Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

150. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 3, 1960—6 p.m.

3095. As Department aware… Sam Sary has just returned to Vietnam although Phnom Penh’s …suggests Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh now Japan, and as reported by FBIS 28 April Free Khmer Radio went on air again 28th, 30th and May 1 (presumably with Vietnamese backing). Furthermore, based on talks I had Bangkok it appears quite certain GVN, probably Nhu, definitely backed and may have instigated RTG plan for raid by 100 “Free Khmers” into Cambodia at Pailin…and it seems quite certain GVN furnished 100 French weapons and grenades on special flight from Saigon March 18 for this raid. These actions coupled with March 9 note re Gulf Thailand islands, and despatch two PC’s and re-enforced Marine platoon in April as show of force against Cambodians despite assurances given me (Embassy telegram 2809²) GVN would not use force in connection with islands, are all matters of deep concern which in my estimation justify our taking positive action in effort force GVN desist from taking such irresponsible actions which in ordinary circumstances could cause further serious deterioration free world position SEA, but are particularly irresponsible in view Chou En-lai’s probable visit Phnom Penh³ near future which I mentioned to Mau in connection with despatch gunboats to islands.

Apart from these provocative external acts I have no reason believe Diem will take corrective action curtail or stop Can Lao party corrupt practices, although we do have some evidence Diem is endeavoring to curtail arbitrary actions by province officials which have been causing more and more internal dissatisfaction with Diem regime (Embassy despatches 345⁴ ⁵).

It seems crystal clear to me that all these unfavorable developments and actions are basically due to machinations of Diem’s brother Nhu and his henchmen. In this connection if reports we have received are true that Diem because of Nhu’s “explanations” does not believe reports he received from us and others, we must in his and our interests use somewhat drastic means to bring him to his senses.

We have tried unsuccessfully to open his eyes by various means such as frank talks about Dap Chuon affair, Free Khmer Radio, urging him send Tho delegation to Phnom Penh, warnings re Can Lao activities in connection with Cassia under-invoicing, telling him we have firm information about other corrupt Can Lao practice (which I also discussed in some detail with Nhu last July), making it clear we disapproved GVN actions re islands, telling him of firm reports on discontent among population, etc. Instead of paying attention to this friendly advice and concentrating all their efforts to solve the very serious basic problem facing GVN—increased Communist-terrorist acts—Diem and/or Nhu are on contrary jeopardizing their anti-Viet Cong efforts by provocative moves against Cambodia such as reviving Free Khmer Radio, etc.

Although so far we have no firm readings regarding Diem’s or other officials reaction to the recent events in Korea, few comments we have heard about these developments and USG reactions indicate these developments have given officials here serious food for thought and therefore a little shock treatment might be very salutary as well as appropriate at this time. Furthermore, Tran Van Van’s and Phan Khac Suu “opposition” press conference April 30 will give Diem further food for thought (Embassy telegram 3092⁶).

Since our previous efforts to persuade Diem to see the evils of his ways have been to little or no avail and brother Nhu seems to be riding even higher, I have given considerable thought about what positive and fairly drastic action we should take to make our efforts more effective. We have never heretofore put any teeth into our “persuasion” but in my estimation the time has come to do just that without any hesitation. We must take some positive action which will hurt enough but not vitally so that he and particularly Nhu know that we mean business. Our action must be sufficiently tied into his present troubles to give Diem real pause. After much reflection I strongly recommend that I be instructed to talk to Diem along following lines soonest:

1. We fully realize stepped-up Viet Cong guerrilla terrorist activities are serious problem which could become worse, and therefore prior to and during Thuan visit we have been endeavoring find ways and means to step up deliveries of and obtain additional equipment which would be helpful in present emergency.

2. We made this special effort to assist Diem despite the fact that we are convinced he not using present security resources effectively or taking all necessary steps to eliminate cause of grievances, stopping arbitrary actions by province officials, Can Lao corrupt practices, setting up effective central intelligence organization and operating through established chain of command, etc.

