, and Lot 72 D 294, PCC May–June 1960.
2. Circular telegram 1288, April 14, asked for reactions to the PCC making an approach on the refugee question. (Ibid., Central Files, 325.84/4–1460)
3. Telegrams 3161, 1828, and 976, April 19, 18, and 16, respectively. (Ibid., 325.84/4–1660 through 325.84/4–1960)
4. See footnote 4, Document 107.