Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

161. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1960¹

Washington, May 13, 1960

SUBJECT

• Possible TDY to Viet-Nam for Brigadier General Lansdale

PARTICIPANTS

• Deputy Defense Secretary Douglas
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Knight
• Messrs. Steeves, Anderson and Wood

Mr. Douglas asked about General Williams’ attitude on the question of whether or not we should accede to President Diem’s request that General Lansdale be assigned to Saigon. He felt that if General Williams concurred, there would be no problem.²

Mr. Steeves indicated our concern about Diem pointing out that he needed to face the facts of a difficult situation and that if he were allowed to deal with someone else besides Ambassador Durbrow and General Williams, the situation might be further complicated.

Mr. Douglas gave it as his impression that Lansdale would be sure of avoiding complications.

Mr. Steeves asked what plans Defense had for General Lansdale.

Mr. Douglas replied that Defense had none and that this request had come from the Vietnamese to the State Department. He added that Ambassador Chuong, when he had called on Mr. Douglas on May 12, knew very little of President Diem’s thoughts on this matter. The Ambassador had said that Diem in 1954 had felt very much alone and that it had been important for him to be able to talk to Lansdale whom he trusted completely.

Mr. Steeves replied that anyone whom Diem wanted would in effect become his channel.

Mr. Douglas said that it would be much easier for Defense to keep him in Washington. He mentioned that President Eisenhower had expressed concern to Secretary Gates about the situation in Viet-Nam.³

Mr. Steeves pointed out that we were putting very heavy pressures on Diem and that if we acceded to his request to send someone to whom he could unburden himself, some of these necessary pressures would be diminished.

Mr. Douglas said that Diem might have more confidence in Lansdale’s advice and that we could be sure this advice would be in line with the Country Team’s view. Possibly Lansdale might seek to change the Country Team’s views before presenting them to Diem. Mr. Knight stressed the importance of our military stake in Viet-Nam which revolves largely around Diem who has to make good and whom we cannot antagonize. Mr. Douglas emphasized that General Lansdale had experience and that he was controllable.

Mr. Steeves indicated doubts on this latter point, and said that he had recently talked with several senior officers who had served in Saigon at the time Lansdale was there who felt it was extremely difficult for Lansdale to work on a team.

Mr. Douglas asked whether, if General Williams asked for Lansdale, the State Department would still oppose the suggestion. Mr. Steeves replied that we would unless Ambassador Durbrow approved. He added that if we had a clearer idea of what Lansdale was to do we would put the question to Ambassador Durbrow.

Messrs. Douglas and Knight suggested that he be sent for a limited period—say, 60 days—subject to instructions agreed on with the Department of State and that he would be under Ambassador Durbrow’s control in Viet-Nam.

Mr. Steeves said that we would insist that he follow the same line as the Country Team. He inquired whether CINCPAC had expressed any view.

Mr. Knight replied that CINCPAC had said he would support Ambassador Durbrow.

Mr. Steeves expressed the strong opinion that there was a risk that Lansdale’s presence would be liable to cause discord, and that there seemed no reason to agree to a suggestion which might create new problems in Viet-Nam where so many already existed.

Mr. Douglas pointed out that he was a good technician.

Mr. Anderson replied that a person as well known as Lansdale could not go to Viet-Nam as a simple technician.

It was agreed that State would send a message⁴ saying that the Vietnamese Ambassador had approached the Defense Department with Diem’s strong request that General Lansdale be assigned to Saigon without stating the period of time which President Diem had in mind, that DOD would be willing to make him available for 60 days if Ambassador Durbrow believed he would be helpful with existing problems, that he would be under Ambassador Durbrow’s supervision, and that his orders would be cleared with Ambassador Durbrow.

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 62 D 26, MC Defense. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood.

2. This matter was discussed at the Acting Secretary’s staff meeting on May 13. According to notes by Calhoun:

   “There was a lengthy discussion of Defense’s desire to send General Lansdale back to Vietnam and the problems that would result for our Ambassador in such an eventuality. There was a consensus that we should continue to oppose his assignment there.” (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings, Lot 63 D 75)

3. An expression of the President’s concern, not made exclusively to Gates, is in Document 156.

4. Reference to telegram 2069 to Saigon, May 13, which reads as follows:

   “Vietnamese Ambassador has approached DOD re Diem’s strong desire Brigadier General Edward Lansdale be sent to Saigon as Presidential adviser. Ambassador unable state how long Lansdale’s services desired. DOD willing make Lansdale available for 60 days TDY if you believe he could be helpful to you with present problems. If he should be sent to Saigon he would be under your direct control and his orders would be cleared with you.

   “In discussion with Steeves Under Secretary Defense emphasized DOD needed Lansdale in Washington in order make clear DOD not trying to separate him from Headquarters.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5811/4–2260)