Office of the Historian

158. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1

Saigon, May 9, 1960—6 p.m.

3152. Reference Embtel 3095 to Department, 426 CINCPAC, 382 Bangkok, 328 Phnom Penh.2 Ladejinsky called urgently ninth to discuss recent developments and to suggest possible courses action:

1.
Ladejinsky has seen President twice last week and reports Diem unrealistically optimistic and stubborn about recent developments. Diem blindly convinced that government gaining upper hand over Viet Cong and he is not at all perturbed by Tran Van Van opposition group petition (Embtel 30923) and will not receive group and is not perturbed about Korean developments which were due basically to Rhee’s senility. In course one conversation Diem spoke in somewhat bitter terms about American pressure trying “force him to give up Louisiana and Texas,” obviously referring to our strong reaction to GVN stand on Off-Shore Islands. Diem added he would not give up any territory no matter how much pressure from the US. Ladejinsky and Vo Van Hai, who was present, reminded President United States had not in any way ever suggested GVN give up any territory. On contrary we had suggested that island question be settled amicably. They added that we had suggested for some time that it was in interest of GVN, particularly because of dissidence in border area, that GVN make serious efforts have better relations with RKG. Ladejinsky and Hai pointed out that it would be much easier control Viet Cong if realistic border control arrangements worked out with RKG relations improved. Diem as usual said it most difficult if not impossible obtain RKG cooperation but Hai and Ladejinsky nevertheless urged him make effort.
2.
Ladejinsky reported Vice President Tho and Le Van Dong, Minister Agriculture, continue express deep concern Diem losing confidence of people and that he must take immediate steps turn tide. Both have hinted to Ladejinsky most effective step would be to break Ngo family monopoly and Tho suggested Can Lao should be dissolved.
3.
Ladejinsky (you might think he had been reading my mail) then suggested US should bring positive pressure on Diem to better relations with RKG and work out effective frontier control arrangements. According to Ladejinsky, Tho is of same opinion and urged [Page 451] Ladejinsky to suggest to me that we bring strong pressure on Diem to better relations with RKG. Tho still believes would be most worthwhile for him to visit Phnom Penh. Both feel that frontier arrangements can be worked out, effectiveness VC activities can be diminished 50 percent. I then told Ladejinsky we pleased to learn last few days that FARK on May second had carried out fairly large successful operation against rebel band in Cambodia which driven into Vietnam where apparently ARVN killed or captured many. Ladejinsky suggested that Diem could be induced use this incident to thank RKG for helping out against dissidents and use this as reason for suggesting fuller cooperation against rebels by both countries. I said I had heard GVN Foreign Office thinking of sending thanks (Embtel 31484).

Ladejinsky then stated as his “hunch” that if Diem could be brought to realize importance of better RKG relations and satisfactory cooperation established between the two, Diem would then take other steps to ameliorate situation in country. Ladejinsky could not explain why he felt this but seemed convinced it most worthwhile try. Ladejinsky suggested I get firm instructions to do this. I, of course, did not tell Ladejinsky I had suggested advisability using direct pressure to get Diem better RKG relations but promised to think it over and added great deal would depend upon results of Chou En-lai visit.

Durbrow
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5–960. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and CINCPAC PolAd.↩
  2. Document 150.↩
  3. See footnote 6, ibid.↩
  4. Dated May 9, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/5–960)↩