Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

160. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 13, 1960—10 p.m.

3196. Re Deptel 2037.² Saw Diem half hour May 13.

I opened conversation by stating I had received instructions from my government to see him about reports we had recently received and regarding certain developments which had taken place re RKG–GVN relations. I added my government considered these reports and developments grave, serious and important. I then stated that I was asked state “the following” to him orally. Since I only once before had read from typewritten notes, I formalized this démarche by translating my full instructions in French and proceeded read them slowly to Diem (see Embassy despatch 396³ going forward 14th for English and French texts my notes).

1. Until I referred in second paragraph to corruption in Can Lao party Diem remained grave but calm. When party mentioned he immediately became very serious and was obviously agitated but nevertheless he heard me through to the end.

Still agitated he replied that he was deeply hurt that USG would believe such false rumors that Sam Sary had come to Vietnam and that GVN had given arms to Free Khmers in Thailand. He added that it was sincerely regrettable that such rumors should harm relations between GVN and the USG. He then asked me whether I believed these reports. I replied that I was certain my government would not give me instructions of this nature unless they had firm reasons to believe these reports were probably true. Therefore I had no reason to doubt their accuracy. Diem then speculated Free Khmer radio was probably run by Communists and asked me if I knew its location. I replied that of course possible radio run by Communists but I had seen texts of broadcasts and they did not resemble in any way Communists propaganda. I added I did not know exactly where radio was but reminded him that when I spoke of radio several months ago indications were that it was in Vietnam. I added that no matter where it is Sihanouk probably thinks it is in Vietnam. Diem did not pursue this matter further but reverted to the island question.

He reminded me that the GVN had sustained the US position at the Law of Sea Conference, for which I thanked him, and added that since GVN was hoping that agreement would be reached on a 6-mile limit, it felt it necessary before the conference to remind Cambodia about GVN claims to islands. I interrupted to state that unfortunately GVN did not indicate in any way in note or otherwise that this matter was being brought to attention RKG in connection with Geneva Conference and unfortunately note was so drafted as to give impression that GVN claimed lie de la Baie as well as others. I added that French administrative circular of January 31, 1939 turning over administrative control of the islands to Cambodia specifically stated that the sovereignty of these islands was in dispute. Therefore I stated Diem might suggest RKG bring the matter before an international tribunal or try work out equitable settlement with RKG. Diem did not reply except to state that the Cambodians had used force in occupying islands and strongly contended that they belong GVN. I then stated that Mau had assured me GVN had no claim to lie de la Baie and Trimble had so informed RKG, but nevertheless because of the wording of the GVN note RKG seemed to believe GVN still claims that island.

2. I then stated that since matter such as islands, Paris accords were in dispute and it was in interest of both countries to work out soonest effective border control arrangements, it would be helpful to all concerned if Diem should send a high-ranking delegation to have frank talks with RKG as he had told me he planned to do. Diem replied despite my inference he had abandoned idea and despite daily RKG press attacks on him personally and GVN he still thinking of sending high-powered delegation, but had not firmed up matter because of death of King and change-over of government. I stated since effective frontier control would be very much in his interest and might reduce Viet Cong capabilities by as much as 50 percent, I urged he make arrangements to send delegation soonest to discuss frankly outstanding questions. Diem reiterated he still thinking of doing this.

I then mentioned free world situation in SEA to say that only really troublesome problem is GVN and RTG relations with RKG. I added I convinced Sihanouk seemed to fear Communists and I was pleased to see from RKG–CPR communiqué and other reports I had received that apparently no arrangements derogatory to free world had been made during Chou visit.⁴ I underlined that it was Chou En-lai unilaterally who had promised support of 650 million Chinese to Cambodia. Diem did not comment. I then reminded him that on April first and May second RKG had mounted fairly large-scale operations against Diem’s Hoa Hao enemies. I reiterated if satisfactory frontier arrangements could be made it possible Sihanouk would cooperate in other areas along frontier which would be beneficial to both countries. Diem then said cynically GVN naturally should be more concerned about its relations with RKG than with United States. I agreed that it was very much in his interest to have as close and effective relations with Cambodia as possible and that my government had been urging him for long time to bring this about.

