Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

157. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, May 9, 1960—8:03 p.m.

2037. Your 3095.² Department and other agencies have given serious exhaustive thought recommendations contained reftel. While line of action you propose most convincing and has endorsement your … , Chief MAAG and Director USOM we are reluctant proceed immediately with that portion of your recommendations which deals with sanctions in field of military aid.

If this serious step taken, we must be willing follow through on any threat of aid curtailment if President Diem does not cooperate, thus putting our threat to test and weakening our over-all security posture in Asia. We are faced with difficult problems involving several of our Asian allies and although Diem realizing this may drive harder bargain with us, we must be extremely cautious lest we precipitate all our crises at once. In addition if we do reluctantly have to move in with sanctions as ultimate weapon to bring Diem to heel they must be of a magnitude which will be effective.

FYI: If telecommunications equipment and special forces training were to be excluded—and we agree they should be—from any sanction, remaining emergency equipment for which DOD is likely to request funds includes only six H–34 helicopters (value $2 million of which $1.2 million available from present program) and four small boats for canal patrol ($36,000 payable from present program). End FYI.

There are certain influences which should be given some time to find their mark, such as Diem’s reaction to events in Korea and stern warning given to Thuan when he was recently in Washington.³

In view of all that must be considered, following actions should be taken:

1. At your discretion you may present following views either directly to Diem under instructions or as preliminary step initially to Vice President and Thuan in order lend weight and seriousness to your subsequent talks with President.

2. In presentation “under instructions” you are authorized use line set forth your reftel action paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 eliminating that portion para 3 on aid sanctions.

3. You should emphasize in strongest manner possible that we mean business with respect Diem’s anti-RKG activities. US power and military backing is in final analysis all that guarantees security of area. Therefore without being accused of interfering in internal affairs of our friends we must have our wishes complied with in asking that irresponsible acts be stopped immediately which if continued would be a threat to area which only US can contain. All activities which you enumerate of an anti-Khmer character must cease immediately. You may also indicate that strong representations will be made to other allies who may be engaged in equally dangerous game.⁴

4. You may emphasize that Diem should need no added proof that US will continue to give Viet-Nam fullest backing in arresting Viet Cong activity and in maintaining Viet-Nam’s security, but should assistance which we are providing be misused for other purposes we will give serious consideration to backing our words with action. US Government cannot justify to Congress its requests to back heavy aid programs being used to bolster feuds with neighbors instead of being applied to curb major threat.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5–360. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood and Steeves, cleared with SEA, with Dillon in substance, with Knight of DOD/ISA by telephone, and approved by Parsons. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC for PolAd, and Vientiane.
2. Document 150.
3. See Documents 133 and 134.
4. Reference is to instructions in telegram 2933 to Bangkok, May 7, in which the Embassy in Bangkok was asked to make the following démarche: “suggest you take earliest opportunity in course conduct other business to mention to Sarit or Prapat our serious view of GVN provocations of Cambodia e.g. support Khmer dissidents, actions in gulf island dispute, etc. Without going into details and if you deem appropriate you may lend emphasis to your remarks by informing Thais we considering taking ‘strong actions’ to persuade GVN abandon its dangerous game. If Thais and GVN collaborating on Cambodia this approach would provide Thais with adequate notice that its partner in trouble with United States Government on this issue.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5–360)