159. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) to the Operations Coordinator (O’Connor)1
SUBJECT
- Viet-Nam: Material for OCB Lunch2
Situation
- 1.
Security
Since late 1959, the Viet Cong (Vietnamese communists) killed and kidnapped an average of about 100 to 200 persons a month, about double the average of the last three years. The Viet Cong are better organized and more numerous than previously and have attacked larger groups and targets. Most violence has occurred south of Saigon.
The GVN is gathering the rural population of troubled areas into large towns (agrovilles) for protection and is improving roads and airports in those areas. It is creating a 5,000-man commando unit mainly out of the regular army. However, Diem has not done enough to tighten the chain of command or to unify intelligence activities and too often bypasses his subordinates.
To assist the GVN to meet this new threat, the U.S. is supplying additional communications equipment, some small canal patrol boats and thirty (30) specialists in anti-guerrilla warfare training. DOD may also request authority to supply six H–34 helicopters. On the diplomatic front, Ambassador Durbrow and General Williams have spoken strongly to President Diem of the importance of tightening command and intelligence functions and of acting through his chain of command.
- 2.
Discontent
Latent resentment over highhandedness and corruption among government officials has mounted with the increase of subversion and of GVN moves to counter it. Resentment appears centralized in Saigon and is directed principally toward Diem’s brother Nhu. Opposition groups composed of respectable politicians (some former Cabinet members) recently made public charges of popular discontent with GVN actions. Some of this feeling is beginning to rub off on Diem himself. The U.S. press and Congress are beginning to show some awareness of and interest in the situation. Ambassador Durbrow and Mr. Parsons have recently let the GVN know of our awareness and concern; they have strongly urged remedial action. There is evidence that these approaches have had some effect.
- 3.
Cambodia
The GVN has continued to harass the Cambodians by pressing territorial claims and permitting anti-Cambodian dissident activity in Viet-Nam. Ambassador Durbrow has stressed with increasing emphasis that frontier cooperation is a prerequisite to pinning down the [Page 453] Viet Cong. The Ambassador has received instructions to tell Diem that U.S. assistance must not be diverted to anti-Cambodian activities and that in the absence of GVN compliance, we will have to consider backing our words with action.
Summary
Internal insecurity, popular discontent and quarrels with Cambodia are leading toward a serious situation in Viet-Nam which is not yet a crisis. At best it will take a long time to produce internal security, but this can never be achieved unless and until the GVN becomes more active in regaining popular confidence and more willing to settle its differences with Cambodia.
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 2. VN 1960—Operations Coordinating Board. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and Wood.↩
As indicated by the notes of the OCB meeting of May 11 by O’Connor, this memorandum provided the basis of a briefing of Gordon Gray by Hare:
“After the close of the OCB luncheon meeting, Mr. Hare spoke to Mr. Gordon Gray and gave him a fill-in on Viet-Nam in accordance with the memorandum which had been made available by Mr. Daniel V. Anderson of SEA. (Mr. Gray had expressed an interest in having the subject introduced at the OCB after the brief adversion to it in the NSC meeting on May 9, 1960.)” (Ibid., OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Preliminary Notes IV)
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