Diem somewhat irritably then reiterated Can Lao party’s principal job is to ferret out and stop corruption rather than engage in any corrupt practices. He said he had just had talk with Thuan on this subject and ordered him to pick up any rumor regarding alleged Can Lao corruption, run it down and punish guilty persons. He said he was incensed that we believe these rumors put out by disappointed merchants, opposition groups and Communists. I replied we had heard many rumors for long time but in past months we had heard many firm reports about alleged Can Lao party corruption. Whether they were true or not more and more people are believing them and this is causing discontentment in the country. Diem then reminded me of his “explanation” about the Hiep Hao sugar refinery which had to be given to new management because of the falsification of books and money drained off by previous management. He stated Can Lao had discovered this and put Can Lao man in place of former manager. I then asked if he had heard of apparently shady flour procurement commercial import case of last week (Toica 2143⁵). Diem immediately denied that Can Lao had anything to do with affair, although I had not mentioned Can Lao he then said this was the type of case we should have brought to his or someone’s attention before it got to point it did. I told him Gardiner had talked to Vice President and others and had sent two letters⁶ stating we had serious doubt re bona fides of US exporter, that despite our efforts to make it clear that we thought this was shady deal, GVN had issued license to Vietnamese importer whom Diem had just denounced as a nondescript small businessman. Diem then said Thuan had told him of rumors this importer Can Lao party member and apparently we believed it. I stated we too had heard this rumor but again stated whether this true or not many people believe he is connected with party. Diem replied it most unfortunate we persisted believing false reports about party which is working only for good of country. I suggested that if party itself is not involved in corrupt practices that maybe some members of party for their own benefit are using party name to extract bribes from businessmen and others. I [He] did not reply.

By then it was obvious that Diem did not care discuss matters further so I took my leave and again urged him to make serious and sincere effort to better relations with RKG. He at least smiled on parting.

Comments: Since Mau had told Diem subject talk he fairly grave from outset, but thing which apparently troubled him most was reiteration allegation re corrupt Can Lao re which his “Explanation” and defense were weak. Except for first incensed flat denial re Sam Sary and arms he did not deny these again. One positive result was he has not abandoned idea to send high-level delegation to Phnom Penh. He was obviously shaken as shown by his initial replies but calmed down later and obviously tried to convey impression he will do something about sending delegation, but did not make firm promise. I am convinced this démarche will do no real harm and in long run will do some good.

In view French Ambassador Lalouette’s suggestion re concerted action (Embtel 3133⁷), I plan tell British and French Ambassadors I saw Diem “this week” (they know I saw him 11th) and found another opportunity to urge him to endeavor have better relations with RKG and do more to meet population’s wishes (which I did somewhat in passing on 11th). Therefore I shall and Department believes we have done enough for moment but see no objection if they take separate steps talk to Diem along lines suggested. I will try avoid mentioning meeting thirteenth, so as not to get press play back through French leak to Sihanouk via Gorce.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/5–1360. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC PolAd, and Vientiane.
2. Document 157.
3. Dated May 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/5–1360)
4. Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Cambodia May 5–9. A summary of the joint statement issued on May 8 by Chou and Cambodian Prime Minister Pho Proeung appears in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, vol. XIII, 1961–1962 (London: Keesing’s Limited, 1961–1963), p. 18013.
5. Not found.
6. Neither found.
7. Telegram 3133, May 6, reported that French Ambassador Lalouette had suggested that he, Durbrow, and British Ambassador Hohler consider taking “independently” concerted steps to convince Diem to take action to rectify the growing popular discontent in Vietnam against his regime. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5–660)