3. We assumed because of growing seriousness Viet Cong threat, GVN would concentrate all its efforts and energy to meet this challenge. We have learned, however, that instead they are continuing to connive in various ways to antagonize Cambodians instead of seeking to increase cooperation latter were giving on frontier control and in order to prevent it from going further to the left because of its growing fears of its neighbors. On contrary GVN diverting arms to Free Khmers and using naval vessels and marines in show of force against RKG rather than using these forces against VC. I would then tell Diem we have learned Sam Sary here and have information that GVN recently furnished arms to Free Khmers (our evidence from here and Bangkok and Bangkok apparently confirms this). I could reiterate although USG had desired to help in furnishing additional matériel to meet Viet Cong threat, it obvious that GVN is not only not using effectively resources now available meet threat, but is increasing the possibility of exacerbating threat by its provocative and hostile actions against RKG. I would then state that since GVN had been able to send arms to Free Khmers, at same time they asking us for more arms, had reopened Free Khmer Radio, and diverted military forces and matériel from use against VC to island dispute with RKG, etc., that USG has reconsidered its decision furnish them additional equipment discussed with Thuan. (In meantime considerable essential equipment such as walkie-talkies and other telecom equipment would have been delivered and special forces instructors will be here or on way and we should let special forces trainees come for civil guard.) I would add for the reason given procurement of all additional equipment for emergency had been stopped and would not be sent (Diem could not care less if we cut off some economic development aid). I should be instructed to add that unless we convinced GVN is making serious and sincere effort to settle basic outstanding problems with RKG, such as Paris financial accords, question of islands, stops Free Khmer Radio, disbands Free Khmer cadres, refuses to collaborate …in trying to overthrow RKG, and endeavors to make acceptable frontier control arrangements with RKG, extra equipment will not be forthcoming even in future. Instead we would revert to previously normal program MAP deliveries. I note that for other reasons, CINCPAC has recommended we hold back on furnishing additional C–47’s, L–19’s, etc. (CINCPAC s 181935Z April 1960 to OSD⁷) but we should hold up these whether or not “GVN taking action to improve utilization resources on hand” and other items such as helicopters, etc., mentioned CINCPAC’s message, to make this “club” effective.

While I realize that this is rather drastic suggestion I am firmly convinced that unless we prepared to stick by our guns and refuse to give extra help at this time Diem will not come to his senses, relations with Cambodia will become worse and the latter might well aggravate situation further by some stupid short-sighted deal with ChiComs. Although this will make it more difficult for GVN to beat back Viet Cong threat, I am firmly convinced they do have the resources to do so if they concentrate all their efforts on this serious matter rather than flailing around in all directions to build up various sorts of new security forces, ask for more military equipment, etc., and desist from aggravating their main problem by provocative acts against Sihanouk. I repeat that in view fact our other efforts have been of no avail we must take this calculated risk.

In this connection it essential we also bring strong pressure on RTG to desist in its efforts to overthrow Sihanouk.

This message concurred in by…Chief MAAG, Director USOM.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/5–360. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and CINCPAC PolAd.
2. Documentation on U.S. efforts to improve Vietnamese-Cambodian relations is scheduled for publication in a separate volume of Foreign Relations. Telegram 2809 from Saigon, March 30, contains a report of a conversation among Vietnamese Foreign Secretary Mau, Ambassador Durbrow, and Under Secretaries Hare and Henderson (who were visiting Saigon). During this discussion, the Americans extracted from Mau admissions that the Vietnamese note of March 9 to Cambodia claiming disputed islands in the Gulf of Thailand was merely in anticipation of the upcoming Law of the Sea Conference and that Vietnam would not use force to regain the islands. (Ibid., 751K.022/3–3060)
3. Documentation on American concern with and response to the trip to Cambodia by Chou En-lai and Marshal Chen Yi, May 5–9, is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations.
4. See footnote 5, Document 131.

5. In despatch 371 from Saigon, April 28, Durbrow summarized and sent a memorandum of conversation of a discussion with Thuan on April 21. The summary reads as follows:

   “I called on Mr. Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency of Viet-Nam, April 21 at his request. It was obvious that Thuan asked me to call particularly to receive my version of the conversation I had with Diem on April 6 regarding Can Lao Party activities (despatch 345 of April 13). Since I made no reference to this matter in the early part of the conversation, Thuan finally brought up the question himself. I gave him the essence of what I had told the President. Thuan listened most patiently, showed no offense and, as indicated in the attached memorandum of conversation, did not try to give ‘explanations’ as did Diem, except for his explanation of the Hiep Hao sugar refinery case.

   “I told Thuan that it would be helpful if some very dramatic means, such as the dismissal of important personages who had been involved in unsavory or illegal activities, were found to quash rumors of Can Lao activity.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/4–2860)

6. In telegram 3092, May 2, the Embassy reported on the press conference held by opposition leaders Tran Van Van and Phan Khac Suu at which they released “the Caravelle Manifesto” to the local press. (Ibid., 751K.00/5–260) The conference proceeded as anticipated in Document 142.
7. Not printed.