Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

165. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, August 18, 1960¹

Washington, August 18, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Mordechai Gazit, Minister of Israel
• G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary, NEA

The Israeli Ambassador had me to lunch today. Surprisingly, he was accompanied by Mordechai Gazit, the new Minister. At a quiet table at the La Salle du Bois we talked for nearly an hour and a half.

By and large the conversation was urbane and general (the more I see of Av Harman the better I like him). They did not raise the telecommunications loan request to the DLF or ask anything in particular.

The following points emerged:

1. The Israeli Embassy had received only this morning a telegram from Cyprus indicating that Israel and Cyprus would exchange Ambassadors. This was a great source of satisfaction. I expressed pleasure at this development.

2. I pointed out that the needs of Africa south of the Sahara for assistance are so great that since our resources have limits, some of our regular clients “such as Iran and Pakistan” (by implication Israel) should realize that the limelight was shifting and that unless appropriations were increased they might have to do with less American assistance.

3. Ambassador Harman said that there was some internal agitation in Israel with regard to taxes. I asked: “Are your taxes being increased or being reduced?” They laughed and said that they were being increased and proceeded to tell me about the very high purchase taxes which operated in Israel which made the price of a Lark automobile approximately $10,000.

4. It was towards the end of the lunch that Harman told me on a “personal basis” that Mr. Ben Gurion had been “deeply disappointed” by the Secretary’s letter. The defense problem of Israel persisted and along with the defense problem the problem of paying for Israel’s defense. Harman implied that Ben Gurion had been “hurt” by the Department’s attitude. He said that he (Harman) tried to be as objective as possible and tried to see our point of view but Israel was in a very exposed position and had to bear the responsibility of preparing for an attack from Egypt. He said that no one could assert that Egypt would not attack Israel even though the USG believed such an attack would not occur.

I replied that what was really happening was an “arms race” between Israel and the UAR. I said that whoever had released to the newspapers in Paris that Israel would receive Mirage aircraft had done Israel a considerable disservice since this had accentuated Nasser’s desires to obtain MIG 19s. I said it was not true that Egypt already had MIG 19s as had been mentioned during the visit of Ben Gurion but in Nasser’s mind, since Israel was to get Mirages, MIG 19s must be obtained for the UAR. Even if the UAR got MIG 19s they would still be inferior to Mirages. I said that if Israel obtained more sophisticated weapons (meaning rockets) this would be only another rung on the ladder of the arms race. I said that “Nasser would sell his soul” to match Israel’s newly acquired power. This would mean Israel would have to top anything that Nasser got.

I told Harman that it was a fact in the situation that the success of the Israelis is the campaign in Sinai had been so crushing that this had left in the minds of the Arabs an inferiority complex “which you can stand on”. I said that the UAR, as I knew the thinking there, gave Israel now a tremendous capability far in excess of their own and this in part accounted for the various wild statements emanating from Egypt and indicative of an inferiority complex.

I said that if there were any logic in the world it seemed to me that it might be possible to “freeze the situation”: to have both the UAR and Israel volunteer to forego the acquiring of new weapons provided there was adequate international inspection. I was not so naive as to believe this would happen but it would have many advantages from the point of view of both parties being able to release funds for economic development which were otherwise wasted on arms.

Harman said that the concept of “freezing the situation” was a good one in broad terms. However, Nasser did not freeze the situation. His periodic speeches definitely thawed the situation and kept matters stirred up in a way which could not be ignored by the Israelis. I said that there was a considerable element of internal politics, I thought, in some of Nasser’s pronouncements and that they should not be taken too seriously.

The lunch broke up with my restating to my hosts the image used recently by an Arab diplomat. He said: “You ask us to be friends with Israel—to in fact receive them in our house. This is like asking a man to receive another man who had raped his daughter. The rape may have occurred some time ago. All the father wants to do is to forget the affair: to think that it never happened. Being forced to have contact with the raper reminds him of the old wrong”. I said that I thought there was something to this speaking in psychological terms. It showed dramatically at least part of the problem with which we had to deal.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/8–1860. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones.